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HISTORY OF GREECE,
495—431 B.C.

The University Tutorial Series.

THE MAKING OF ATHENS:
A
HISTORY OF GREECE,
495—431 B.C.

BY
A. H. ALLCROFT, M.A., OXON.,
AUTHOR OF "THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME," "A LONGER HISTORY OF
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THE MAKING OF ATHENS:

A HISTORY OF GREECE, 495—431 B.C.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1. Recapitulatory: Relations of Asiatic Greeks with Persia: the Ionic Revolt—Reasons for Persian Aggressions: Greek Refugees at the Persian Court—§ 2. Organisation of Ionia by Artaphernes. the Tribute—Mardonius expels the Ionic Tyrants—Decline of Ionia—§ 3. Condition of Continental Greece. Feuds of Rival States—Internal Feuds—West in Hellas.—§ 4. Expedition of 492 B.C.—Disasters of Mardonius in Thriace—Lessons of the Expedition

§ 1. Of the multitudinous Greek settlements which had, before the eighth century ended, spread over the whole western sea-board of Asia Minor, the more wealthy and powerful had, in the early years of the sixth century, been brought into dependence upon the kingdom of Lydia. The Lydians made way for the Persians, and for forty years the Asiatic Greeks paid tribute to the Great King, provided vessels for his naval enterprises even against their own kinsmen of the Aegean Isles, and submitted to the rule of tyrants who studied to secure their authority by subservience to the Great King's wishes. In 501 B.C., however, the selfish blundering of Aristagoras of Miletus led him to provoke a general revolt. The populace expelled the tyrants and declared themselves free. But ill-prepared for any struggle, lacking a capable leader, impatient of united action, and concerned more to indulge party grudges than to resist the common enemy,

the revolted colonies were speedily brought back to their dependence on Persia (494 B.C.). The one success of which they boasted, and which they were not destined to forget, was the burning of Sardis (499 B.C.). In this they had been aided by a band of Eretrians and Athenians. The story said that Darius bade a slave remind him thrice daily of these marauders who had dared to invade his dominions, and to burn the capital of a satrapy. Seven years after the burning of Sardis, he found himself at leisure to deal with them.

Megabazus had long ago (502 B.C.) extended Persia's power over the whole sea-board of the northern Aegean as far as the kingdom of the Macedonian Amyntas and the frontiers of Thessaly. Other officers had been active in reducing the islands one by one. Already the greater number of the islands adjacent to the Asiatic mainland from Cyprus to Lesbos, as well as Imbros and Lemnos, were under Persian rule. By land or by sea the way into Greece lay open to Darius. And the character of his empire was such that, apart from any ambition of his own, it was imperative that the Great King should keep his forces busied with wars abroad if they were not to employ themselves in internecine feuds at home.

In fact, he had for many years cherished the idea of an attack upon Greece, and had even sent out a vessel purposely to reconnoitre the shores of Hellas and to prepare the way for his arms by a judicious distribution of bribes. This was at the suggestion of Democedes, a Greek physician, captive at his court. He desired an outlet for the warlike aspirations of his subjects, and such outlet offered itself most naturally in the west. The attack may have been precipitated by the conduct of the Athenians and Eretrians; but, on the other hand, had there been no Ionic revolt, the attack would, in all probability, have come ten years earlier than it did.

Since the days when the reconnoitring expedition had sailed with Democedes, chance had sent to Darius other and more valuable guides, namely Hippias the Peisistratid, and a number of his adherents. After his expulsion from Athens by Cleomenes the Spartan king

(510 B.C.), the ex-tyrant had thrown himself upon the charity of Darius. We shall find Darius making use of the Peisistratidae in his own good time, and we shall also find an exiled King of Sparta, Demaiatus, doing similar traitor's service for Xerxes, together with the Aleuadae, members of an exiled aristocratic family of Larissa in Thessaly.

§ 2. As to the settlement of the reconquered Ionians we can gather one or two facts only. The lands of each community were strictly defined, and a tribute was imposed proportionate to the area in each case. The commissioner appointed for the purpose was Artaphernes, half-brother to Darius, who had for the past seven years acted as Satrap of Lydia and Ionia. Unquestionably the tribute would be paid with regularity, at any rate up to the year 480 B.C. From that date onwards for many years it was in abeyance, though the Great King never waived his claims in the matter. Herodotus, writing but a few years before the Peloponnesian War, speaks of the Ionians as "still liable to the tribute as assessed by Artaphernes";^{*} and later still (412 B.C.) we shall find them threatened with ruin in consequence of a summons from Susa to make good the arrears of tribute unpaid since the days of Mycale and Plataea.

The tyrants of Ionia were restored for the time, but in the very next year Mardonius, son-in-law of Darius, being appointed commander-in-chief of the Western Armament, set them aside and handed over the government of the several towns to the popular party. The experience of fifty years had proved the difficulty of governing the Greek communities by means of despots who were ceaselessly at variance with their fellows abroad and with both the oligarchic and popular parties at home. It would certainly be as easy to control the actions of democratic governments and much more easy to obtain full knowledge of their designs. Moreover, Persia was about to requisition the services of the Ionians for the campaign against Greece,

* Herod., vi. 42. φόρους ἔταξε ἵκάστουσι, οἵ κατὰ χώρην διατελέουσι εχούστες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου (493 B.C.) αἰεὶ καὶ ἐς εμὲ ("even to my own day") ὡς ἐτάχθησαν εἰς Ἀρταφρένεος.

and whereas such services against kinsmen, if enforced by medizing tyrants, might have aroused factitious scruples, it was reasonable to hope that the masses in the several communities would find in the unexpected recovery of their freedom excuses to salve their consciences. Again, it was upon the masses, in the capacity of rowers and marines, that the burdens of the forthcoming campaign would fall; and however doubtful their loyalty might be deemed in the task of coercing their kinsmen of the western shores of the Aegean, they were at any rate saved from the temptation to make common cause with the latter for the gratification of spite against an odious despot, or for the hope of achieving a liberty as yet unenjoyed.

For the rest, we may notice that with the Ionic revolt the glories of the Asiatic Greeks, long decadent, were now ended. Ionia was wasted and depopulated, its towns ruined, and its commerce destroyed.

§ 3. In narrating the story of the Persian Wars we shall have to speak of Greece as if that aggregate of rival states were a united people. Under the pressure of a terrible crisis Greece attained for the moment a unity which it had never known before. But when the Persian first set foot in Greece, the country lacked all unity. The determining fact was, then as ever, the jealous and selfish isolation of the city-state. And as if this alone were not a sufficient cause of distraction and weakness, individual states had already settled down to the stubborn and suicidal feuds which run through the whole course of Greek history. Argos was the hereditary foe of Sparta, and never forgot that the latter state had overthrown and supplanted the hegemony of the Achaeans. Thebes was the bitter enemy of Athens, because Athens had extended her protection to Plataea in defiance of the Theban claim that this tiny town belonged to the Boeotian confederacy. So Athens was at active war with Aegina,* neither state being willing to allow to the other a share in the trade of the Saronic Gulf; and Phocis was perpetually embroiled with Locris, Boeotia, and Thessaly, on the score of her claim to the control of Delphi. We shall find Thebes and Aegina medizing out

* Below, p. 10.

of hatred to Athens, Thessaly following suit out of hatred to Phocis; though had Athens and Phocis medized, their respective rivals would in all likelihood have been obstinately patriotic. Internally the various states were no more united. Everywhere there was the probability that the oligarchic party would throw itself upon the side of Persia. In Athens the extreme oligarchs were in treasonable communication with the expelled Peisistratidae at Susa, and doubtless the Aleuadae had their correspondents in Cnannon and even Demaratus his sympathizers in Sparta. The name of Dorians was not enough to prevent Aegina from wishing to betray the interests of Sparta, any more than the name of Ionians availed to deter the Asiatic Greeks from fighting against their Athenian kinsmen at Artemisium and Salamis. Even the Peloponnesian Confederacy possessed as yet no reality,⁴ and when the troops of Sparta marched out to Marathon they marched alone.

As in Greece itself, so in Magna Graecia. The Iapygians, Lucanians, and Samnites were already driving the Greek immigrants back towards the coast, and the pirates of Etruria assailed them ceaselessly from the seaward side. In Sicily again, not to mention the chronic quarrel between the Greeks on the one hand and on the other the Sicels of the interior and the Carthaginians, almost every Greek community was alternately the scene of violent military despotism and equally violent revolution. At or about the present date (492 B.C.) we hear of tyrannies in Gela, Syracuse, Himera, and Messana. Rich and populous as were the Greek colonies in the west, in spite of their incessant and manifold troubles, they had not even as vague a sentiment of their common origin and interest as had the states of Greece itself. And the same is true in a still greater degree of the outlying settlements on the shores of France and Spain, on the inner Adriatic, on the coast of Africa, and northwards towards the Tauric Chersonese.

* The muster of a number of the Peloponnesian states in 510 B.C., at the invitation of Sparta, to assist in the expulsion of the Peisistratidae from Athens (Vol. I., ch. xiv.), is the first indication of the probable existence of such a league. But the conduct of the Spartans in making a secret of the purpose of the similar muster in 507 B.C., and the secession of the Corinthians immediately upon hearing that its purpose was to restore Hippodamus, prove how slight was the authority of Sparta at this date even over her fellow Dorians (Vol. I., ch. xv., § 4).

§ 4. Such was the condition of the Hellenic world as a whole when, in 492 B.C., two years after the suppression of the Ionic revolt, the new commander-in-chief, Mardonius the son of Gobryas, mustered his forces in Cilicia. Having put the Ionic Greeks into good-humour by the political changes before mentioned, he raised amongst them a considerable fleet, as well as additional land forces, with which he sailed to the Hellespont and there joined the main body of Asiatic troops. Crossing the straits and marching thence along the coast of Thrace, he speedily presented himself at the gates of Northern Greece. Pending the arrival of his fleet in the Thermaic Gulf, Mardonius made Acanthus the headquarters of his army, and busied himself with the completion of the conquest of the Macedonian tribes. The fleet in the meantime, coasting westwards along the northern shores of the Aegean, reached Thasos, which island, heretofore independent, submitted without a blow. From Thasos the fleet pushed on to Acanthus, and started thence to circumnavigate the triple peninsula of Chalcidice. But the summer was spent, and the weather was already breaking up. A northerly gale drove the fleet upon the cliffs at the foot of Mount Athos, the extreme point of the bill of Acte. It was said that three hundred vessels and twenty thousand men perished in the storm. We are not told what portion escaped, but the disaster put an effectual stop to Mardonius' designs. Moreover, as he was marching along the coast he had himself experienced a serious reverse at the hands of the Bryges (or Brygi) of Thrace, who surprised his forces by night and wounded Mardonius in person. After chastising that tribe he returned to Asia (492 B.C.).

The real cause of his ill success lay in the fact that his proceedings in Ionia, and the tedious length of the overland route from Cilicia to Macedonia, delayed his march until the season was too far advanced. The disaster at Mount Athos completed the mischief already begun; for with the fleet was probably lost the bulk of the stores, and without an adequate fleet it must have proved impossible to gain any real advantage over Athens and Eretria, the primary objects of attack. Nevertheless, something had been done: the conquest of Thrace had been completed; Thasos had

been annexed ; the temper of the Ionians had been tested , and the Persian commanders had learnt a valuable lesson in regard to the wisdom of speedier movements in the future. In the light of this lesson Darius resolved that the next expedition should make its way into Greece by the speedier route of the Aegean. Orders were at once issued for the preparation of the necessary flotilla and stores with a view to service in 490 b.c. ; and in the meantime, trusting probably to the alarm which he must have believed to be inspired in Greece by the now manifest avowal of his designs, the Great King sent heralds to a number of the Grecian states, demanding the customary tokens of submission^{*} to his authority. The fortunes of these heralds had a very decided influence upon the results.

* That is, the symbolical surrender of earth and water, in token that the Persians should be masters of both the soil and seas of Greece

CHAPTER 11.

THE MARATHONIAN CAMPAIGN.

§ 1 Internal History of Athens: Hippias appeals to Persia—his Arguments.—§ 2. External History of Athens the Wars with Thebes, Chalcis, and Aegina—§ 3 Darius summons the Greeks to submit: Import of the Submission of Aegina—§ 4 The Athenians denounce the Aeginetans to Sparta—Abortive Interference of Cleomenes.—§ 5. Cleomenes intrigues against Demaratus—Leotychides becomes King.—§ 6. The Expedition of 490 B.C.: the Persians land at Marathon.—§ 7 Miltiades his Parentage and Early Career—§ 8 Message of Pheidippides to Sparta: the Spartans postpone their Aid—§ 9. Topography of Marathon—Position of the Opposing Armies—§ 10. Numbers of the Opposing Armies—the Athenian Generals divided in Opinion—Miltiades pleads against a Retreat—the Polemarch Callimachus decides for Miltiades.—§ 11. The Battle.—§ 12 Attempted Descent of the Persians upon Athens—Story of the Shield.

§ 1. For a generation after its creation the Cleisthenic democracy seems to have enjoyed a perfect harmony. The ingenious organisation of the new tribes and demes had entirely obliterated the recollection of the ancient feuds.^{*} The Alcmaeonidae[†] and their fellow Eupatrids seem to have either identified themselves cordially with the new condition of things, or at least to have refrained from any overt antagonism to the rising flood of democratic feeling. The few who still entertained the hope or the wish to see the Peisistratidae restored, although, as it would appear, they maintained a treasonable correspondence with the exiled party and their advocates abroad, whether from

* Vol. I., ch. xiv., § 2.

† The Alcmaeonidae were now divided into two sections, one identified with the policy of Cleisthenes, the other inheriting the traditions of Cylon and so far opposed to the democratic régime as to become to some extent identified with the party of the Peisistratidae. See below, ch. iii., § 4.

feelings of policy or of fear, made no sign. Taken as a mass, the Athenian people were solidly democratic ; and under the new régime they entered forthwith upon a career of growth which drew admiring acknowledgment from Herodotus.* They were in a condition of prosperous vigour, and political unity, which offered small promise of success to any attempt on the part of Hippias and his followers to recover their lost inheritance.

Upon their first expulsion the Peisistratidae had turned their thoughts towards Persia. Doubtless they had relations more or less close with one or other of the despots whom at that date Persian policy was still subsidising in the towns of Ionia, and they might reasonably hope that their promise to bring Athens, and possibly much more than Athens alone, within Persian control, would be met by ready support of their pretensions. It was with this hope that Hippias had immediately established himself at Sigeum in the Troad.

Finding that there was no chance of Gracian aid, he attached himself to the court of Darius and urged his wishes in person upon the Great King. He could bring good reasons to his support, for he could point out that his expulsion had been effected by Sparta only in unwilling obedience to a spurious oracle, that the nature of that oracle had been now made known ; that the Spartans were therefore willing enough to revenge the deceit put upon them by at once reinstating the Peisistratidae, that the feelings of such other states as Corinth were of small moment if the forces of Persia could be brought up to support the demands of Sparta, and that finally, in Athens itself, the power of the Alcmaeonidae, his worst enemies, was not what it had once been, while the state was hampered by the long continuance of the double war with Thebes and with Aegina. But Hippias did not know—and had he known he would not have mentioned—that the strength of Athens

* See Herod., v. 78 : "Herein is proof of the universal excellence of equality, that the Athenians, so long as they were ruled by despots, were no better than their neighbours in the art of war, but so soon as they were rid of despotism, became far their superiors. In fine, they cared to run no risks so long as they were a subject community toiling for a tyrant's profit, but when once they were free they vied one with another in their efforts to do great things, for each now toiled for his own."

now surpassed many times over her strength as it was in his own day, and that the immense influence of the Alcmaeonidae was no longer what it had once been only because it was now devoted mainly to the support of the democratic constitution. As for Darius, his own desires led him to attempt the conquest of Greece, and he was therefore the less likely to examine too closely into the accuracy of his petitioner's assertions.

§ 2. Of the external history of Athens from the year of the abortive intervention of Cleomenes on behalf of Isagoras (508 B.C.) down to 492 B.C. we have meagre information. The purpose of Cleomenes when, on his ignominious withdrawal in 508, he recommended the Plataeans to seek protection against Thebes rather at Athens than at Sparta,¹ had been fulfilled, for the Athenians had, by espousing the cause of Plataea, brought upon themselves the abiding hostility of the Thebans. The rapid and decisive character of the successes of the Athenian troops against the Thebans and against their allies, the Euboeans of Chalcis, led to an aggressive alliance between Thebes and Aegina, the latter state having, and needing, apparently no more valid excuse than was afforded by trade jealousies. Athens held her own against the combined hostilities of these enemies throughout a more or less continuous war. In the naval war with Aegina, matters were evenly balanced, but in the war with Thebes by land the Athenians were uniformly successful. In fact, the Athens of this date is rather a territorial than a maritime power. Athens and Aegina were still at war in a desultory fashion when, in 491 B.C., the Persian heralds presented themselves in Greece.

§ 3. Travelling by way of the Aegean Isles, the heralds delivered their message to those of the Island Greeks in their path who were as yet independent of Persia. Naxos refused to obey the summons. The other islands, most of them too small to think of resistance, submitted at once. Paros was amongst the number. In Euboea the Eretrians

* Vol. I., ch. xv., § 4. It should be mentioned that the date of this affair is placed by Thucydides (iii. 68) in 519 B.C., ninety-two years before the destruction of the town in the Peloponnesian War (427 B.C.). Grote was the first to suggest that the affair belonged to the expedition of Cleomenes in 508 B.C.

and Carystians refused, but, on the other hand, Aegina medized.

In regard to the states of the mainland in general we have no information. The important fact is that Athens and Sparta, without reference to the conduct of friends or enemies, and prompted by independent motives, disdained all thought of submission ; and further, that they treated the heralds in a manner which left no alternative but war : the Athenians threw the heralds into the Barathrum,* as the only fit place for the persons of those who ventured to address such a message to Athenian ears. The Spartans, acting with more humour if with less vehemence, threw them into a well, with the remark that they would there find the earth and water for which they were come. In either case the primary article of the unwritten international law of the time, the inviolability of a herald's person, was outraged. The Barbarian, in fact, was treated as if he were beyond the pale of law.

Amongst all the states which had obeyed Darius' summons Aegina was the most important. It was, in fact, an accession of superlative importance, for it gave to his fleets undisputed entry into the Saronic Gulf ; its navy, at least equal to that of Athens and probably larger than any other in Greece,† would prove a valuable addition to his forces ; its docks and arsenals would be most convenient for refitting his ships ; the island was rich enough to furnish all needful supplies and strong enough to prevent their being cut off. It would serve as an ideal basis for a naval expedition destined to act against Athens and Eretria on the one hand, and against Sparta on the other ; for it lay right opposite the port of Athens,‡ and in the very position most convenient for striking at Athens or Sparta, or for preventing the conjunction of their forces.

§ 4. The only possible motive of the Aeginetans in thus medizing—and in the particular case it is a sufficient one—

* The ravine into which were occasionally thrown the bodies of criminals executed for offences against the state.

† Excepting probably that of Coreya, with which, however, we have no concern in the Marathonian campaign.

‡ Phalerum. Perseus was not yet raised to its subsequent position as the great fortified port of Athens.

was their wish to obtain for themselves by the all-powerful alliance of Persia the gratification of their long-standing hatred of Athens. Fortunately for the fate of Greece, Darius never reaped the benefit of their complaisance, for no sooner did it reach the ears of the Athenians than they despatched to Sparta an embassy setting forth the disastrous results that must follow from such treachery. The arguments of the Athenians were seconded by the wishes of King Cleomenes, a personage always eager for any opportunity of interfering with other states. It was resolved to take Aegina to task, and this duty was entrusted to the single hands of Cleomenes.

But the Aeginetans declined to acknowledge the authority of Cleomenes, remarking, truly enough, that when the Spartan government employed a Spartan king, it employed both together.* Cleomenes therefore was not properly accredited. If his message was not a matter of contrivance betwixt himself and the Athenians, let him come again and bring with him his colleague Demaratus. Having no force wherewith to back his demands, Cleomenes was fain to swallow the affront and withdraw.

§ 5. This event led to important results in Sparta. Demaratus, the representative of the Eurypontid royal line, was, for some unknown cause, more than ordinarily jealous of his colleague of the rival line. As long ago as 507 B.C. this jealousy had been manifested in the refusal of Demaratus to support Cleomenes in the matter of the expulsion of Cleisthenes, and the restoration of the Peisistratidae,† and Cleomenes was now led to believe that the uncompromising attitude of the Aeginetans was provoked by private suggestions from Demaratus. He determined to rid himself of a colleague who had so little sympathy with the policy by which Cleomenes believed the interests of his country to be best served. Both plea and instrument were ready to his hand. Aristo, the predecessor and the reputed father of Demaratus, having long been

* This was certainly the rule up to the year 510 B.C., but after that date, owing to the frequent quarrels of the rival colleagues in the field and the reverses resulting therefrom, it was arranged that only one king should take command in war. The place of the second king was speedily taken by a staff of "advisers" nominated by the Ephori and representing their views.

† Vol. I., ch. xv, § 4.

childless, married late in life the wife of a Spartiate named Agetus, taking her from her husband by a discreditable manœuvre; and when very shortly she gave birth to Demaratus, even Alcisto himself publicly admitted his doubts as to whether himself or Agetus was the child's father. Albeit he subsequently did his best to remove the doubts which he had himself created, the scandal was not forgotten. Had Demaratus not succeeded to the throne, the next heir would have been Leotychides. When, therefore, Cleomenes suggested that Demaratus might yet be removed, Leotychides showed no scruples as to the means to be employed. The matter was referred to the arbitrament of the national god at Delphi. In the meantime Cleomenes had arranged matters with those who worked the oracle, with the result that Apollo publicly declared Demaratus to be no true descendant of the Eurypontid line, and therefore no fit king of Sparta. Demaratus withdrew from Sparta, and presently betook himself to Susa, following the example of Hippias the Athenian. Leotychides stepped into the vacant place, and to show his gratitude forthwith joined with Cleomenes in a second visit to Aegina. The appearance of both kings quelled the contumacy of the Aeginetans : they surrendered the required ten hostages, whom Cleomenes made over to the safe-keeping of their enemies the Athenians.

§ 6. In the early spring of 490 B.C. the Persian forces mustered under Datis and Artaphernes, a son of the satrap of the same name, in the Aleian Plain in Cilicia. The new commanders were instructed to make the attack by sea directly across the Aegean. Coasting therefore northwards from Cilicia as far as Samos, the fleet, to the number of six hundred ships of war besides transports, stood westward thence and so arrived at Naxos. The inhabitants betook themselves at once to their mountains, allowing their town to be burnt and their lowlands ravaged without resistance. The smaller islands submitted as soon as summoned.*

* Herodotus relates that the fleet visited Delos, and that a splendid sacrifice was there offered in the name of Darius. The passage is of interest, because he goes on to say that immediately afterwards Delos "was visited with an earthquake, for the first and last occasion." But Thucydides (ii. 8) mentions an earthquake shortly before 481 B.C., which he describes as the first of which the Greeks had any record. Clearly

In due course the Persian fleet made land at Carystus in the south of Euboea. Small as the town was, it nevertheless made what resistance it might; but being left without aid, it was speedily reduced.

From Carystus the fleet moved onwards to Eretria. The Eretrians had already sent to Athens for assistance, and not being in any position to detail even a small portion of their forces for service beyond the limits of Attica, the Athenians had sent word to the cleruchs of Chalcis to march to the defence of Eretria. But after a continuous assault of six days the town was betrayed by two of its leading citizens, Euphorbus and Philagrus. The place was sacked and burnt to the ground, in requital for the burning of Sardis. After a very brief delay the entire Persian force sailed down the Euripus and landed at the plain of Marathon, on the eastern shore of Attica, whence a direct road ran to Athens.

§ 7. The Athenian commander-in-chief in 490 B.C. was Callimachus, the Archon Polemarch. At this date the ten generals (*strategi*) were commanders of the tribal regiments, and formed a Council of War under the Polemarch. From 487 B.C. the Polemarch, as a result of being appointed by lot, was superseded by the ten generals; but in 490 he was in supreme command of the army. One of the ten generals in this year was Miltiades, and the legends which gathered round the battle glorified Miltiades at the expense of the Polemarch, and ascribed to him, instead of to Callimachus, the strategy and tactics by which the day was won. This is quite false; but at the same time, it is probable that Miltiades, the only prominent Athenian who had a first-rate knowledge of Persia and Persian warfare, was to a very great extent responsible for the vigorous action of Athens during the crisis.

Miltiades belonged to the noble house of the Philaidæ. His father was Cimon, younger half-brother to another Miltiades. About 560 B.C. the elder Miltiades sailed to the

Thucydides did not believe in Herodotus' earthquake, and it may be maintained that Herodotus was expressly contradicting that mentioned by Thucydides. Probably the two writers drew upon different traditions, but we have no means of reconciling the two accounts.

Thracian Chersonese, where he speedily won for himself an independent *tyrannis*, which he retained until his death.* His half-brother Cimon was assassinated by order of the despot's successor, leaving two sons, Stesagoras and Miltiades. The former had already stepped into the place of his uncle as despot of the Chersonese, and when he died the Peisistratidae sent out Miltiades, the younger son, to fill the place of Stesagoras. This occurred before the great expedition of Darius against Scythia (512 B.C.), for Miltiades, in common with the greater number of the despots of Ionia, accompanied that expedition, and marked himself out for the Great King's hostility by his efforts to induce the Ionian captains to break down the Danube bridge, and so leave Darius and his army to their fate on the Scythian shore. The opposition of Histaeus prevented this, and Miltiades speedily found himself the object of Persian vengeance. Twice at least he was expelled from the Chersonese, and as often returned. The date of his second return fell about the time when the Ionic revolt was keeping the Persian forces employed elsewhere, and he took advantage of this fact not only to regain all that he had lost, but to extend his power to the islands of Imbros and Lemnos. As the Persians claimed to be masters of these islands, they had now a second reason for enmity against Miltiades, and the Ionic revolt ended, they brought against him the whole force of their navy. Miltiades was compelled for a third and final time to fly from the Chersonese, and barely made good his escape to Athens (493 B.C.). But Athens was now a democracy, and the Athenian mind was violently biased against despots in general, and against nominees of the Peisistratidae in particular. As spokesman of this bias, the Alcmaeonid Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, caused the fugitive to be arrested and put upon his trial for alleged violence in his late government. He was acquitted, probably in recognition of the services which he had rendered to Athenian honour in avenging the national feud with the Pelasgians of Lemnos; nor were the Alcmaeonidae able even to prevent his election as

* In subsequent times the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese revered him as their ancestor.

one of the Board of Generals in the course of the next three years.

§ 8. It may be taken for granted that Miltiades, to whom Persia's victory must have spelled his own chastisement, spared no effort to encourage his countrymen in the spirit of resistance. When therefore the news arrived that Datis and Artaphernes were now landing their forces at Marathon, the Archon Polemarch at once put ten thousand Athenian hoplites on the road to Marathon, previously despatching to Sparta an appeal for instant aid. The messenger was Pheidippides,* who accomplished the distance of one hundred and fifty miles within forty-eight hours, arriving upon the ninth day of the moon. But unfortunately for the Athenians, the Spartan law with regard to this particular month forbade the marching out of an army upon any day between the ninth and the fifteenth days of the moon, *i.e.* before the moon was at the full. All that the Ephors could do was to assure Pheidippides of their goodwill and to promise to send aid at the earliest permissible opportunity, *i.e.* in six days' time. As the march from Sparta to Marathon proved ultimately to be a matter of three days, and could not possibly have been accomplished by an armed force in any less time, this answer meant that nine days must elapse before any Spartan contingent could unite with the Athenian forces. As a similar occurrence delayed the out-march of the Spartan main force in 480 B.C.,† when the imminence of the great festival of the Carneat‡ was the excuse offered, it has usually been supposed that the same festival was in progress on the present occasion.


§ 9. In the meantime the Athenians had mustered their own forces and had marched out alone against the invaders, who were by this time entrenched near the shore at Marathon. Marathon, one of the Attic demes, lay north-east of Mount Brilettus and south-east of Mount Parnes.

* Or Philippides. Under the west cliff of the Acropolis at Athens was a grotto known as the Cave of Pan, dedicated to the worship of that god. The legend said that it was consecrated in memory of the fact that Pan appeared to Pheidippides upon Mount Parthenius, between Pegae and Sphacteria, declaring himself to be, both in the past and in the future, the friend of Athens.

† See below, p. 43.

‡ In August.

To the south-east of Marathon stretches a small plain, in length about six miles, and in breadth varying from two miles to one mile and a half. The plain is crescent-shaped, and lies open to the sea on the south-east, its convex edge being ringed in by hills, its hollow side forming the shore of a small bay. The northern end of the plain



- T. Tomb of the Athenians
- II. Hepteleon—Athenian Camp.
- C. Peisan Camp.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

is occupied by a great marsh, while a much smaller tract of marsh-land almost fills up the space between the sea and the mountains at the southern extremity of the plain. The broadest portion of the plain is traversed by a ravine and watercourse (the *Charadra*) which flows in a south-easterly direction through a gorge in the hills in which

the villages of Marathon (modern Marathon) and Oenoe (modern Ninoi) were situated.

Two roads lead from Athens to the plain of Marathon. The main road passes between Mount Hymettus and Mount Brilettus or Pentelicus; it traverses the deme of Pallene, and soon after turns due north, and, after running between Pentelicus and the sea through Probalinthus, enters the plain at its southern end, between the mountains and the lesser marsh. The other road is more direct, but much more difficult; it runs in a north-easterly direction from Athens, passes the deme of Cephisia, traverses Mount Pentelicus, and finally splits off into two paths; one path goes north-east to Marathon, and then south along the *Charadra* into the plain of Marathon; the other passes the village of Vrana and so enters the plain from the west.

It is difficult to estimate with anything like an approach to certainty how far the Athenian victory at Marathon was of military importance. The account given by our chief authority Herodotus is vague and defective; in some points it contradicts historical facts which have been established from other sources. Moreover, Herodotus, as an enthusiastic admirer of the Athens of Pericles, accepts without criticism the exaggerations and legends which Athenian vanity and self-glorification permitted to take the place of the record of actual facts. On the other hand, ancient critics like Theopompus, who were enemies of Athens, go too far on the other side when they assert that the Athenians simply had a brief encounter with the Persians when the latter were on the point of sailing away.

The following account of the battle is based on reconstructions of the narrative of Herodotus by modern authorities like Macan and Bury.

§ 10. The Athenian army, which mustered about nine thousand men, took the direct north-western road from Athens, and encamped in the Heracleion or sacred grove of Heracles which was situated in the valley of Avlona (see plan on page 17.) Here they were joined by the full muster of the Plataeans, one thousand strong; for Plataea, though situated in Boeotia, had now been an ally of Athens for twenty years. The choice of the admirable position in

the vale of Aylona was half the victory ; for the Persians, encamped in the plain on the northern side of the *Charadra*, were unable to take either the southern or the western road to Athens without exposing themselves to a flank attack, while the Athenians in the narrow valley were hardly assailable. Since, then, the Athenians had such an admirable strategic position, it would be a military blunder on their part to begin the attack ; and the longer they succeeded in putting off the conflict, the more chance was there for aid to arrive from Sparta. The story goes that the delay of some days which actually ensued was due to Miltiades. It is said that, although his colleagues had given up their right of command to him, he waited till his own day of command came round, so that he might have the more honour in case of victory. This account is apocryphal. The rotation of command was not introduced until a later date, and the decision as to a battle lay entirely with the Polemarch. Miltiades, however, no doubt advised that the Athenians should stay where they were until the Persians moved.

§ 11. At length the Persians, seeing that the Athenians were not likely to leave their advantageous position, determined to advance upon Athens by land and sea. The total number of men on the Persian ships was probably not more than 100,000, and of these only about 70,000 would be fighting-men. The proportion of cavalry is not known, but it was probably small. The Persians now embarked the greater part of their infantry and the whole of their cavalry ; the rest of the infantry began to march in column southwards through the plain towards the main road for Athens ; on the right flank of this marching column was detached a force to serve as a cover against the enemy. Callimachus, probably following the advice of Miltiades, now decided to take the offensive. In order to prevent his line being outflanked on one or both wings, he spread out his centre by drawing up the tribes posted there in fewer ranks than usual ; those on the wings were in the usual depth of formation, and consequently stronger than the centre. Callimachus led the right wing ; the Plataeans were stationed on the left.

As the Greeks drew near the enemy they were met by a hail of arrows, which they charged through at a run ; this charge at the double during the last two or three hundred yards was magnified by Herodotus, a decided partisan of Athens, until it became a run over the eight furlongs.

For a long time neither side prevailed ; then, as might have been anticipated, the centre of the Persian covering force where the Persians themselves and the Sacae were stationed, drove back the weak Athenian centre. But the right and left wings routed the wings opposed to them and drove them towards the shore. They then closed in upon the victorious Persian centre (which was still laboriously pressing the Greek centre up the hill), so that it also was routed. Part of the marching column had fled to the ships when the Persian wings were routed, and had been taken on board, along with such of their defeated comrades as had escaped ; the rest of the column, together with the remnant of the routed Persian centre, now formed one wild stream of fugitives, pursued by the Athenians, who cut them down as they fled, and tried to prevent the ships from getting away. In this struggle fell Callimachus, and here too died Cynegeirus, brother of Aeschylus, his arms hewn off as he clung to a stranded ship and endeavoured to prevent its escape. The Greeks were too few for their task, and only seven ships fell into their hands. But they had won the first of their victories over the national foe, they had taken his camp and a prodigious spoil, and to appease the shades of the 192 Greeks who had fallen they had slain 6,400 of their enemies.*

§ 12. But they had not yet done with the Persians. The great fleet, after clearing the shore, was seen to stand southward towards Cape Sunium, evidently with the intention of attacking Athens while the Marathonian army was still absent. The generals at once marched the entire force back to the city, accomplishing the distance of six-and-twenty miles before nightfall. When, on the following

* The battle was commemorated in the famous painting by Polygnotus, which adorned the walls of the Stoa Poecile in Athens. The slain were buried where they fell, beneath one large tumulus, the "Sólo" (*σώπος*), which still stands at the southern end of the plain of Marathon.

morning, the Persians came off Phalerum they found their victors of the previous day drawn up to receive them a second time. After hanging about for a few hours the entire armament made sail for Persia.

Herodotus says that the Athenians believed this movement of the fleet to have been prompted by traitors within the city, who, according to arrangement, displayed a bright shield as a signal that Athens was now at the mercy of her enemies. The traitors, rumour alleged, were some of the Alcmaeonidae. The story looks like a partisan attempt to bring the aristocratic Alcmaeonidae into discredit, but on the other hand, it must be remembered that the Alcmaeonidae were at this time being thrust into the background in political matters by Miltiades and Themistocles, and it is not improbable that they may have attempted to regain their position by the aid of Hippias and the Persians. In any case the statement of Herodotus that he did not believe in the accusation against them is of little value, for Herodotus was a strong partisan of the Alcmaeonid Pericles.

Though the military importance of the victory at Marathon must remain a matter of dispute, its moral and political importance was incalculable. It is true that from a certain point of view Marathon is entitled to no higher rank than the battles of Salamis, of Plataea, of Thermopylae; but its superior importance lies in its significance for the Athenians themselves. They rightly felt that it marked an epoch; but for Marathon there would not have been that series of victories which made the story of the later invasion so glorious. Moreover, in the fact that Athens, alone and unaided, save by the tiny Plataea, withstood as "champion of Hellas" the Persian power, was contained the germ of the future Panhellenic position of the Athenian state.

On the evening of the day after the battle, true to the promise of the Ephors, a Spartan force of two thousand men reached Attica, having marched the distance of one hundred and fifty miles in three days. These were intended to be the forerunners of yet larger reinforcements. But the crisis was now past: there was nothing for them to do but

visit the scene of the conflict, compliment the victors, and so return home, carrying with them, however, the unpleasant conviction that from this day forward the traditional prestige of the Spartan arms would no longer pass unchallenged in the Greek mind.

CHAPTER III.

THEMISTOCLES AND THE NAVAL PROGRAMME.

§ 1. Miltiades attacks Paros his Condemnation and Death : Another Account More Probable.—§ 2. Deposition of Cleomenes and Renewal of the Aeginetan War · Fate of Cleomenes —§ 3. Course of the Second Aeginetan War —§ 4. Parties in Athens.—§ 5. Themistocles · his New Policy · Ostiaicism of Xanthippus and Aristides.—§ 6. Appropriation of the Profits of Laurium . Fortification of Peiraeus.

§ 1. On the soil of Marathon were laid the foundations of the empire of Athens, and the man whose courage had made this possible was Miltiades.

How his countrymen rewarded their leader we do not know. For the moment he must have been all-powerful in Athens, but he was destined speedily to experience a change in the popular sentiment. Not content only to have saved Attica from the Persian yoke, he seems to have hoped to recover forthwith such of the Aegean isles as had submitted to that yoke, or at least the nearer of those islands ; for, as so many Persian outposts, those islands were a standing menace to the security of Greece. As Herodotus relates the story we are bidden believe that his action was the outcome of private spite against a citizen of Paros, and that he was able by his immense influence with the Ecclesia to obtain command of a fleet of seventy war-vessels for a purpose which he preferred to keep secret, on his bare assertion that he would make it worth the city's while. With this force he sailed straight to Paros and demanded of the islanders the sum of one hundred talents, nominally as a fine for their late submission to Persia and their contribution to the Persian fleet, threatening, in default, to use force. The Parians

declining to pay the sum he demanded, he forthwith besieged their capital. Unable to capture the town by assault, he next attempted to reduce it by treachery, and to this end opened communications with a priestess in the town; but in returning from a clandestine interview with her, he accidentally injured his thigh so severely that he was forced to abandon the siege. Upon his return with empty hands he was put upon his trial for having "deceived" the Ecclesia. The accuser was Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, and the same who had impeached Miltiades some four years earlier: the court refused indeed to condemn to death the man who had done so much for his country, but sentenced him to a fine of fifty talents; ^{*} but the wound in his thigh had already mortified, and within a few days Miltiades was dead.

Without question the truth is perverted in this story. It is more probable that Miltiades was appointed to command the fleet, with full instructions to use it against those of the islanders who had aided Persia, and that he made the unfortunate attack upon Paros, amongst other islands, in obedience to these orders. [†] His failure was nothing surprising, in view of the resources of Paros, but in the flush of their new-born aspirations the Athenians had no patience with failures; and taking advantage of this opportunity, Miltiades' enemies, who were both numerous and powerful, were able to secure his condemnation. He left a son, Cimon, who presently paid the fine, and lived long enough to make the State many times over his debtor.

§ 2. If the Athenians had indeed already conceived the design of recovering the islands from Persia, their ardour was no doubt cooled by the rebuff at Paros; and their relations with Aegina shortly became such as to prevent for the present any further undertakings of that sort. The fraud by which Cleomenes had secured the deposition of

* That is, practically the cost of the expedition, if we calculate it in accordance with the nominal rate of pay.

[†] Possibly Miltiades exceeded his orders in attacking Paros, or possibly he did so without consulting the Ecclesia: either fact would suffice to explain the origin of the story that he persuaded the Athenians to put him in command of an expedition the purpose of which he kept to himself.

Demaratus was very soon divulged, and his nominee Leotychides had been on the throne but a few months when the Spartans learnt how they had been tricked. Cleomenes in his turn was deposed (490 B.C.), but Leotychides was suffered to remain in possession of his ill-won honours, a fact which gives ground for the suspicion that he may have known something about the causes which so early led to the discovery of the other's malpractices.¹ Nevertheless, his conduct in regard to Aegina was made the subject of an inquiry, and he was compelled to submit to the indignity of seeing his arrangements there declared corrupt and void. It is probable that the Spartans were not sorry, in view of the late sudden aggrandisement of Athens and the boldness with which she was acting amongst the Aegean Isles, to have a decent excuse for embroiling her once more with an enemy nearer home. At any rate, they enabled the Aeginetans with justice to demand from Athens the restoration of the ten hostages lodged there by Cleomenes, and when this was refused, as the Spartans probably expected it would be, they had the satisfaction of seeing the Aeginetans retaliate by detaining the members of an Athenian Theory, whom they seized at sea.

Upon his deposition Cleomenes withdrew to Thessaly, but very shortly returned to Arcadia, where he commenced to intrigue against Sparta. The Ephors, grown alarmed for the security of their hold over the Arcadian towns, speedily sent to him assurances that he might resume his old position if he would return. Cleomenes accepted the offer and became once more King of Sparta; but his conduct, never remarkable for self-control, became in a few months so outrageous that the Ephors felt compelled to put him under restraint. A little later he was found dead in the stocks, his body atrociously mutilated. We are told that his incarceration was due to insanity, and that his death was self-inflicted; but whatever it was, his secret died with him. We do not know even the date of his death. He was succeeded by his brother Leonidas.

¹ As a parallel to the attitude of Leotychides as here suggested, compare the case of Agesilus, who, being put upon the throne by Lysander in the room of another Leotychides, immediately used his position for the discomfiture of Lysander. See Vol. IV., ch. vi., §§ 7, 11.

§ 3. The Athenians, now again at war with Aegina, found a ready instrument for their purpose in Nicodromus, an Aeginetan who had recently been banished by the ruling oligarchy, and was willing to go any lengths by way of retaliation. With his assistance it was arranged that the Athenian fleet should attack the port of Aegina at the moment when Nicodromus should lead a rising of the democratic party in the upper town.* Nicodromus fulfilled his part of the engagement, and obtained temporary possession of Old Aegina; but here the plot failed, for the Athenians, mistrusting the strength of their fifty available vessels† in face of the seventy warships of Aegina, had wasted time in negotiating for twenty other vessels from Corinth. In the upshot they arrived off the port of Aegina twenty-four hours too late, to find that the oligarchic party had recovered from their surprise and defeated the revolutionists. Nicodromus in person, with a remnant of his followers, took refuge with the Athenians, while the victorious oligarchs had to be content with massacring their prisoners. They next appealed for aid to Argos. The Argives allowed a thousand of their number to take service with Aegina as volunteers. They came to no good: an Athenian force was presently landed upon the island and cut off almost the whole of them. The war was still in progress in 481 B.C., having broken out apparently in 489 B.C. It was a monotonous business, which brought little credit to either side, but it was partly to her small success in this same war that Athens ultimately owed her naval Empire in the Aegean.

§ 4. The condemnation of Miltiades at the instance of Xanthippus had for the moment transferred to the latter, and to his ally Aristides, the political ascendancy in Athens. Of Xanthippus we know little: he was the leader of the democratic party, and therefore the natural foe of Miltiades, who represented the aristocracy; but he had married the niece of Cleisthenes, and was therefore a connection of the

* The position of the Old Town as compared with that of the port or New Town of Aegina was similar to the position of Athens as compared with Peiraeus at a later period.

† Miltiades is said to have had seventy at Patos. Probably at this date a portion of the fleet was still engaged in dealing with the medizing islanders of the Aegean.

Alcmaeonidae, and he is best known as the father of Pericles. Of Aristides, on the other hand, we shall see much as the narrative proceeds. He was a person of birth and some means, ranking in the first of the four property-classes; he had been an intimate friend and adviser of Cleisthenes in the days of the great reform; he was one of the Strategi who supported the views of Miltiades at Marathon; and he was Archon-Eponymus in the year of Miltiades' fall (489 B.C.). Already he was known to every Athenian as "The Just."

Opposed to these stood the oligarchic group, with which we may include the party of the exiled Peisistratidae. Of these also the leaders were Alcmaeonidae, or connections of the Alcmaeonidae. So bitter was the quarrel between the two parties that in the very next year, for the first time, recourse was had to the arbitrament of ostracism.¹ The verdict went against the Peisistratid faction, whose leader Hipparchus accordingly enjoyed the distinction of being the first to retire into this honourable exile (488 B.C.). In the next year again (487 B.C.) the same fate befell his political successor Megacles, a nephew of Cleisthenes. The activity of the defeated faction must have been very great thus to bring upon itself within so brief a space this double rebuff, and it is likely that on the removal of Miltiades they believed themselves free to develop more vigorously that treasonable policy which he had succeeded in repressing for a time. The events of 490 B.C. must have furnished the primary reason for the revival of the animosity against them. A further proof of the suspicion with which some of the great houses were regarded may be seen perhaps in the modification now effected in the method of filling up the archonships. At this time the archons were chosen by election; but from henceforth (487 B.C.) five hundred candidates were nominated by the Demes, and from these five hundred the nine archons and their secretary were drawn by lot, one from each tribe. This process was substantially a return to the method of selection by lot, established by Solon, which had been overthrown by the despotism of the Peisistratidae.

§ 5. Political power was now left in the hands of the party

* See VOL I., ch. xv., § 3.

under Xanthippus and Aristides. But their monopoly was short-lived, for there had occurred a split in their own ranks, owing to which first Xanthippus (486 B.C.) and next Aristides (? 484 B.C.) was compelled to go into exile. The question which thus divided the democratic party was first raised by Themistocles.

Themistocles, son of Neocles, was the first man of other than high lineage to obtain an ascendancy in the Ecclesia. He was not only of but middle rank in life, he was not even of pure Athenian blood, for his mother was a foreign^{*} woman. Born about the year 520 B.C., or somewhat later,† he was now somewhat over thirty years of age: and if it be not true that he was, like Aristides, one of those Strategi who supported Miltiades at Marathon, we know nothing at all about his career previous to the year 486 B.C., when he appears as the creator and leader of a new party.

For the past three years the Athenians had been struggling with Aegina, without obtaining one decisive success, while they had suffered more than one reverse. Here Themistocles found his opportunity. He stood forth to point out the natural and only remedy. If the Athenians wished to win, they must make the obvious sacrifices: they must enlarge their fleet until it was strong enough to sweep the Aeginetans from the seas; they must provide and maintain crews to man it and docks to receive it; they must fortify a port where it might ride secure. Then they would be rid of the old enemy which lay at their very gates, they would hear no more of such rebuffs as that at Paros, and even the Persians themselves would not venture a second time to parade their fleets before the city.

The policy which Themistocles preached may seem an obvious and simple thing, but it was not so in reality. It meant that the citizens must voluntarily bring upon themselves the burden of an enormous and never ending expense in building and maintaining ships and docks and walls; that they must submit also to the constant obligation

* She is variously styled a Thracian, a Carian, and an Acaeanian.

† The date is disputed. It depends to some extent upon the date in which we place his Archonship, for a man could not be Archon until he was thirty. Dionysius says that he was Archon in 498 B.C., which is certainly too early. Almost all the recent authorities accept the date 482 B.C.

of service in the fleet as rowers and marines ; that they must abandon the old way, throw aside old prejudices, and set themselves with one accord to the self-imposed task of creating for themselves a maritime power. Yet Themistocles succeeded in his aim.

Already, probably in 486 B.C., the new party was numerically strong and well organised, for in that year Xanthippus was ostracised, and if he did not owe this to Themistocles, we cannot suggest another explanation. The split in the democratic party was already a matter of daily politics. But it was not until 483 B.C. that Themistocles at last succeeded in persuading the Ecclesia to take the first definite step towards the realisation of his schemes, by making a preliminary subscription of ten *drachmae* apiece towards the new " Naval Programme."

§ 6. In Laurium, the district in the vicinity of Sunium, may still be seen the borings and refuse of ancient silver mines. In Themistocles' time the mines were very productive : they were the property of the State,† and brought in a very considerable revenue as times went then, for at the close of 484 B.C. the State found itself with a surplus of one hundred talents in the Treasury. Out of this sum it was proposed to make a public distribution of ten *drachmae per man*, a course which would have brought no direct advantage to the State. Themistocles moved that the entire surplus should be divided on loan to a hundred of the wealthiest citizens. If any such loan were found to have been expended in a manner satisfactory to the State, it was to be considered as a gift ; if the contrary, it was to

* Abbott points out that up to this date the Athenians were essentially an agricultural community, and that the feeling of attachment to this kind of life must have rapidly deepened during the years of comparative quiet and undeniably prosperity which succeeded the Cleisthenic Reform. He remarks also that heretofore the Greek mind seems to have felt a necessary connection between democratic well-being and the development of the land army of citizen soldiers, (hoplites). It was, so to say, a new *invention*—this notion of a democratic power supported primarily by a citizen manned navy—which Themistocles was now submitting to the Athenians.

† The mines were leased to private citizens at a rental of one twenty-fourth of the annual profits, besides a sum down for the right of opening a shaft. The rights of the lease could be transferred to a third party by purchase or inheritance. The process employed was so wasteful that only recently a company was formed to re-work the refuse of the old workings, and made a handsome profit. Nicias made his money in connection with these mines (Vol. III., ch. viii., § 11).

be recovered from the recipient. Themistocles carried his point. The one hundred talents were expended upon the construction of as many ships of war.* This was in 483 B.C. It was just in time, for the new vessels were hardly built when Athens found herself once more menaced with a Persian invasion.

It must have been about this time that Themistocles obtained the popular sanction for his scheme of providing the city with a more commodious and defensible port. Heretofore the principal port had been the small bay of Phalerum, which was protected neither from weather nor from hostile attack. Themistocles selected Peiraeus† as the new naval port, and at once commenced to fortify it. Phalerum doubtless continued to be used as a commercial roadstead, but it did not at present come within the scheme of defence. That plan, however, included the two subsidiary ports of Munychia and Zea ‡—in fact, the entire peninsula of Peiraeus. Themistocles was Archon in the year 482 B.C., when the fortifications were in progress. In that year, if not sooner, there reached Athens the rumours of mighty preparations directed by Xerxes against Greece at large and against Athens more especially—rumours which provided a new and unquestionable justification of the policy of Themistocles—and hard on the heels of these rumours came the heralds of Persia repeating the formal demand for earth and water. Sparta and Athens they did not visit: those states had, by their treatment of Darius' envoys, put themselves beyond the pale of law.

* Heretofore the main force of Athens, as of the greater number of Greek states, had been hoplites. As the citizen-soldier received from the State nothing beyond his spear and shield, having to find himself in all other necessities and to serve without remuneration, a force of this kind was not burdensome to maintain. On the other hand, the initial outlay required for the construction of a single vessel was considerable, not counting the cost of maintaining it in active service. For each vessel which saw six months' service in the year, the Treasury was called upon to find as many talents, for the payment of the crew was not a part of any liturgy, although the initial cost of finding the ship might be transferred as a liturgy to an individual citizen or citizens. The proposal of Themistocles in regard to the Lianian funds was a clever expedient for finding the required vessels—providing, that is, for the formidable initial outlay—without touching the pockets of the wealthy, who, as liable to liturgies, would be at once the most anxious and the most able to obstruct a policy which promised to prove so costly.

† See the plan on p. 155.

‡ See below, ch. xiii.

CHAPTER IV.

ARTEMISIUM AND THERMOPYLAE

§ 1. Revolt of Egypt and Death of Darius Xerxes Resolves to Attack Greece.—§ 2 The Slip-Canal Bridging the Hellespont.—§ 3 The March from Sardis to Macedonia · Numbers of the Persian Forces —§ 4. Condition of Greece · Conference of Greeks at the Isthmus.—§ 5. Attitude of Argos ; of Gelo and Sicily, of Crete , of Coreya —§ 6. The Three Barriers of Greece · Northern Greece submits to the Persians —§ 7. Resolution of the Athenians the Appeal to Delphi. —§ 8. Topography of Thermopylae · Numbers of the Greek Forces at Thermopylae and at Artemisium.—§ 9 The Three Naval Battles of Artemisium · the Greeks Resolve to Retire.—§ 10. First and Second Battles of Thermopylae Epialtes betrays the Greeks.—§ 11. The Third Battle Death of Leonidas.

§ 1. Not deterred by the defeat at Marathon, Darius had given immediate orders for the preparation of yet another expedition against Greece, upon a scale yet more formidable. His purpose was frustrated by the revolt of Egypt (487 B.C.) Postponing schemes of conquest to the more pressing need of recovering a lost dependency, he led against Egypt the forces which had been collected for the invasion of Greece ; but he died upon the way, leaving his various schemes to his son Xerxes (485 B.C.). He had reigned for thirty-six years.

Xerxes was the son of Queen Atossa, a daughter of Cyrus the Great. He entered upon his inheritance without opposition, and speedily recalled the Egyptians to their allegiance, Achaemenes, brother of Xerxes, being appointed satrap (484 B.C.)

Xerxes entered zealously into his father's designs upon Greece. It was resolved that the invasion should follow the route planned by Mardonius in 492 B.C., for the expedition

was to be on a scale too gigantic to admit of its being conveyed by sea; but Xerxes, in choosing this route, found opportunity for two particularly striking works—the bridging of the Hellespont and the construction of a ship-canal across the peninsula of Acte.

§ 2. Of the two works the latter proved to be the easier. The extreme breadth of the peninsula at the spot selected was only a mile and a half, and the ground presented no great difficulties in the way of inequalities. The excavations were commenced in 483 B.C. and lasted for three years, the result being a canal of sufficient width to allow of the rowing of two warships abreast from end to end. Its purpose was to obviate the need of conducting the fleet of transports and warships round the headland of Athos, the scene of the disaster to Mardonius' fleet. There is no question that the canal is an historic fact, albeit some six hundred years later a satirist scoffed at it as a Greek fable.* Herodotus speaks of it as simply the outcome of Xerxes' love of ostentation, but modern observers pronounce it a salutary, if not necessary, precaution against very real perils of the sea at that point.

The bridging of the Hellespont was a greater task, although less novel, seeing that Darius had achieved the same feat for the purposes of his campaign against Scythia.† Of the bridges of Xerxes—there were two double bridges—the first was apparently commenced so soon as to experience the full effects of the storms of the early year, with the result that it was completely destroyed. Xerxes, in his wrath, ordered the Hellespont to be scourged and manacles to be flung into its waters, in token that the stream was henceforth Xerxes' slave. He then sent the unlucky engineers to execution, and appointed others to take their place.

The second pair of bridges lay closely side by side, crossing the Hellespont (*Dardanelles*) from Abydus on the Asiatic to the neighbourhood of Sestus on the European shore. The width of the channel, at least on the site of the original

* Juvenal, *Sat.* x. 174: "Velificatus Athos, et quicquid Graecia mendax Audet in historiis."

† See Vol. I., ch. xvi., § 3.

bridges, is said to have been seven *stadia*, or furlongs,* but the trend of the shore was such that the bridge nearer to the Euxine was considerably longer than its companion nearer to the Aegean sea. The former required three hundred and sixty vessels, the latter three hundred and fourteen. The vessels were anchored side by side, nose up stream, against the violent current which sets from the Euxine towards the Aegean, intervals being left here and there to allow of the passage of trading vessels of small size. Across them from shore to shore were carried immense cables of flax and of papyrus, eight for each bridge. Upon these were laid logs, planks, and soil, until there was formed what resembled a solid road. To prevent the danger of panic amongst the horses, each bridge was flanked with a tall continuous palisading. The engineers were partly natives of Phoenicia, as also in the case of the ship-canal, and partly Egyptians.

Smaller bridges were also thrown over the Strymon (*Struma*), and at stated points along the Thracian coast-road were collected immense stores of supplies. The nearest of these was in the Chersonese, the farthest at Therma in Macedonia.

§ 3. In the meantime the levies from every part of the Persian empire were mustering at Critalla in Cappadocia. In the autumn they moved to Sardis, where they wintered. Xerxes in person was already at Sardis when his heralds appeared in Greece with his summons to the Greek states to make their submission.

Very early in the following year (480 B.C.) the march began. The route passed through or near the towns of Atarneus, Adramyttium, and Antandrus, across the lower slopes of Mount Ida and the plain of Troy, to Abydus and the bridges. It is said to have required seven days and nights for the entire army, with its baggage and followers, to cross from shore to shore. Traversing the length of the Chersonese, the host struck into the great Thracian coast-road, and so reached Doriscus, near the mouth of the Hebrus. Hither, too, came the fleet to meet it, and here

* At the present time there is no point at which the Dardanelles are less than five thousand feet (one mile) in width, but the channel may have altered greatly since Xerxes' time.

was counted the entire force of all arms. It amounted to 1,700,000 foot, 80,000 horse, and 1,207 ships of war. There was no account taken of non-combatants and of transports

No fewer than forty-six nations^{*} contributed contingents of infantry to this enormous force, captained by nine-and-twenty "leaders of nations," all true-born Persians of the noblest rank. Over these were the six commanders-in-chief, amongst them a brother of Xerxes, Masiates, and three of his cousins, of whom one was Mardonius. The equipments of the various contingents were as diverse as their nationalities: some wore mail, some skins, some, like the Ethiopians from the Upper Nile, little but war-paint; they carried shields of wickerwork, of leather, of the skins of beasts; on their heads were turbans, brazen casques, the skins of foxes, the skulls of horses, nothing at all; some fought with sword and spear, some with bows and arrows, some with clubs, some with the pole-axe or the sling, some with scythes. The pick of them all were the Persians proper and the Medes, with the Scythian Sacae. Equally motley were the cavalry. The picked corps was that of the ten thousand "Immortals,"† superbly horsed and armed with lances upon the butts of which gleamed knobs of gold or silver; but side by side with these rode Sagartians armed only with the dagger or the lasso.

Of the fleet the majority (900 sail) was collected from non-Hellenic peoples, the Phoenicians (300) and Egyptians (200) being by far the most numerous; but smaller contingents came from Cyprus (150), Caria (70) and Lycia (50), Pamphylia (30) and Cilicia (100). The Hellenic dependencies of Persia furnished 307 vessels, of which 17 came from the "Pelasic Islands," probably Imbros and Lemnos, the

* Amongst these were Persians proper, Medes and Cissi (*Khucistan*), Hyrcani from the south-east shore of the Caspian Sea; Assyrians and Chaldeans, Bactri and Sacae (*Kirghes*), Indians; Arians and Parthians, Chorasmii, Sogdiani, Gandari, and Dadiace, from the borders of India; Caspi; Sarangians (*Sestam*), Pactyes, Utii, and Myci; Paricanii and Arabians; Ethiopians (so called) of Asia and Ethiopians of Africa; Libyans, Paphlagonians, and Matieni; Marandyni; Lygyes, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Myians, Cabellians, Mares, Colchians, Alarodians, Gaspeii, Sagartians, and Thracians of Bithynia. Those who served in the fleet alone are not included in this list. It will be seen that this list (taken from Herodotus) does not total up to the number required.

† So called because their number was always kept at the same total. They were the royal body-guard.

remainder from the whole sea-bord of Ionia between Cyzicus to the north and Halicarnassus to the south.

From Doriscus the land-force, marching westward in three divisions by as many parallel routes, traversed the length of Thrace, crossed the Strymon, and presently re-united at Therma on the southern border of Macedonia. Here, in front of the famous Pass of Tempe, it rested for a few days. Along the whole route further contingents had been swept up and carried onwards. The semi-savage natives of Thrace were amongst the most formidable fighting races of whom the Greeks knew, and formed no mean addition to Xerxes' army. How the whole enormous host was provisioned we can only conjecture. It is true that depots of supplies had been provided here and there, as already mentioned, but when we are told that the cost of a single meal amounted to four hundred talents, or about a quarter of a million of modern money, we can only wonder that it ever found supplies at all. It must have left behind it desolation—a land without grain or cattle.

§ 4. The Greeks in the meantime had had ample warning of the impending invasion. Refusing to credit the rumours which reached their ears in regard to the vastness of Xerxes' preparations, the Athenians had sent spies to Sardis to learn the truth. The spies were discovered and seized, but Xerxes, with great astuteness, gave orders that they should be carefully conducted through the whole camp, and informed of every detail of his forces and designs, and then set at liberty to carry back to Greece the dispiriting tale of their discoveries.

Themistocles, perhaps, was the only man in Athens who could view the circumstances with equanimity. The coming event was what he had long foreseen and foretold. It proved the wisdom of his views and furnished the fullest justification for the great change of policy which he had so laboriously brought to pass in the Ecclesia. He was no more surprised, disappointed, or alarmed at the threatened attack than was Pericles when he saw the Peloponnesians invade Attica. Each statesman had foreseen the event and was, so far as himself was concerned, prepared for it.

Themistocles was resolved that the Athenians should fight, and that they should not fight alone. At his suggestion there was summoned to the Isthmus, as to a conveniently central spot, in the autumn of 481 b.c., a Conference of all the states of Greece for the discussion of the position and defence of the nation. The great majority of the states obeyed the call: at heart they had little hope of a successful resistance, if not actually guilty of medism, either in deed or in will; but to attend the Conference could do them no harm, whereas to absent themselves might provoke unpleasant reprisals. To Themistocles is due the credit of having brought about this, the first and in many ways the most complete expression of the existence of the feeling of Panhellenism. There was one state, however, especially notable by its absence—the powerful state of Argos.

The first act of the assembled delegates was to promote arbitration and conciliation between those states which were hostile to one another. By these means the Athenians and the Aeginetans were persuaded to come to terms.

The second act of the Conference was to despatch envoys to Argos, and others to the outlying states of Hellas—Corcyra, Sicily, and Crete—appealing for aid on behalf of the parent country whence those younger states were sprung.

Thirdly the Conference issued a public proclamation, calling upon every state of Greece to support the common cause. Should any state voluntarily submit to the invader, they bound themselves one and all to visit the treason upon it with the sword in the name of the god of Delphi.

§ 5. The appeal to Argos was unsatisfactory. That state, at least in later days, declared she was ready to devote all her strength to the national cause if Sparta would make with her a peace of thirty years, and if she were allowed an authority in the control of the combined forces equal to that of the two Spartan kings. The Spartans, whatever they may have thought about the first demand, flatly declined to entertain the second; whereupon the Argives retorted by professing themselves neutral. Among the other Greeks there always remained dark suspicions that Argos had not only never intended to lend them aid, but had even instigated the invasion of Xerxes, in the

hope of recovering thereby her ancient supremacy in the Peloponnesus, and that she purposely made stipulations which she knew would be rejected. The Greeks never arrived at the truth as to the Argive attitude, and it is hopeless for us to attempt it. All that can be said is that the hatred of Argos for Sparta was sufficient to make her a traitor,¹ while her fear of Sparta, and perhaps her weakness, was sufficient to keep her neutral.

As regards Sicily, the hopes of the confederate Greeks turned mainly to Syracuse, where Gelo was now at the height of his power. He was master of the greater part of the island, and entertained the vain hope of expelling the Carthaginians from their last remaining footholds in the western ports. According to the story of Herodotus, he showed himself willing to lend aid to his countrymen of Greece, offering to supply the magnificent force twenty-four thousand infantry, four thousand horse, and two hundred ships of war, † besides provisions for the entire confederate army for an indefinite period. Unfortunately, his offer, like that of Argos, was conditional. He stipulated at first that he should be recognised as Commander-in-Chief of the united forces. Finding that the Spartans would not concede this, he next required that he should at least be accepted as commander of the naval forces, as the Spartans were by land. But now the Athenians intervened: if there was to be any such division of command, they claimed the naval commandership for themselves. "Ye are like to have commanders in plenty, but few to be commanded," said Gelo. "Go home and tell your fellows that their year is robbed of its spring-tide." ‡ There came no help from Syracuse, and therefore none from all Sicily.

* Cp. the attempted nucleus of Argina in 490 B.C. (above, ch. II, § 4), owing to hatred of Athens. Besides her older grudge against the usurpation of the hegemony by the Spartans, Argos still nursed the memory of the more recent invasion and massacre by Cleonenes, from which she had not yet recovered.

† This catalogue, equal to the combined muster of Athens and Sparta, must be greatly exaggerated. Gelo may have had as large a force at his command for home service, but by sending it out on foreign service he must have stripped his possessions of their defenders; and he was scarcely likely to do this at a time when actually at war with Carthage and in immediate expectation of a formidable attack at home.

‡ "Ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπαντοῦ τοῦ ἕαρ αὐτῇ (τῇ Ἑλλάδι) ἔξαραιρηται." The meaning is that in losing the aid of Gelo's forces, Greece had lost the flower of the army which might have been hers.

From Crete came no better news. As their island, so long as the Persian fleets were supreme in the Aegean, was entirely at the mercy of Persian vengeance, the Cretans had no wish to provoke Xerxes. For the sake of appearances, however, they based their unpatriotic apathy upon an alleged warning from Delphi.

Finally, the Corcyraeans proved in the event to be equally ungenerous, although making pretence of better things. They professed themselves ready to lend the aid of their navy of sixty sail—a navy only second to that of Athens—but they took care that it should not arrive until the danger was past. If Xerxes had conquered at Salamis, they would certainly have joined him, representing their remissness as a virtue. As events fell out, they proved of no use to either party.⁴

§ 6. There were three points at which the Greeks might seek to stay the advance of an invader approaching by land, corresponding to the three natural frontiers of Northern, Central, and Southern Greece. These were the barrier of the range of Olympus north of Thessaly, the barrier of Mount Oeta south of Thessaly, and the barrier of the Isthmus. The normal route over the first-named barrier was by the famous pass of Tempe, that over the second barrier was the still more renowned pass of Thermopylae; and these two were in every way more defensible than the third or Isthmian barrier. It was also more politic to defend these, for not to do so was to sacrifice either Northern Greece, or all Northern and Central Greece together. But all three barriers were in the present crisis open to one grave danger, consequent upon the fact that the Persians were as formidable at sea as on land: the defence of any one of the three lines might be rendered impossible by the landing of a Persian force from the fleet in the rear of each. Thus, wherever the Greeks decided to offer resistance by land, it was imperative that their fleet should be present to co-operate by sea.

The Greeks at first decided to make a stand at Tempe, but the force sent to hold that pass was presently

* This was the consistent policy of Corcyra. See Vol. III., ch. II., §§ 1, 8, 9.

withdrawn, mainly upon the advice of Alexander, King of Macedonia, who, though compelled to assume a friendly attitude towards the Persians, nevertheless took this opportunity of pointing out that the Greeks would, if they held their ground, certainly be surrounded, there being, somewhat to the west of Tempe, a second pass opening into the south-western end of the better known defile in the neighbourhood of Gonnus. This line of defence abandoned, the Thessalian tribes, however much against their will, were constrained to make their submission to the invader.

The event was unfortunate, for it set an example which other states too readily followed,† and without the same excuse. Of the mass of petty tribes occupying the rugged district between the ranges of Othrys and Oeta, few or none remained loyal to the cause of Greece; and if in point of numbers and of resources these tribes were not individually formidable, collectively their defection was a serious loss to the strength of the patriotic party. More than this, it laid open to the invader the road across the second and most formidable line of defence, the pass of Thermopylae, which, if defended at all, must now be held by the efforts of others. Finally, the spirit of treachery penetrated into Boeotia, and although for the present the disaffected towns in that quarter did not venture to make public their treason, yet it was suspected, and the suspicion increased the difficulties of the patriotic party. Before the danger was ended every community of Boeotia, excepting the tiny towns of Plataea and Thespiae, had gone over to the enemy. The Phocians remained loyal, principally by reason of their hostility to Thessaly and Boeotia. So did the petty state of Doris.

§ 7. In the meantime neither the hesitation nor the defection of their kinsmen shook the determination of

† The list of these medizing states is thus given in Herodotus: * Thessalians, * Dolopians, * Aenianes, * Paeonians, * Locrians, * Magnetes, * Malians, * Achaeans of Phthia, Thebans, and the Boeotian confederacy excepting Plataea and Thespiae. The states marked with an asterisk are members of the Delphic Amphictyony. So also was Boeotia (one vote). Of the whole twelve tribes of the Amphictyony, only the Ionians (Attica), the Dorians (of Oeta), and a portion of the Boeotians remained loyal. See Vol. I., ch. vii., § 8.


the Athenians. They had no alternative but to fight, for in their case no worse fate could follow from unsuccessful resistance than from immediate surrender. To the last moment they hurried forward the construction of additional triremes, and in every way carried out the suggestions of Themistocles. They addressed, however, an appeal to the oracle at Delphi, seeking to obtain thence some encouragement for their resolution. The answer was disquieting : "Quit your homes and flee to the ends of the earth, for there is no health in you, and the chariots of Assyria shall bring upon you fire and ruin." Still hoping for better things, the envoys made a second appeal, and were rewarded by a somewhat more hopeful reply: "Zeus grants to you that your wall of wood shall alone stand fast to save both you and your children. Turn your backs and flee, nor seek to stand against horse or foot. O holy Salamis, thine shall be the undoing of them that are born of woman, either at the earing or at the reaping."

Themistocles, quick to turn everything to the furtherance of his own teaching, at once interpreted the words as a divine corroboration of his naval policy: Athens' "wall of wood" was her navy, he maintained, and Salamis was to prove the scene of its triumph. Others, however, understood the oracle to refer to the Acropolis, which had in earlier times been fortified with wooden palisading. Naturally the interpretation of Themistocles, falling in with the dominant policy, prevailed, and the naval programme became more popular than ever. To remove all grounds for internal jealousies the dominant party generously resolved to formally repeal the sentence of banishment lately passed upon the leaders of the old democracy. One inestimable result of this act was to restore to his country the services of Aristides.

§ 8. From Therma the Persians descended into Thessaly by one or other of the passes, debouching upon or near to Gonnus, thus avoiding the possible dangers of the defile of Tempe. The Thessalians being in no position to offer any resistance upon their own account, Xerxes traversed their country without molestation, and in a fortnight's

time arrived at Halus in Phthiotis, near the Gulf of Pagasae, where he expected to meet his fleet once more. Thence he passed on to Trachis, at the western termination of the pass of Thermopylae.

The pass of Thermopylae was in ancient times * a narrow



A. Camp of Xerxes.
cc. Anopaea.

B. Phocian Wall and Station of
Leonidas.

D. Station of the Phocians

(The dotted lines show course of coast and rivers at the present day.)

path skirting the foot of the hills where Mount Callidromus, an offset of Mount Oeta, running eastward along the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf, falls abruptly down to

* At the present day the sea has retired considerably, and the road is now for the most part at some little distance from the shore.

the sea. For some two miles the hills met the sea so steeply as to leave bare room for the pathway. At the eastern end stood the village of Alpeni, in the territories of the Locrians. The western end was marked by the village of Anthela. At this latter spot was the temple of Demeter, the ancient meeting-place of the Delphic Amphictyony.* Farther to the west, in the direction of Trachis, the hills retired from the shore far enough to leave a small plain, where the host of Xerxes was now encamped. The natural difficulties of this, the second line of defence against an invader seeking to enter Greece by land, had been artificially increased in ancient times by the Phocians, who, in the course of their traditional feud with the Thessalians, had built a rude wall across the road where, at a point halfway between Alpeni and Anthela, the pass was narrowest. They had also diverted the waters of a hot spring,† which rose somewhat farther to the east, so that it now flowed over the path, and rendered it more than formerly rugged. It was at the Phocian Wall, which they repaired and strengthened, that the Greeks had determined to make their first stand.

It was not without considerable hesitation that the Spartans, upon whom devolved the conduct of the Greek forces, resolved to attempt to maintain even their second line of defence. The majority of those contributing to the land army were Peloponnesians, who were not disposed to risk their lives in defending their brethren of Central Greece. They would have preferred that the latter should withdraw within the Isthmus and combine with the Peloponnesian Greeks for the defence of this, the third and last of the barriers of Greece. They would have repeated in an aggravated form the blunder which had already sent over to the side of Xerxes all the fighting force of the tribes between Thermopylae and Macedonia, by selfishly declining to defend their far more valuable allies in Locris, Phocis, Boeotia, and Attica. At the same time they resolved to risk no more than was needful, and a mere handful of men was detailed for the purpose. For the inadequacy of the

* Vol. I., ch. vii., § 8.

† The name of Thermopylae was derived from this hot spring.

force an excuse was found in the fact that it was now the Olympic month, a season in which the Greeks were disposed to give more attention to their national festival than to any external peril, however great. It was also the season of the Carnea¹ at Sparta. The fleet was ordered to support the force at Thermopylae by guarding the entrance into the Maliac Gulf, and so preventing the Persians from landing troops in the rear of the pass.

It is Herodotus who tells us about the excuses made by Sparta. But it is hardly likely that, when so grave a crisis was impending, the Spartans would neglect the defence of Greece. It is probable that they thought that a decisive defeat might be inflicted on the Persian navy in the strait between Euboea and Thessaly; for in the confined space the Persians would lose much of the advantage of their superior numbers. Such a reverse would probably cause the land-army, dependent as it was on the transports, to retreat. The object of defending Thermopylae would then be to keep the Persians out of Central Greece until their fleet was defeated; thus there would be no occasion to send a large force to Central Greece, where it might be trampled underfoot by the hordes of Asiatics, and the 7,000 hoplites with which the Spartan king Leonidas now occupied the pass seemed quite adequate for the purpose in view. This force comprised 4,000 Peloponnesians (including 300 Spartiates, 1,000 Lacedaemonians, 2,000 Arcadians, and contingents from Corinth and other cities), 1,000 Phocians, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, and the Opuntian Locrians in full force. There were no Athenians in the force, for the entire population of Athens was pressed for service in the fleet, which took up its station at Artemisium on the northern coast of Euboea, opposite to the islet of Sciathos and the coast of Magnesia. It took its name from a temple of Artemis, which belonged to the town of Histiae. The Grecian fleet mustered two hundred and eighty ships, including nine penteconters.† The command was entrusted

* See above, ch. ii, § 8.

† The several contingents were as follows. Athens 117 (including 20 hulls supplied by Athens, but manned by the Chalcidian cleruchs), Megara 20, Corinth 40, Aegina 18, Sicyon 12, Laconia 10, Epidaurus 8, Eritrea 7, Troezen 5, Ceos 2

to the Spartan Eurybiades, for despite the fact that the Athenians contributed two hundred vessels, nearly two-thirds of the total number, while Sparta furnished no more than ten, yet the remaining contributory states—Corinth, Megara, Aegina, Sicyon, Epidaurus, Troezen, etc.—refused to obey any but a Spartan admiral. The Athenians, to their credit, made no protest against this arrangement. Nevertheless, as will be seen, the real control was in the hands of Themistocles.

§ 9. The approach of the Persian fleet from Therma was heralded by a squadron of ten swift cruisers. These overtook and captured the three look-out vessels of the Greeks which lay off Sciathos, although to balance this gain they had to set the loss of three of their own number which were wrecked upon a reef in the channel between Sciathos and Magnesia. Thereupon Eurybiades at once fell back to Chalcis, and on the same evening the whole force of the hostile fleet lay to near the headland of Sepias to the gigantic total of 4,327 sail.¹ On the next morning there sprang up an on-shore gale which grew into a hurricane of three days' duration, and drove four hundred of the Persian warships, besides many transport vessels, upon the rocks of the coast of Magnesia. Those which escaped the storm moved round as soon as possible to the safer roadstead of Aphetae on the Gulf of Pagasae. At the same moment the Greeks, their courage reviving at the news of this disaster to their enemy, returned from Chalcis to Artemisium, whither they arrived in time to capture the rearmost squadron of the Persian fleet, fifteen sail in all, as it was rounding Cape Sepias.

Thus far events had gone steadily in favour of the Greeks. Nevertheless, upon seeing the full force of their enemy—the fleet beached at Aphetae and the army encamped in

tremes and 2 penteconters, Styra in Euboea 2, Locrians 7 penteconters. A further Athenian squadron of fifty-three sail subsequently came up.

* There were 1,267 Persian ships of war, besides more than 3,000 transports, representing a force of 517,610 men in 4,207 vessels. There were also 120 warships from the coasts and islands of Thrace, with crews of 24,000 men. Grand total of the crews, 541,610; of the ships, 4,327. Combined with the land-army, the invading host mustered 2,641,610. There were as many more camp-followers, etc. Total, 5,288,220. These are the figures given by Herodotus. One figure only is certain—that of the warships at Salamis, viz 1,267.

the plain of Trachis—their courage again faltered. In particular the Peloponnesian contingents were eager to retreat to the Isthmus, where they would fight under cover of the grand muster of the land-army. For the defence of the territories north of the Isthmus, or even for the safety of the small force now assembled at Thermopylae, they had small concern. Eurybiades was of the same way of thinking, as was also Adeimantus, the commander of the Corinthian flotilla, which was, next to that of Athens, the largest in the fleet. But Themistocles would not hear of retreat. He knew that such a course would make impossible the defence of Thermopylae, by enabling the Persians to assail Leonidas at once in front and rear, and would lay open to the invader without reservation the whole country up to the Isthmus. He was resolved if possible to save Attica from the enemy. So earnest were his arguments^{*} that he carried the day, both Eurybiades and Adeimantus agreeing to hold their ground.

The Persians believed that they had caught their antagonists in a trap. To make the more sure they detached a squadron of two hundred sail to circumnavigate Eubœa, and block the southern entrance of the Euripus, so that there should be no escape for the Greek vessels. This squadron sailed in the night and was already well on its way when the Greeks heard of it. Thereupon they once again clamoured for an immediate retreat, and it was with great difficulty that Themistocles persuaded his colleagues at least to remain until nightfall, proposing that they should then move down the strait under cover of darkness to engage the smaller squadron at a point well out of reach of the Persian main fleet. His one anxiety was to convince his countrymen that their foe was more formidable in number than in fact, and to do this before they had once given way to their fears. He made an opportunity upon

* Herodotus says that the Eubœans, hearing of the proposed retreat, sent to Themistocles a bribe of thirty talents, out of which that personage found the means to induce Eurybiades and Adeimantus to change their minds. There was certainly no need to bribe Themistocles, who was resolved not to retreat, but it is quite likely that he had to use other means than argument to overrule the fears of his colleagues, whether or no he obtained the needful means from the Eubœans. It was a matter of life and death to the latter that the fleet should not withdraw and leave their island at the mercy of the Persians.

the evening of the same day. Standing out into the open strait, he persuaded the Greeks to approach the Persian moorings at Aphetae ; and when the latter, content to wait the coming up of the circumnavigating squadron, made no forward movement, he even persuaded the Greeks to make an attack. The result was all that he could desire : the Greeks were victorious, carrying off thirty of the Persian vessels. More than this, before the time came when the Greek fleet was to have quitted its station, a violent storm broke over Euboea and the adjoining coasts. Like the previous storm, it beat on shore, and though it did no great damage to the Persians riding in the sheltered roadstead of Aphetae, and none at all to the Greeks lying safely beached under a lee shore at Artemisium, it caught the Persian detached squadron while still off the eastern shore of Euboea,* and destroyed it entirely. The news was brought to Artemisium on the next day by a further force of fifty-three Athenian vessels, which now took their place under Themistocles. Elated by this double piece of good fortune, the united Greek fleet once again put out and offered battle. Again the enemy declined a general engagement, and allowed the Greeks to attack and destroy the whole Cilician squadron of one hundred sail.

Either by storms or in action the Persians had already lost more than seven hundred sail,† without having made the slightest advance. They now resolved to bring on a general engagement, trusting to their superior numbers to hamper and overwhelm the agile Greek vessels. Accordingly when at noon on the third day the Greeks were again preparing to attack, the Persians anticipated them. In so narrow a space there was no room for manoeuvring. The fight was a mere *melée*. When night terminated the struggle, neither side could claim the victory. Both had lost heavily,

* At a spot known as the " Hollows " between the headlands of Caphareus and Geraestus.

† Viz. :—8 vessels sunk off Sciathos, 400 wrecked by the storm off Sepias, 15 captured in the passage to Aphetae, 30 taken in the first engagement of Artemisium, 200 wrecked off the " Hollows," and 100—the Cilician contingent—destroyed in the second battle of Artemisium ; total 748. But as it is unlikely that actually the whole of the Cilician contingent was destroyed, we may put the total in round numbers at 700. The loss had been made good before the battle of Salamis. A single Lemnian vessel deserted to the Greeks during the three days' fighting.

so heavily that out of their total force of two hundred sail the Athenians found one-half to be damaged or disabled. Feeling unable longer to maintain his position, Eurybiades once again resolved to retire. It was in vain that Themistocles set his wits to work to find means to delay the retreat. Within a few hours there came a message which persuaded even him that further delay was useless, and that the fleet was needed nearer home. This message was that Xerxes had forced the pass of Thermopylae.

§ 10. Advancing from Halus through Achaea Phthiotis, Xerxes crossed Mount Othrys, and arrived in Malis on the first day of the great storm which inflicted so much damage upon his fleet at Sepias. He probably pitched his camp at Trachis, facing the western entrance to Thermopylae, on the evening of the same day. Here he was content to remain inactive in his camp until the weather should moderate sufficiently to allow the fleet to come up, the more so as he had every reason to believe that the handful of Greeks with Leonidas would, upon realising the full strength of their foe, either voluntarily retire or be compelled by treachery to do so. Accordingly he was for the present satisfied with merely reconnoitring the position of Leonidas. Thus passed four days, during three of which the storm raged. His patience now exhausted, he ordered on the fifth day his Median and Cissian troops, some of the most redoubtable in his host, to fall upon the Greeks and bring them captive into his presence. But no efforts of these troops could make any impression upon the Greeks. Thereupon Xerxes ordered up the ten thousand Immortals. The "Immortals" were not less brave and not more successful than their forerunners. On the same evening Xerxes probably heard that the Greek fleet had won its first laurels at Artemisium.

The repulse only whetted the Great King's wrath. On the next day he renewed the attack in still greater force. But numbers were useless in so confined a space, and in point of accoutrement the barbarians were no match for their antagonists : their light shields and short pikes were powerless against the longer spears and mail armour of the Greeks, and this attack also proved fruitless.

At length Xerxes determined to send the 10,000 Immortals under Hydarnes to the rear of the pass by a rough mountain path which led from Trachis over the southern shoulder of Mount Callidromus to a point east of Alpenus. Both the path and the hill which it traversed were known as Anopaea. The Immortals could then attack Leonidas in the rear, and so bring about what the Persian fleet had failed to do. Leonidas knew of the existence of this path, and had detailed the Phocian contingent to occupy its highest point. The Persians had also heard about the path from the Thessalians in their army, and now impressed a Malian called Ephialtes, who knew the country, to act as the guide of the Immortals. In the early dawn of the third day the Phocians were surprised by the approach of the Immortals, and withdrew for safety to the summit of the mountain, leaving the pathway clear for Hydarnes.

In the camp of Leonidas the Greeks had learnt from deserters the movement which threatened them. A council of war was held, and it was decided that the 300 Spartiates, the Thebans, and the Thespians should remain to defend the pass, while the rest of the small army retired eastwards, probably with directions to attack Hydarnes in the flank on his descent from the path into the road east of the pass. The Spartiates under Leonidas undertook the defence of the west end of the pass, and the Thebans and Thespians defended the east end against the Immortals.

Hitherto the Greeks had merely received the Persian onset ; now Leonidas with his 300 advanced outside the pass and fell upon the enemy. The struggle was terrible. Many of the noblest Persians fell, among them two brothers of Xerxes. Then Leonidas himself fell, and over his body the contest grew fiercer still ; four times the Persians tried to carry it off, and four times they were beaten back. At length the spears of the Greeks were broken ; and the Immortals, having discomfited the Greeks who attempted to take them in the flank, were forcing their way into the pass from the eastern end, the feeble resistance of the 1,100 Thebans and Thespians counting for nothing. The remnant of the Spartiates, driven behind the Phocian Wall, retired

to a hillock for the last stand, and were borne down, desperately fighting to the last, by the thousands that surged into the pass from either side.

Since the Greek fleet was unable to gain a decisive victory over the Persians, the primary purpose of the occupation of Thermopylae could not in any case have been attained. However, the heroic death of the defenders of the pass raised rather than weakened the confidence of the Greeks, and therefore was not altogether fruitless.

The fall of Thermopylae rendered the position of the Greek fleet at Artemisium untenable, and the Greeks accordingly retreated by way of the Euripus to Salamis.

CHAPTER V.

SALAMIS.

§ 1. Xerxes enters Central Greece: Evacuation of Athens—
§ 2. The Persians at Athens: The Rival Navies at Salamis.—§ 3. Attitude of Themistocles. Xerxes Resolves to Attack.—§ 4. Trick of Themistocles: Movements of the Persian Fleet—§ 5. The Battle of Salamis.—§ 6. Flight of the Persian Fleet: Themistocles Dissuades the Athenians from Cutting the Bridges: Honour Shown to Themistocles.—§ 7. Xerxes Resolves to Retire to Asia.—§ 8. Retreat of Xerxes from Thessaly to Asia: Revolt of Chalcidice.—
§ 9. Result of the Battle of Salamis: Reasons for the Failure of the Persian Invasion.

§ 1. THE capture of Thermopylae laid open to Xerxes the whole of Central Greece, and with it Attica and Athens. He did not, however, at any rate in person, advance by way of Thermopylae and the coast: he struck directly south from Trachis into Doris, following the valley of the Cephissus, traversed Phocis, and so reached Boeotia, which now medized openly. This was the shortest route to Athens.

The event was unfortunate for the Phocians. They had earned for themselves the wrath of the Persians by the part which they had taken at Thermopylae, but their worst enemies were their fellow-Greeks of Thessaly, who inflamed the anger of Xerxes against "the only Greeks thereabouts who had not medized." They persuaded the Great King to detach a column for the purpose of chastising Phocis. This column they at once led towards Delphi, probably with the express intention of looting the wealthy shrine, and certainly in the hope of securing for themselves the control of the oracle, with the profits attendant upon such control. The Delphians, like the rest of the Phocians,

betook themselves to Amphissa or to Parnassus. But the Thessalians were balked of their revenge, for the barbarian army, from some cause, fell back at the very moment when Delphi seemed to be in its power, and hastily quitting the lands of Phocis, rejoined the main army on the road to Athens. Themistocles had hurried back with the fleet from Artemisium. He was aware that the Spartans and Peloponnesians could not be induced to abandon their selfish policy of defending the Isthmus only. There was no hope of making any further stand by land between Athens and the enemy. The city must be evacuated. Accordingly he caused immediate orders to be issued, directing the whole population of Athens to remove, with their families and whatever else could be rescued, to some place of safety. The bulk of them passed over to Salamis. The combined Greek fleet meantime remained at Salamis to cover the migration. Only the few who, whether from sentiment or from despair, had decided to entrust their safety to the fortifications of the Acropolis, remained in the city. The Areopagus came energetically to the help of Themistocles in this crisis, a fact which was not forgotten. Any citizen who lacked the means to effect the removal was assisted thereto to the extent of eight *drachmae*, but whether this was drawn from the public treasury or was voluntarily disbursed by the members of the Areopagus is not certain. When, not later than the tenth day after the capture of Thermopylae, the Persian army united with the fleet at Phalerum, the evacuation was already accomplished.

§ 2. Upon the day on which the Greek fleet retired from Artemisium, the Persians crossed from Aphetae thither. On the next day they sailed to Thermopylae to view the battlefield. On the third day they returned to Artemisium. As they had probably received instructions to make their arrival at Phalerum coincide with that of Xerxes at Athens, they there remained inactive for three days more. On the seventh day they commenced the passage of the Euripus, and in the course of the ninth day they beached their whole fleet at Phalerum. Either upon that or the following day Xerxes presented himself before the walls of Athens, to

find them deserted. Entering the city,* he caused it to be sacked and fired, thus tardily revenging the burning of Sardis twenty years before. The few inhabitants who had chosen to remain behind had retired to the Acropolis. As they declined to surrender upon the Great King's summons, the latter proceeded to carry the fortress by assault, after first firing and destroying its wooden fortifications by means of arrows carrying lighted tow. Even then the defenders made a brave resistance, nor were they vanquished until a number of the barbarians contrived to scale the cliff of the Acropolis at a point which had been left unguarded because of its supposed inaccessibility. The temples of the Acropolis shared the ruin of the rest of the city: even the sacred olive-tree of Athens was burnt to the roots. Legend avers that within the course of the one night following the burnt stump shot forth a fresh shoot of a cubit in length—symbol of the speedy resurrection of the city from its ashes.

Meantime the combined Greek fleet, still under the command of Eurybiades, lay on the coast of Salamis, off the town of that name. On the Isthmus adjoining was gathered the Greek land-army, busied with the task of entrenching its position. The fleet now mustered in all three hundred and sixty-six sail, of which total the Athenians, despite their losses at Artemisium, again contrived to furnish two hundred.† From the Peloponnese and Aegina came a hundred and nineteen. The Corcyraeans did not come up, and from the whole Hellenic world in the west there came but one ship, and that the ship of a volunteer. The Aegean Islanders, with a few inconsiderable exceptions, were ranged on the side of the Persians, and so formidable

* The date was exactly four months after the passage of the Hellespont. Calliades was Archon-Eponymus, and the month was September.

† Viz., 180 manned by Athenians and 20 lent to the Chalcidian cleruchs. The contingents were as follows:—The Lacedaemonians, 16; Corinth, 40; Sicyon, 15; Epidaurus, 10; Troezen, 5; Hermione, 8. Total Peloponnesian squadron, 89 triremes. Athens, 200; Megara, 20; Ambracia, 7; Leucas, 8; Aegina, 80; Elatia, 7; Coos, 4 (including 2 pentekonters); Naxos, 4; Styra, 2; Cythnos, 2 (one pentekontor); Melos, 2 pentekonters; Siphnos and Seiphus, each one pentekontor; Phayllus of Crotone, 1. Total Extra-Peloponnesian force, 270 triremes and 7 pentekonters. Grand Total, 859 triremes and 7 pentekonters. Aegina presently sent up an additional squadron of 12 triremes, Lemnos and Tenos, one each; thus making the total, at the date of the battle, 880 sail. The Naxian squadron had been despatched to join Xerxes, but refused to do so. Phayllus was a volunteer. Excepting those here mentioned, and the Parians (who held aloof until the battle was decided), all the Aegean Islanders sent their contingents to the aid of Xerxes.

was their combined muster that Herodotus declares it to have balanced all the heavy losses suffered by the attacking fleet since the day when first it reached Sepias. Now, as then, the war-vessels of Xerxes are alleged to have mustered one thousand two hundred and seven sail—outnumbering their antagonists by considerably more than three to one.


§ 3. On hearing that Athens was actually in the hands of Xerxes, the Greek commanders, fearing to be cut off in the island, decided to retire in the night ensuing to the Isthmus, where they would be in more immediate touch with the land-army. No protestations of Themistocles could avail to dissuade them in the first incidence of panic. But before nightfall there came to him an Athenian named Mnesiphilus, who insisted most emphatically that to show the least sign of cowardice now would entail the demoralisation and dispersal of the entire fleet. Encouraged anew by finding at least one man to corroborate his own belief, Themistocles persuaded Eurybiades once more to assemble the commanders, and proceeded again to point out the inevitable results of the proposed retreat. Such a retreat would mean the sacrifice of all those Athenians, mostly women and children, who had sought refuge in Salamis. This perhaps was but a small thing in the eyes of the selfish Peloponnesian contingents, but it would involve also the occupation of Megara and Aegina by the invader, and the loss to the fleet of the Megarian and Aeginetan contingents—more than fifty sail. It would enable the Persian land-army to advance as far as the Greek lines upon the Isthmus, and would compel the Greek fleet to fight—if, indeed, it ever stayed to fight at all—in open water, where the superior numbers of their assailants would have the fullest effect. Eurybiades listened with attention to Themistocles' arguments, but Adeimantus the Corinthian combatted them obstinately, and it was only by threatening to sail away with the entire Athenian contingent that Themistocles was able to carry his point.

On the following day Xerxes held a council of war to discuss the advisability of risking a general engagement by sea. Amongst all those summoned to the council only Artemisia, Queen of Halicarnassus, attempted to dissuade

him from the bolder course : if he declined to fight, she pointed out, the Greek fleet would soon disperse for lack of provisions or from growing fear ; whereas if he hazarded a battle, he ran the risk of a defeat which would be fatal to his further progress. Xerxes complimented the queen on her perspicacity, but was the more resolved to risk a battle in order to prove that her caution was needless. He gave orders that a portion of the army should at once move towards the Isthmus, and that the fleet should stand in nearer towards Salamis. This movement commenced in the late afternoon.

§ 4. The nearer approach of the enemy was soon known to the Greeks, and their fears at once returned. The Athenians, Aeginetans, and Megarians naturally supported the recent decision of Eurybiades, but the rest of the fleet, having no such immediate interests involved, clamoured for retreat before it was too late, speciously declaring that such a course was demanded by the interests of their allies in the land-army at the Isthmus. The debate threatened to lead to a downright quarrel. In this emergency Themistocles despatched by boat to the camp of Xerxes a trusted slave, by name Sicinnus, the tutor of his children, who made his way into the presence of Xerxes and delivered the following message : "The commander of the Athenians, seeing that he prefers to see you victorious rather than the Greeks, has sent me hither to tell you that the Greeks are panic-stricken and about to fly. They have no common purpose to resist you, but if you attack them forthwith, you will find them fighting one with another." Xerxes gave immediate orders for his fleet to come in yet nearer, so as to occupy the eastern channel between Salamis and Attica, while a division of two hundred Egyptian vessels was detached to do the like service in the western channel between Salamis and Megara.* At the same time a large force of picked troops was landed upon the islet of

* This manœuvre is one of the difficulties in the narrative, it not being sufficiently clear whether this squadron passed round the *nothern* side of the island along the coast of Attica, or round the southern side. But there seems no reasonable doubt that the latter was the course followed. The squadron was probably meant to effect what the squadron detached from Aphetae to circumnavigate Euboea (ch. iv, § 9) had failed to do—viz., to pass completely round the island and to come upon the left wing and rear of the Greek line when already engaged. This explains why the Greeks made their attack as soon as it was light, to anticipate the arrival of the detached squadron, which would be a matter of some hours.



Psyttalea at the entrance of the eastern channel, in readiness to destroy any survivors from the Greek vessels who might seek safety there. By these manœuvres the whole Greek fleet, which was beached or anchored in the small bay where lay the town of Salamis, was caught in the Sinus Eleusinus as in a trap.* Themistocles had gained his point: the Greeks could no longer retire. They had no choice but to hold their ground and fight.

In the meantime the Greek captains, unaware of the futility of further debate and still disputing as to the proper course of action, had compelled Eurybiades to call another council, and were arguing the case as hotly as ever. At this juncture Themistocles received from an unexpected source the assurance that his plan had succeeded. The news was brought by Aristides, who had just crossed over from Aegina,† narrowly escaping seizure by the Persian squadron now moving round towards the Megaric channel. Themistocles conducted Aristides before the council, and bade him tell his news in person. In their dismay many of the assembled commanders refused to credit the word of even Aristides; but hard upon his arrival followed that of a Tenian vessel, a deserter from the Persian side, which corroborated his assertion and revealed besides the disposition of the whole Persian fleet. It remained only for the commanders to put the best face upon matters and to hearten their crews for the now inevitable struggle.

§ 5. When day broke ‡ the Greeks found the Persian fleet drawn up ready for battle. The disposition of the two fleets and the details of the action are obscure. Neither the splendidly poetical description of Aeschylus, nor the narrative, based on popular tradition, of Herodotus,

* The movements of the fleet are thus described in Herodotus: "The western wing put out and wheeled in the direction of Salamis, and those who had been stationed off Ceos and Cynosura likewise put out, so that they occupied the whole channel as far as Munychia." This account is inexplicable, because we do not know where "Ceos and Cynosura" were. They were certainly not in the island of Salamis. Grote believes them to have been on the Attic coast. The final result is certain: the main strength of the Persians lay close under Aegaleos over against the town of Salamis, while their left blocked the entry into the Sinus Eleusinus from the south-east.

† He had been recalled from exile (ch. iv., § 7), and had gone to Aegina doubtless with many others of the fugitives from Athens.

‡ It was at the end of September. "Probably the 27th or 28th," says Holm.

enables us to obtain a clear idea of the fight from a strategic point of view. The Athenians were stationed on the left of the Greek line, the Aeginetans and Lacedaemonians on the right; the Corinthians and lesser contingents in the centre. The Greek line was probably drawn up so that it faced eastwards towards the entrance of the strait and extended right across the channel from the town of Salamis to Mount Aegaleos on the Attic shore. The poet Aeschylus, who was present as a combatant at the battle, says in the *Persae* that the Great King ordered his captains "to marshall the close-packed fleet in three rows, to guard the passages out and the navigable sea-straits." It is probable that the Phoenicians were posted, facing westwards, between Psyttalea and Mount Aegaleos; the Ionian squadron, which formed the division on the left, were probably stationed between Psyttalea and Salamis; while the other contingents of the Great King extended from Psyttalca to the Peiraeus. From the hill of Aegaleos overlooking the bay Xerxes, seated on a throne, watched the struggle. The fighting began on the Greek left, where the Athenians encountered the Phoenicians, the most formidable division of the enemy. In vain the Phoenicians strove to avoid the terrible ramming of their ships by the brazen beaks of the Athenian triremes; in their endeavour to escape they caused confusion among the ships pressing up on their rear; the vessels became entangled with one another, and their very numbers proved an encumbrance in the narrow space. At this juncture the Aeginetans on the Greek right, having broken through the Ionian division on the Persian left, appear to have taken the stream of ships, some advancing and others flying, on the flank, and to have won the day. What part the Corinthians played we do not know, but it is certainly only a malicious Athenian invention which tells us that Adeimantus and all the Corinthian ships fled, until they were turned back by a supernatural messenger when the battle was already won. From his throne on Aegaleos Xerxes looked down to see his mighty Armada routed, pursued, and to all intents annihilated by the handful of their antagonists. The barbarians indeed surpassed themselves in courage; but, as

usually happens, courage without generalship proved useless. Some vessels, probably a very large number, nevertheless made good their escape, but the upshot of the battle was the destruction of Xerxes' fleet, and with it many of the noblest Persians, including Ariabignes, son of Darius and half-brother of Xerxes. Artemisia, the Halicarnassian queen, for whose capture alive the Greeks offered a reward of a thousand drachmae, greatly distinguished herself. Neither the King nor his army could bring help to the conquered, except to prevent the capture of vessels driven ashore, and so complete was the demoralisation of the moment that Aristides, landing with a number of hoplites upon Psyttalea, cut down or captured every man of the Persian division which had been stationed there.* The battle lasted until nightfall put an end to the vengeance of the victors. What was their loss we cannot say. It must have been heavy, for their enemy fought with notable bravery. Nevertheless, the victory was theirs, and in it were justified both the Naval Programme of the New Democracy and Themistocles, and also the promise of the Delphic Apollo, as construed by Themistocles, that the Athenians should find safety in their "wooden walls."

The Greeks themselves held the victory at Salamis to be the most significant event in their history, for to them it represented the triumph of liberty over the hated power of Oriental despotism. Periander and other Greeks were typical tyrants, but Xerxes was the tyrant for all time.

§ 6. The victorious Greeks returned for the night to their anchorage. The next morning found them again on board their vessels, in readiness to renew the fight. But there was no enemy to meet them. The Persian vessels had disappeared entirely, and even the land-army was in full retreat northward. Themistocles, to whom the escape of a single vessel was a disappointment, at once led the Greeks in pursuit of their vanished foe. Having reached Andros, some eighty miles to the eastward, without sighting the fugitives, they then held a council of war. The Athenians were

* The student should read, either in the original or in a good translation, the splendid passage in Aeschylus' *Persae*, vv. 855—478, describing the battle from first to last. Aeschylus was himself present as a combatant in the fight, as also was his brother Ameimias.

eager to hurry forward to the Hellespont, in order to destroy the bridges and so cut off the army under Xerxes from its communications with Persia ; but Eurybiades, and with him the majority of the captains of the fleet, who had no taste for such venturous and distant voyaging, found a specious plea for refusing to advance further. To cut the bridges, they argued, would be to keep in Europe the very foe whom they had so strenuously struggled to beat off. If Xerxes desired to retreat after the late disaster, better let him go and be rid of him. Themistocles took the same view, and used his best efforts to check the enthusiasm of his countrymen, urging that the wiser course would be to return at once to attend to their families and rebuild their city, and to postpone until the ensuing spring any action in the further parts of the Aegean. At the same time he sent another messenger^{*} to Xerxes, warning him that the Greeks would destroy the bridges unless he (Themistocles) restrained them, and pointing out that as yet the road back to Persia lay open to the barbarians if they would but take it.

The fleet returned to Salamis to divide the spoil and to award the meed of valour to those who had done most bravely in the battle. So great was the spoil that the tithe of it was enough to provide, as an offering to the Delphic Apollo, a brazen statue eighteen feet in height. The awards of merit were three—one for the contingent, one for the individual, and one for the commander, who had done the best service. Each award being determined by ballot, a humorous result was seen in the voting for the prize last named ; for each commander was found to have voted for himself as the recipient of the first prize. All, however, agreed in naming Themistocles as second in merit. The prizes for individual prowess fell, the first to Polycritus of Aegina, the second to the Athenian Ameinias of Pallene. Similarly, in the award for the most distinguished contingent, Aegina was placed first and Athens second.

It is easy to see in this adjudication the working of that same jealousy which had already led the Greeks at Artemisium to refuse to obey the command of Athens.

* The name is variously given as Sicinnus (§ 4), or Arnaces.

Even the Spartans were ashamed of the result, and sought to redeem it by according to Themistocles a public invitation to visit Sparta, where they received him with unparalleled honours. Unhappily this belated recognition of their admiral's merits, so far from healing the wounded vanity of the Athenians at large, only served to render Themistocles an object of distrust and jealousy, feelings which found effect at the elections to the Board of Strategi in the very next year, when the leader of the New Democracy was superseded by his old antagonists, Aristides and Xanthippus.

§ 7. By the evening of the fatal battle of Salamis, Xerxes had made up his mind that Greece was not a safe place for the Great King. There still remained to him a fleet much superior in numbers to that of the Greeks; but to risk a second battle was never his intention. It was therefore only to save appearances that he summoned a council upon the same evening and pretended to weigh the various proposals of his captains. Now Mardonius, as having been mainly instrumental in bringing Xerxes into Greece, was aware that he would suffer for his master's blunders or misfortunes so soon as fear left in Xerxes' mind any room for the feelings of anger and spite, and was probably confident that he could achieve better results when rid of the presence of the king. Accordingly he made use of the monarch's fears to save his own head and obtain a free hand, suggesting that Xerxes should return to Asia and leave Mardonius behind with a picked army of his own selection. He undertook on these conditions to complete the conquest of Greece. The fleet he did not need. It must go at once to the Hellespont to safeguard the bridges. Artemisia seconded the plan with the remark that if Mardonius succeeded it would be well, and if not, it was of no moment, seeing that the Great King himself was safe. This being the Great King's own private opinion he accepted the suggestion with alacrity. The same night the residue of his vessels sailed away for the Hellespont. At the same time orders were issued for the recall of the division lately sent overland towards the Isthmus. A few hours later the whole army broke up from its camp beneath Aegaleos, and

retreated with all speed towards Thessaly, for Xerxes seems to have expected that the Greeks on the Isthmus would at once advance to the attack. There presently came to him the message of Themistocles relative to the proposal to destroy the bridges. This message precipitated his retreat. It was not until he was safely back in Thessaly and rid of the fear that Thermopylae might be closed against him, that he halted to make arrangements for leaving Mardonius behind.

About the same date the Greeks assembled at the Isthmus abandoned the fortifications which they had almost completed, and dispersed to their several homes. They found an excuse in the occurrence of a partial eclipse of the sun,* but their real reason was doubtless the secret hope that the fortifications would no longer be required.

§ 8 Arrived in Thessaly, Xerxes felt himself entitled to pause for sufficiently long a time to enable Mardonius to select the three hundred thousand troops with which he undertook to reduce Greece in the ensuing year. The bulk of these were native Persians, Sacae, Medes, and Bactrians, together with the "Immortals." But lest the Great King should come to grief upon the homeward journey through Thrace with no other force than the half-million or so of his less redoubtable troops, a division of sixty thousand of Mardonius' army was detached under Aitalazus to escort Xerxes as far as the Hellespont. The king now resumed his retreat at a speed which played havoc with his followers. If we are to believe Aeschylus, the miseries of the march were parallel to those of Napoleon's famous retreat from Moscow. There was no commissariat, no depots of stores, and the country had not yet recovered from the exhaustion caused by victualling the army on its outward march some five months earlier. Thousands died of starvation, and many more were frozen to death in the frosts of an early Thracian winter. Many, too, were drowned in the passage of the Strymon, and the Thracian tribes seized the opportunity to harass the fugitives.† Six weeks after leaving

* The eclipse occurred on October 2, within four or five days of the battle of Salamis.

† The retreat is described in Aeschylus, *Persae*, vv. 484—516.

Thessaly Xerxes reached the Hellespont. Storms had already destroyed the bridges there, but the fleet was in readiness to put him across to the Asiatic shore. Artabazus now turned back, to find the spirit of revolt spreading rapidly in Thrace and Macedonia. The peninsula of Chalcidice openly defied him. Late though it was, Artabazus felt it needful to make an example of the rebels. He speedily took and sacked Olynthus, where he installed a despot by the name of Cistobulus. Next attacking Potidaea, he found himself reduced to the slow methods of a siege, and that too from one side of the town only. As he had no fleet, his labour was lost. He abandoned the siege, and returned to Thessaly, having lost one-third of his division. This was in the early spring of 479 B.C.

§ 9. Momentous as were the direct results of the battle of Salamis—the flight of Xerxes with the greater portion of his land-army, the disappearance of the Persian flag from the western and central waters of the Aegean, the liberation of the western islanders—not less momentous were its indirect results. At Salamis the naval policy of Themistocles had been tested to the utmost, and had come through the ordeal in triumph. Henceforward the Athenians were to be a naval power, the greatest in Grecian history. Their noble deeds at Salamis shamed even the Ionians into emulation, and led to another Ionic revolt, which defied Persia for the best part of a century. Their victory called into being a great Empire. It set up Athens as the confessed rival of Sparta, and laid the seeds of a division which ultimately ruined Greece. And the sole author of all these mighty results was the half-alien Themistocles, leading a people that was now, for the first and last time* in history, homeless and cast out from its immemorial seat.

The criticism of Thucydides † that “the barbarian had no one but himself to blame for his ill-success” is a complete summary of the facts. The best portion of Xerxes’ armament was certainly his navy; but not only did he not make any material use of it, but he sent it away at the very first

* This remark includes, of course, the second evacuation of Attica in the next year. See ch. vi, § 2.

† Thuc., i. 69: “τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὗτῷ τὰ πλεῖστα σφαλέρτα.”

reverse. The bad generalship which caused him to fling away twenty thousand of his best soldiers at Thermopylae made him similarly hazard the safety of his fleet by engaging in waters too narrow for its movements. He had not the courage to withstand a single reverse. Adding to these facts the inefficient training of the motley rabble of his infantry, and the inferiority of their weapons and armour as compared with those of the Greeks, it is not surprising that the campaign resulted as it did. Indeed, the few successes which Xerxes did achieve were due rather to the treachery, jealousies, and selfishness of the Greeks than to any merit of his own. A more generous policy on the part of Sparta, and a more united effort on the part of the Greeks at large, might have prevented the Persians from ever reaching Thessaly, and would assuredly have checked them entirely at Mount Oeta.

CHAPTER VI.

PLATAEA AND MYCALE.

§ 1. The Athenians Re-occupy Athens. Mardonius Endeavours to Purchase their Submission.—§ 2. Alarm at Sparta: Second Occupation of Athens by the Persians.—§ 3. Second Embassy to the Athenians the Spartans March to the Isthmus.—§ 4. Muster of the Greeks at Plataea (Plan): First Position of the Armies. Cavalry Battle of Erythrae.—§ 5. Second Position of the Armies. Mardonius resolves to Fight.—§ 6. Alexander betrays the Plans of Mardonius to the Greeks. the Greeks resolve to Retire. Third Position of the Greeks.—§ 7. Battle of Plataea.—§ 8. Submission of Thebes: Distribution of the Spoil.—§ 9. Movements of the Persian and Greek Navies. Battle of Mycale.

§ 1. THE fact that Mardonius and a large Persian army remained in Thessaly was of course known to all the Greeks, but it does not appear to have led them to take further measures for their safety. The fortification of the Isthmus was still unfinished, but throughout the winter nothing was done towards its completion. In fact, it was not completed when Mardonius again entered Attica in the following July. Nothing but the actual presence of peril could rouse the Peloponnesian Greeks to activity.

The Athenians in the meantime had returned to their ruined homes and had commenced to rebuild them. The year had been calamitous to them, not in point of direct damage only, but because it had robbed them also of the wherewithal to sow their fields for the next harvest.

It had more than once been suggested to Xerxes that the most effective method of conquering Greece was to be found in judicious bribery. The unanimity which had brought formidable forces to Salamis and to the Isthmus was but a transitory sentiment, and had Xerxes not been

in so great a hurry to obtain his laurels he might easily have disarmed all resistance. The fears of the Greeks would have been revived by delay, their jealousies might have been aggravated by bribery; and mediism, or the suspicion of mediism, would have resulted in the break-up of both their fleet and their army. Such had been the advice of Artemisia and Demaratus, but the valour of Xerxes lacked that better half which is discretion. Mardonius, however, had laid this advice to heart: he determined to try whether intrigue could succeed where force had failed, and he made his first overtures to the Athenians. The Athenians had suffered so much from Spartan remissness that there seemed good reasons for supposing that they would not reject any reasonable terms.

The agent of Mardonius in this matter was Alexander, King of Macedon, the same who had already warned the Greeks against the futility of their design to occupy Tempe. Alexander offered them, on the part of the Great King, not subjection, but alliance on equal terms. Not merely the soil of Attica would be restored to them, but they should share in the conquest of the Peloponnesus.

But the Athenians said No. We do not hear that a single voice supported Alexander's plea. With everything to gain and nothing to lose except their honour, they flatly declined Mardonius' offer. They knew to their cost, they said, all that they had to fear, but they did not fear it. There should be no alliance between Athens and Xerxes while there was a sun in heaven.

§ 2. The mission of Alexander had been early known through the Peloponnesians, as he probably intended that it should. It awoke the liveliest apprehensions at Sparta, whence were instantly despatched ambassadors to counteract the diplomacy of Alexander. Their first argument was in characteristically bad taste: Athens had been the initial cause of all the trouble with Persia, and had therefore no right now to leave in the lurch those upon whom she had herself brought trouble. Next they appealed to the Athenians' sense of patriotism, and warned them against the faithlessness of tyrants and barbarians. Finally they made

* Above, ch. iv., § 6.

the more practical offer to house and support the wives and families of the Athenians, if need should be, so long as Athens remained loyal to the cause of Greece. But it is to be observed that they made no pledge which would have bound them to send a single hoplite beyond the Isthmus. Sparta meant to secure the help of Athens, but she did not intend to risk anything in defending Attica.

The reply of the Athenians to Alexander reassured the envoys, to whom was moreover given the more particular answer that the Athenians would not betray the cause of the Greeks. They thanked the envoys for the offer of an asylum in case of need, but intimated that they expected Sparta to save herself that trouble by using her best efforts to prevent its necessity. They expected the Peloponnesian Greeks to defend Attica in the future as Athens had defended the Peloponnese in the past.

The diplomacy of Mardonius had profited him nothing at Athens. He had, however, used it elsewhere to remove any lurking scruples in the minds of those of the Greeks who were already at his command, by formally consulting a number of the minor oracles of Central Greece—Lebadea, Abae, and others—as if to show that he, too, relied upon the gods of Greece. He did not consult the Delphic Apollo. On hearing that the Athenians were still defiant, he at length put his army on the march, hurrying direct across Boeotia in the hope of overtaking them before they could again evacuate their city. It was in vain that the Thebans urged him to halt in Boeotia and try what could be done by diplomatic means amongst the Peloponnesian Greeks, who were now again mustering in hot haste to the Isthmus and feverishly pushing forward the completion of the defensive works there. He pressed forward to the gates of Athens, only to find that he was after all too late. The whole population of the city was once more lodged in Salamis, and as he had no fleet wherewith to pursue them thither, he was balked of his revenge. The Persians entered Athens for the second time just ten months after the entry of Xerxes (July 479 B.C.).

§ 3. Mardonius' wisest plan perhaps would have been instantly to send forward the bulk of his army to the

Isthmian Wall, detaining in Attica only such a force as would ensure him against the cutting of his communications. He had with him something like 350,000 men — a force amply sufficient, for the Spartans certainly, and probably also the majority of the rest of the Peloponnesian Greeks, had not yet even started for the Isthmus, and the wall was as yet unfinished, as well as incompletely manned, while the Argives were pledged to obstruct the approach of the Spartans whenever it should occur. Such a bold course, if successful, would have broken the resistance and destroyed the cohesion of the Greek land-forces, and if it failed, it would have left Mardonius no worse off than now he was. But Mardonius was no general. He preferred once again to try his skill as a diplomat, and sent a second envoy, a Hellespontine Greek named Murychides, to treat with the Athenians. Again he failed. One senator indeed, Lycidas, ventured to suggest that the Persians' offer was worth consideration, but the people frenzied by their second exile, stoned him on the spot, and their women dealt in the same fashion with his wife and children. Mardonius wasted time in completing with elaborate care the destruction of the previous year: not one stone of Athens, or of the Attic villages, was left standing upon another.

But he had lost his opportunity. While he was venting his malice throughout the length and breadth of Attica, the Peloponnesians had gathered to the Isthmus and completed the long-delayed wall. On the first news of Mardonius' approach the Athenians had sent to Sparta an urgent request that the Spartans would come to the rescue and save Attica from this second invasion. But the Spartans did not come. The Ephors had taken care, on the occasion of the late embassy to Athens, not to commit themselves to any such risk, and they had no intention of fighting if they could avoid it, except for the security of the Peloponnesus. As before^{*} they had on two occasions found a ceremonial excuse for holding back, so now they pleaded the incidence of the festival of the Hyacinthia as an excuse for not taking the field. Then came the news that the Athenians were in Salamis, their country in the hands of the enemy,

* See above, ch. II., § 8, and ch. IV., § 8.

and with it came other envoys from the Athenians, from Plataea, and from Megara, urging once more the duty of striking at least one blow for Attica and redeeming the pledge, moral if not verbal, under which Athens had refused to desert the cause of liberty. But it was only on the tenth day, when at last the envoys were on the point of departure with the threat that Athens would now make for herself what terms she could, seeing that her allies would lend her no help, that the Ephors revealed the fact that forty thousand Lacedaemonian^{*} troops were already well on the march towards the Isthmus. The despatch of this force was due to the suggestions of Chileus of Tegea, who pointed out to the Ephors that they must at least keep on good terms with the Athenians, for otherwise the Athenian fleet would be put at Mardonius' service and therewith the Isthmian Wall would cease to be tenable. The sending of the force in secret was prompted by the fear that the Argives might obtain information of its movements, and, according to their bond, might obstruct its northward march.

§ 4. Mardonius now decided to fall back upon Boeotia, where he would be in a friendly country, assured of his communications and supplies, and on ground better suited for the employment of his cavalry. He withdrew to the river Asopus, beyond Hysiae, on the left (northern) bank of which river he entrenched his army within a camp of which the area exceeded one square mile and a half.


At last the Spartans had taken the field, and in such force as had never been seen before. Hard after them followed the levies of half a dozen Peloponnesian states. Greece never made such a muster before or after.† The

* The force consisted of five thousand Spartiates, each with seven attendant helots. On no other known occasion did so large a force of Spartans take the field at once.

† Herodotus gives the exact numbers as follows. Sparta, 5,000 Spartiates and 5,000 perioeci (hoplites), with 35,000 helots (light-armed); Athens, 8,000; Corinth, 5,000; Megara, 3,000; Sicyon, 3,000; Tegea, 1,500; Troezen, 1,000; Phlius, 1,000; Epidaurus, 800; Leucas and Anactorium, 800; Oenomea, 600; Plataea, 600; Eleusis and Styra, 600; Ambracia, 500; Aegina, 500; Mycenae and Tiryns, 400; Chalcis, 400; Hermione, 800; Potidaea, 800; Lepreum, 200; Pale (Cephallenia), 200. Total, 88,700 heavy-armed hoplites and 85,000 light-armed. Add 84,500 light-armed troops of other than Lacedaemonian states, together with 1,800 Thessalians, making a total of all arms of 110,000 men. There was no cavalry.

whole was under the command of the Spartan regent* Pausanias.

After a brief halt at the Isthmus to await the up-coming



- 1 Scene of Cavalry Battle and Death of Mardonius
- 2 Spring of Gaugaplia
- 3 Scene of Death of Mardonius
- 4 Pass of Diyoscephalum.
- 5 The "Island."

of other contingents, Pausanias advanced to Eleusis, where he was joined by the eight thousand Athenian hoplites

* On the death of the Agiad King Leonidas at Thermopylae, the next heir, Pleistarchus, being a minor, Cleombrotus, brother of Leonidas, became *protegeus*, or regent. It was he who commanded the land-army assembled at the Isthmus at the date of Salamis. He dying in the same year, the regency devolved upon his son Pausanias, who retained it till the year 463 B.C., when the rightful heir of Leonidas, Pleistarchus, succeeded and reigned ten years (418-458 B.C.). The Euryponid kingship remained in the hands of Leotychides until the year 409 B.C.

under the command of Aristides. Thence he crossed Mount Cithaeron by the pass known as Dryoscephalae, and advancing to Erythrae, took up a position on the hills overlooking the valley of the Asopus and the Persian camp. The right wing, the post of honour, was taken by the Lacedaemonian and Tegeatan troops, the left by the Athenians, next to whom came the contingents of Aegina, Megara, and Plataea. The rest of the allies formed the centre. It was in this order that the Greeks ultimately engaged.

Hostilities commenced with an attack in force by Mardonius' cavalry. It happened that that portion of the left centre where stood the three thousand Megarians lay on lower ground than the rest of the Greek line. Here accordingly the Persians made their attack. The Megarians stood their ground bravely, but were compelled to send to Pausanias for help. None of the Peloponnesian Greeks had much experience of fighting against cavalry, so that when Pausanias declined to risk the lives of his own men, the rest of the Peloponnesians were quick to follow his example. Here again the Athenians came to the rescue, sending up to aid the Megarians Olympiodorus with eight hundred picked hoplites and a company of archers. The enemy, however, continued to attack incessantly until a chance blow wounded the horse of their leader Masistius and caused him to be thrown and slain. After a brave but abortive effort to recover the corpse, the Persians at last drew off.

§ 5. Pausanias now moved down from the hills to the lower ground westward, taking up a second position between the road from Thebes to Plataea on the left and the spring of Gargaphia on the right. His object appears to have been to obtain a better supply of water, but the result of the movement was to make the entire army dependent upon the solitary source of Gargaphia on the extreme right. It was perhaps not entirely by accident that the Lacedaemonians had the advantage of the position nearest to the stream. The Persian cavalry prevented the Greeks from watering at the Asopus. The Persian infantry had responded to Pausanias' change of position by moving higher up the river and putting it between themselves and the Greeks.

Convoys of provisions continued to reach the Greeks from the Isthmus by way of Dryoscephalae.

Mardonius' army, as arranged in battle order, had the native Persians on the left wing, which faced the Spartans and was to his thinking the post of danger. The rest of his Asiatic troops confronted the Greek centre. On his right, over against the Athenians, Aeginetans, Megarians, and Plataeans, lay the infantry of the medizing Greeks—the tribes of Northern Greece and Thrace and Macedonia, the Locrians, Phocians, and Boeotians. In all he had, according to Herodotus, upwards of 350,000 men, including a number of superb cavalry, who were to meet the Greek total of 110,000, of whom only a third were regulars and none were cavalry.

For more than a week did the two armies thus lie facing each other idly, both commanders alleging that it was impossible to obtain omens of good augury for the attack. Day after day the Persian horse harassed the Greeks at one or other point, but neither general had the genius to make a decisive movement. At length, on the suggestion of Timageridas, a Theban, Mardonius seized the pass of Dryoscephalae, and thus cut off from the Greeks all further supplies and reinforcements from that direction.

Mardonius now believed that he was in a position to make a general attack. If he had been a capable officer he would have seen that his best plan was simply to wait until lack of supplies should force his antagonist to attack or to retire. But Mardonius was too proud for such a course, and moreover, he was confident that by studious reverence paid and sacrifices offered to the gods of Greece he had earned as good a title as any Greek to the favour of those divinities. On the twelfth day he resolved to risk a battle.

§ 6. In the night following, Alexander of Macedonia, the same who had lately acted as Mardonius' envoy to the Athenians, made his way to the Greek lines and warned Pausanias of the impending attack. It was to occur on the morrow, he declared; but even if it did not, yet the Greeks must stand their ground, for the Persian army had provisions

* Probably the total on either side is exaggerated, but we cannot guess how far. Some critics have reduced it to as low as 15,000 on each side—in which case too few.

remaining for only a few days more. The message, although probably untrue—for Thebes was immediately in Mardonius' rear—gave occasion to Pausanias for a second exhibition of very unsoldierly spirit. It has been said that the Lacedaemonians, stationed on the Greek right—a position which they had claimed to take in virtue of their hegemony in the war and which they would have regarded it as an insult for any other state to claim—were confronted by the native Persians, the flower of Mardonius' men. Now the reputation of these Persians was deservedly high, and Pausanias, like the rest of the Greeks, was fully alive to the reason why they had been stationed opposite to the Lacedaemonian troops. On hearing that the battle would commence with the coming dawn he sent word to Aristides, the commander of the Athenian force, suggesting that the Spartans and Athenians should change places; the Athenians, he naively remarked, had already met the Persians at Marathon and were the better able to deal with them now. The Athenians were delighted thus to obtain the coveted post of honour, and the two wings changed places under cover of the darkness. But at day-break the manœuvre was immediately discovered and announced to Mardonius, who retorted by executing a similar interchange of his own left and right. Pausanias thus found himself no longer in the place of honour, while he had still to face the same adversaries as before. If the assembled Greeks had had any doubts of his motive in suggesting the late movement, these doubts disappeared when Pausanias was seen to reverse it, returning to his old place on the right wing and sending back the Athenians to the left. Whereupon Mardonius did exactly the same, and the two lines were once more in their original positions.

But Mardonius allowed the day to pass without the promised battle, although his cavalry again came into action, annoying the Greeks with incessant discharges of arrows. What was of greater moment, they choked up the spring of Gargaphia, thus depriving the Greeks of their only means of watering.

The choking up of Gargaphia, following upon the inter-

ruption of all supplies from the rear, now made retreat imperative. The Greek generals resolved to fall back towards Plataea, and to take up a new position—their third—at a spot some little distance to the north of that town, where two affluents of the river Oeroe almost surrounded a considerable extent of level ground, thence known as “the Island.” To the mass of the Greeks, who constituted the centre of the line, this decision came gratefully. Their courage, never very great, had been considerably lessened by the events of the past eleven days, by the constant strain, and by the manifest dilidence of their leaders the Spartans. They at once moved off, nor did they halt until safely under the very walls of Plataea, at least a mile farther to the south than the spot appointed for their position. In plain language, they ran away. Meantime the retreat of the wings had been delayed. The Athenians on the left were strongly suspicious that the regent intended some treachery, and therefore refused to move until the right wing also moved. But the right wing was delayed by the obstinate refusal of one of its captains, Amompharetus, to be a party to any retreat. It was all but daybreak when at length Pausanias marched away with the rest of the Lacedaemonian companies. Thereupon the Athenians also retired, and the two wings hurried forward to resume their several places in line with the centre, which they believed to be awaiting them in the “Island.” Amompharetus, finding himself thus deserted, presently followed suit. But before the retreating forces had come near to their appointed stations the dawn broke and the Persians saw that their enemy was gone; and when, a few minutes later, their vanguard dashed across the Asopus in pursuit, all that could be seen was the Greek right wing moving towards the crest of a low ridge of hills in hasty and disordered retreat towards Plataea.

§ 7. The grand army of Greece was to all appearance lost. The centre had vanished entirely, the two wings were far apart and hidden from each other's view. All alike were in retreat. There was no line, no cohesion, to all appearance no courage. And withal they were jaded with a night's wakefulness, waterless and possibly in part

foodless, without cavalry, and even when concentrated they were but one to every three of their enemies. Mardonius felt that his triumph was come, and like a bad general he grasped at it too soon. He should have kept his men in hand and pursued his enemy with caution and in good order. He did neither: he allowed his whole force to dash forward *pelle-mêle*, as if the battle were already won. The Boeotians and other Greek troops which formed his right wing followed in the track of the Athenians, but seemingly the whole mass of the Asiatic troops pressed more or less energetically after the Lacedaemonians, who were still in sight. And now, when the need came upon him, Pausanias recovered his courage. Halting and facing his men about, he proceeded quietly to offer the usual sacrifice before engaging. His position was upon the brow of a slope. As the enemy, the same native Persians whom he had so dreaded, came up in disorder, they planted in the ground their wicker shields and from behind these discharged showers of arrows upon the Lacedaemonians. In the exultation of their imagined victory they formed into no sort of order. Suddenly—for Pausanias had at last obtained the omens he desired—the Spartans ceased to stand at bay; they charged down the hill and into the crowds of breathless Asiatics below. The Persians fought their bravest in vain against the mail armour and long spears and solid ranks of the hoplites. Mardonius fell, killed by a stone, and at his fall they broke and fled. The rout of the van threw into confusion the thousands who were straggling up behind them, and in a few short minutes the whole crowd of Asiatics was in full flight to the camp, the terrible hoplites at its heels.

In the meantime the Athenians, retiring at some distance to the left along lower ground, and unaware of the predicament of Pausanias, found themselves pursued by the fifty thousand medizing Greeks. They faced round and awaited the charge. The Thebans, always foremost in their support of Persia, accepted the challenge and fought bravely, but receiving no support from their comrades they, too, were presently routed, leaving three hundred dead behind. As the Athenians advanced the whole force before them turned

and fled towards the Asopus without further resistance. The battle was won. Of the centre of the Greek army only the contingent of the Megarians came into action. For when the news came to the centre as it lay before Plataea, announcing already that Pausanias was victorious, the whole number dashed back, in the hope of earning some small share in the glory, or at least of concealing their own cowardice. In this way the Megarians, pressing forward on the left to come up with the Athenians, fell in with the Boeotian horse. Six hundred Megarians were cut down, but "no man recked of it."

The victorious Athenians hurried after the flying enemy, to find the Lacedaemonians already assaulting the Persian camp. By their help the entrenchments were quickly carried, and therewith the Asiatics ceased to struggle. The battle became a slaughter. Artalazus, indeed, who had all along been averse to a battle, had fled from the field so soon as ever he saw the turn of fortune, carrying with him his column of forty thousand men; and hastening past Thebes, made his way across Thessaly before even the rumour of what had occurred could overtake him. He ultimately brought his whole column back to Asia. But of the remaining 260,000 Asiatic troops we are told that there survived but 3,000 men. These figures are of course incredible, but we must believe that the death-roll was enormous. The losses of the victors may be gathered from the fact that of the Spartiates there fell but 91, of the Athenians only 52, of the Tegeatans (who first forced their way into the camp) only 16.* As for the helots and perioeci, the Megarians, and such as they, no one troubled about their loss, whether it was small or great (4th of Boedromion, † 479 B.C.).

§ 8. Ten days after the battle Pausanias marched to Thebes and demanded the surrender of those Thebans who had been most active in aiding the Persians. The demand was complied with after some delay: one of the leaders escaped, but the remainder were carried off to Corinth and

* The grand total of the Greek loss was thirteen hundred and sixty, as recorded on the monuments erected on the field.

† Septem b.c.

there executed without trial. No further steps were taken against those Greeks who had medized.

The victory of Plataea was commemorated by an annual sacrifice in honour of those who had fallen, and a five-yearly festival * on the field. The Plataeans were solemnly named stewards of the sacrifice and festival, and the assembled Greeks declared the town and its people to be under the peculiar protection of heaven and secure against all molestation.† This freed them from acknowledging the supremacy of Thebes. Out of the enormous spoil of the Persian camp there were set apart eighty talents wherewith to build a commemorative temple at Plataea. A tithe was apportioned to the Delphic Apollo,‡ and other shares to the Olympic Zeus and to the Isthmian Poseidon. Of the remainder, Pausanias took the lion's portion. The prize of valour, the adjudication whereof led to a sharp controversy between the Spartans and Athenians, was finally awarded by compromise to the Plataeans.

§ 9. On the very day—so tradition declares—on which the Grecian land-army conquered at Plataca, their naval forces gained an equally decisive victory on the further side of the Aegean. A small remnant of the fleet of Xerxes, after transporting the Great King and those with him to the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, had retired for the winter to Samos and Cyme. At Samos they reassembled in the ensuing spring, but receiving no orders, they there remained inactive, nor was any larger force levied from the Persian maritime dependencies further to the south. Xerxes had taken Mardonius at his word and took no measures to assist him by land or sea. The entire fleet numbered only some three hundred sail, mostly Ionian vessels.

In the course of the same spring (479 B.C.) a new Greek fleet was assembled at Aegina under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides. It numbered, however, only a

* It was styled the Eleutheria.

† The value of this public guarantee was seen fifty years later, when the Spartans besieged and finally raised the town. See Vol. III., ch. 11., § 8.

‡ The offering took the shape of a tripod of gold supported upon a brazen column of three serpents intertwined. Upon the column were engraved the names of those who shared in the battle. The column still stands in the At-Meidan at Constantinople. It was deported to that city by Constantine the Great, but was lost for many years, and not dug up until 1856.

hundred and ten vessels, of which the Athenians probably supplied the major portion, their commander being Xanthippus. There were squadrons also from Corinth, Troezen, and Sicyon. It was naturally expected that the Persian fleet would reappear in Greek waters, in order to support Mardonius. This did not occur, and encouraged by the fact, as well as by the assertions of secret envoys from Chios and Samos, who declared that all Ionia would rise against its Persian rulers so soon as the Greeks appeared off the coast, Leotychides, whose presence at Aegina was of no use to the Greek land-forces now that these had passed beyond the Isthmus, was prevailed upon to sail eastward as far as Delos. Here there met him other envoys on behalf of the Ionic Greeks, who eventually persuaded him to cross to Samos.

In the meantime a Persian force of sixty thousand men had been moved from Sardis to the coast opposite to Samos where the promontory of Mount Mycale runs out towards that island. Immediately upon hearing of Leotychides' approach, the Persian fleet fell back from Samos to Mycale, where the vessels were beached before the camp of the Sardian force and secured behind a rampart and palisade. Thither Leotychides, growing bold in proportion as his enemy showed fear, presently followed, and standing close in shore, caused his heralds to call upon the Ionians in the Persian camp, adjuring them not to fight against those who had come to restore them to liberty. This proceeding had its effect in the issue: at the moment it only caused the Persian leader, Tigranes, in doubt of the loyalty of his Ionian followers, to disarm the Samians who were with him and to detach on special service also the Milesian contingent. The latter he was foolish enough to trust with the duty of holding the passes leading across Mount Mycale to the plain of the Cayster. It never entered his imagination that he was possibly blocking his own retreat. Presumably under the impression that his victory was assured, he even allowed the Greek vessels to run ashore at a point further up the coast towards Priene and there to disembark their entire fighting force without molestation. It is said that at the moment of their debarkation the Greeks observed a herald's

staff floating shoreward, and that simultaneously there ran through the squadron the mysterious "Pheme," or divine rumour, that Mardonius had been crushed at Plataea. With the Lacedaemonians, as usual, in the place of honour on the right wing, the Athenians on the left by the shore, and the small contingents of Corinth, Troezen, and Sicyon in the centre, the Greeks at once advanced to the attack. The left and centre, moving along the level ground near the beach, were the first to engage, and these alone proved strong enough, though not without a fierce fight, to beat the Asiatics back within their entrenchments. When the right wing also came up—it had been delayed by the difficulties of the ground—the trenches were carried one after another. Thereupon the Ionic portion of the defeated force, led by the Samians, deserted in a body, and the Asiatic troops, abandoning all resistance, fled to the higher ground, only to find themselves at the mercy of the Milesians to whom the passes had been entrusted. Only a remnant of the whole returned to carry the news of this last defeat to Xerxes at Sardis. The three hundred vessels of the Persian fleet were captured and burnt. Such was the end of Xerxes' dominion over the waters and coasts of the Aegean. Without thought of further aggression he withdrew to Susa. Greece was saved and Ionia was free (4th Boedromion, 479 B.C.).

CHAPTER VII.

THE DECLINE OF SPARTA.

§ 1. Position of Greeks and Persians, 179 B.C. Capture of Sestus.
—§ 2. Fortification of Athens. Themistocles Outwits the Spartans.—
§ 3. Pausanias Captures Byzantium: he Intrigues with Peisias.—§ 4
Recall of Pausanias. Decline of Spartan Influence. Condemnation of
Leotychides.—§ 5. War of Tegea with Sparta. Centralisation of
Elis and Mantinea. Continued Intrigues of Pausanias. Lysander Murders
him.—§ 6. Growing Power of Argos. Themistocles at Argos. Battle of
Dipaea: Destruction of Mycenae and Tiryns.—§ 7. Earthquake in
Laconia and Revolt of the Helots: Third Messenian War: Cimon at
Ithome.

§ 1. WITH the battle of Plataea, the Persians disappeared from Greece. With the battle of Mycale their naval power in the Aegean and their control of the Aegean Islands was at an end.* But they still retained possession, either directly or in the persons of tyrants whom they had there established, of a number of the most important positions along the coasts of the Hellespont and Thrace. Thus Eion, the key of the north-west, was held by Boges, Doriscus by Masicamus, Sestus by Oeobatus, and Byzantium was the headquarters of the Persian power in Europe; and while these towns remained in their hands, the Persians both controlled the waters and commerce of the Euxine, and possessed also the means of throwing new armies into Europe. Ionia again, if secure against Persian attacks by sea—and while the fleets of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phoenicia were still available, even this was not certain—was entirely undefended from the landward side. It is therefore not surprising that the Ionic communities of the mainland did not too precipitately declare against Persia, seeing that as yet they had no guarantee of continued support from their kinsmen of

* From henceforward no Persian squadron was seen in Aegean waters until the year 394 B.C. See Vol. IV., ch. iv., § 5.

European Greece. With the islands it was different. They could be attacked by sea only, and the victory at Mycale had made the Greeks for the moment masters of the sea. Those of the island states which felt themselves strong enough to run some risks at once declared themselves free, and expelled the garrisons or despots representing the Persian power. The first to set the example were the large and wealthy islands of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos (479 B.C.).

The position of the Ionians was the cause of some perplexity to the commanders of the Greek fleet. Having as good as asked the Ionians to revolt from Persia, Leotychides could not well leave them to their fate, and yet he foresaw the extreme difficulty of maintaining them in their independence as against Persia. He, and the other Peloponnesian commanders in the fleet, were inclined to leave the Ionians to their fate, or at most to offer them new and safer settlements in European Greece. They suggested that the lands of the medizing Greeks, such as Thebes and Argos, might justifiably be confiscated and made over to any Ionians who cared to migrate—a plan which would have vastly simplified matters for Sparta, by ridding her of the Argives. But the upshot was that Leotychides let matters take their own course, without troubling himself as to results. The revolted island states were formally received as allies of the European Greeks, and the fleet, thus considerably augmented, proceeded northwards towards the Hellespont with the intention of breaking down the bridges, and so impeding the passage of any fresh armies of barbarians into Europe. On obtaining proof that the bridges had ten months before been destroyed by storms, the Peloponnesians declined to take any further measures and sailed away home (autumn, 479 B.C.).

Xanthippus, however, had more ambitious aims, and a sufficiently large force of his own countrymen and their now Ionic allies to put his plans into execution. He overran the Thracian Chersonese, and shut up the satrap Artayctes along with the Governor Oeobazus in Sestus, the strongest place in the peninsula. The siege was obstinate, nor did it conclude until the early spring of the following year,* when

* This is the last event of the Persian wars as related by Herodotus. The siege ended in the spring of 478 B.C., having begun late in 479 B.C.

the Persians contrived to evacuate the town at night. Half of them, with Oeobazus, fell into the hands of a Thracian tribe, who murdered them. Artayctes was captured by the Greeks and crucified. This done, the fleet dispersed, and Xanthippus returned to Athens.

§ 2. Immediately after the victory at Plataea and the chastisement of Thebes, the Greek army under Pausanias was disbanded. Returning to their own place, the Athenians commenced a second time to rebuild their ruined city. It has been said that Themistocles, conformably to his policy of developing the naval power of Athens, had already commenced to fortify the Perseaeus. He now conceived the still grander scheme which was to provide Athens herself with an impregnable wall, as well as an impregnable port. He urged the Athenians to unite in building such a wall as should enable their city to bid defiance to any further invasion. He spoke as if he had only the Persians in his mind, but it is certain that inwardly he foresaw the time when Athens might need such a defence against her fellow Greeks. Aristides cordially seconded his advice, which was forthwith acted upon. This wall was designed upon a scale of immense strength, and embraced an area very considerably larger than that of the older city.

The news of these proceedings was speedily carried to Sparta, where it provoked great anxiety. The Spartans were painfully conscious that they had been entirely eclipsed by the Athenians in almost every action against the Persians, and they felt the desirability of checking the further progress of this new-born but vigorous rival. They sent an embassy, which pretended to point out, in a spirit of pure friendship, how disastrous it would be to Greece at large if the Persian should return and occupy a city so strongly fortified as Athens promised to be. Once there, they argued, he would stay there, for no force would avail to dislodge him. It would be much wiser for the Athenians to assist Sparta in dismantling every fortified town in Greece !⁺

Themistocles was equal to the occasion. He persuaded the citizens to send back the embassy with reassuring words,

* It should be remembered that Sparta itself was never walled.

and directed them thereupon to hurry forward the building of the wall without a moment's pause, while he himself, with Aristides and another, went to Sparta to explain the views of his city. It was arranged, however, that his two colleagues should remain behind until the wall was so far advanced as to be defensible. Themistocles accordingly went to Sparta, where he easily contrived to postpone any "explanations" until the arrival of his fellow-envoys, at whose delay he professed to be much disappointed. When at last they came they could assure him that Athens was already fortified. Themistocles now requested the Ephors to send to Athens a second embassy, in order to see exactly what had been done. The Ephors fell into the trap: the envoys went, and were detained by the Athenians as hostages for the safety of their own envoys in Sparta. Whereupon Themistocles quietly informed the Spartan government that the Athenians were quite able to decide for themselves in the matter of their own walls. The Ephors were compelled to confess themselves outmanœuvred, and said no more. When the fleet under Xanthippus returned in the following spring, Athens was risen from her ashes on a scale far grander than of old. Within the next two years were completed the fortifications of Peiraeus as a separately defensible fortress and port. This, too, was the design and work of Themistocles. He also obtained the passing of a law that there should be added to the fleet twenty new ships of war in every successive year. Themistocles had now done his work, and his authority lasted but a short time longer.

§ 3. During the summer of 478 B.C. a Greek fleet again took the seas. Its commander-in-chief was Pausanias, who had reasons of his own for desiring a duty which would bring him into further contact with Persia. This purely personal motive seems to have been the only one at work so far as Sparta was concerned, for that state had already, in the person of Leotychides, decided against any progressive policy in the direction of Ionia. She provided, however, twenty ships, and Athens sent thirty. The Athenian commander was Aristides, and with him was probably Cimon, the son of Miltiades, now just commencing his brilliant career.

Pausanias first visited Cyprus, overrunning a large part

of the island, and expelling the Persian garrisons or nominees. He then sailed northwards to parade his forces before the islanders of the Aegean and the Ionians, and finally laid siege to Byzantium. Byzantium was a strong town, but it was presently reduced. Here Pausanias made his headquarters for the time being, and here he came to grief.

The Spartan training, while it sternly forbade all indulgences and luxury of living, never succeeded in inspiring the practice of frugality and honesty as matters of principle. The average Spartan lived coarsely and rudely, because his law bade it, not because he believed in it. As a consequence, no one was more prone than a Spartan to break that law when he believed himself in a position to do so with security. Now Pausanias had unluckily felt the temptation of the luxury and display of which he had seen such abundant tokens in the spoils won from the army of Mardonius at Plataea. He had received an enormous share of those spoils in virtue of his office as generalissimo, but he could not find at Sparta any opportunity for imitating that Oriental life which had fired his imagination. But once out of sight of the Ephors at home, he suffered himself to indulge his new desires. He commenced to live in a manner unknown to any European Greek, least of all to a Spartan. From indulgence towards himself he passed to insolence towards his colleagues and their followers; and finally so far forgot his nationality as to associate only with Persian companions, to wear the Persian dress, and move abroad amongst free Greeks with all the pomp and arrogance of a satrap amongst his subjects. He went further: he made use of certain of the Persian prisoners captured at Byzantium to open communications with the Great King, sending the more notable of them back to Asia without ransom, and promising to make Xerxes master of all Greece, if the latter would assist him. He even ventured to ask for the hand of one of the king's daughters. Of this request Xerxes took no notice; but in the overtures of Pausanias he saw his way to revenge the disasters of 480 B.C. He sent down Artabazus, the fugitive from Plataea, in the capacity of satrap of North-Western Asia, with orders to assist the

Spartan regent in every possible way, and with an autograph letter assuring Pausanias of all the men and money that might be needed.

§ 4. Before the intrigue could proceed further, Pausanias found himself in difficulties. His conduct had from the first been intolerably offensive to all but his Spartan followers, and these, originally less than half of the whole fleet, were now many times outnumbered by the accession of various contingents from the communities of the islands and Ionia. Moreover, the predilections of the new contingents were all rather towards Athens than towards Sparta, and in particular towards Aristides, whose conduct and reputation contrasted conspicuously with those of Pausanias. When the latter proceeded to treat the non-Spartan allies with open contempt and brutality, these turned naturally to Aristides for redress. Aristides was in no way eager to grasp at this opportunity to aggrandise his own state at the cost of offending Sparta, but matters presently came to such a pass that no other course was open. Either he must take the place for which Pausanias was manifestly unfit, or the whole fleet must disperse and the golden chance of consolidating once and for all the national movement against Persia must be thrown away. He accordingly accepted the honour thus thrust upon himself and his colleagues. When shortly afterwards there arrived from Sparta a small squadron under the command of one Dorcis, with instructions to take over the authority of Pausanias—of whose conduct the Ephors had at length taken cognizance—and to bid that personage return at once to Sparta, the allied fleet had made up its mind. Dorcis was powerless to assert himself, and presently followed Pausanias home. Pausanias was put upon his trial upon the charge of medism, but for the present there was not forthcoming sufficient evidence to justify his conviction, and probably the Ephors were not anxious to press the matter (478 b.c.).

But this quiet shelving of Sparta from the leadership in the Persian war was only the first of a series of reverses which befell her about this time. There appears to have been a general disposition, even within the Peloponnesus, to ignore the claims of Sparta to a grandmotherly right of

guidance. This feeling did not at once take outward shape, at least within the Peloponnese, but none the less the Ephors were aware of its existence. They felt the necessity of asserting the power of Sparta, and in the least offensive way. Accordingly, as Athens had taken upon herself the conduct of the war against Persia, so Sparta resolved to undertake the easier task of chastising those Greeks who had supported the Persians. Their relations with their Peloponnesian allies not being sound enough to admit of their molesting Argos, the nearest of the medizing states, the Ephors turned their attention to Northern and Central Greece. They pointed out that the bulk of the medizing Greeks in that quarter were members of the Delphic Amphictyony, and suggested that the Amphictyony should be purged of the traitor states and reconstructed upon a more desirable basis. In other words, they wished to "pack" the Amphictyony in the interests of Sparta, and thereby to obtain an ascendancy based upon religious grounds in the affairs of Northern and Central Greece. Themistocles, however, saw through the design and prevented its execution, thus adding yet another to the causes of Sparta's hatred against him. The Ephors next endeavoured to vindicate the cause of loyalty, and incidentally of course to extend the power of Sparta in the North, by force of arms. They fixed upon Thessaly as a suitable subject. Thither was despatched a strong force under Leotychides. Landing in the Pagasaean Gulf, Leotychides had gained several important successes, when he, too, fell under suspicion. It was alleged that he had taken a heavy bribe to discontinue his operations. At any rate the expedition failed, and on his return Leotychides was put upon his trial, was condemned, and fled to Tegea, whither the Ephors pursued him. But to add to Sparta's troubles that town, heretofore her staunch ally, was now at variance with her. The Tegeatans declined to surrender the fugitive, who died there in 469 B.C.

§ 5. For what cause Tegea quarrelled with Sparta we do not know. As the Argives are presently found in alliance with Tegea, it is possible that they had in some way provoked the quarrel. Or it may have been more directly

brought about by Mantinea, for Tegea and Mantinea were by tradition as much mutual foes as they were severally the friends of Sparta. Whatever the initial cause of the coolness, the question of the surrender of Leotychides so far accentuated it as to lead to open war (475 B.C.). The Argives lent their aid to Tegea, but neither side achieved any decisive results, although the real honours remained with the Tegeatans, who successfully maintained their right to afford sanctuary to Leotychides.

At about the time that Leotychides was despatched to Thessaly, political changes commenced to make themselves felt in certain of the Peloponnesian states, notably in Elis and at Mantinea. The Eleans had thus far occupied a large number of petty towns, each with its own oligarchic government, whose representatives met at a convenient central point, for the discussion of federal matters. Now, however, the country underwent a *synoecismos*, and at the old meeting-place on the banks of the Peneus was built a new capital city by the name of Elis. This event signified the overthrow of the local oligarchies, at any rate in their old and extreme form, and the substitution of a government more or less democratic; and inasmuch as Sparta had shown studied regard for the old oligarchic régime in Elis, the change was tantamount to a disruption of relations with Sparta.

At Mantinea, nearer to Sparta and therefore more open to interference, there occurred a similar silent revolution. We are told that Argos supported the Mantinean revolution, and as Mantinea, the immediate neighbour and hereditary enemy of Tegea, lay almost on the borders of Laconia, the fact that such a movement was ever effected without Spartan interference is proof that Sparta was in a bad way. Very possibly the Mantineans seized their opportunity when Sparta was at war with Tegea (*circa* 475-4 B.C.), and when therefore both those states were too busy to be formidable. In later years* Sparta showed her disapproval of this *συνοικισμός* by reversing it, but at the moment she was unable to prevent it.

At about this date Pausanias contrived to return to Byzantium, where he at once resumed his intrigue with

* In 885 B.C. See Vol. IV., ch. vii., § 2.

Artabazus. In his altered position, however, the Athenians and allies, on observing his conduct, did not hesitate to expel him, whereupon he crossed to the Troad and settled in Cleonae. Presently the Ephors again interfered and ordered him to return on pain of outlawry. Pausanias a second time returned, and after a brief incarceration was again set free. The Ephors had been roused to renewed action against him by the rumour that he was tampering with the helots; but neither of this charge, nor of the charge of medism, was any valid evidence to be found. They at length obtained by espionage indisputable proof from the suspect's own lips. Warned of his danger, Pausanias took sanctuary in the precincts of the temple of Athene Chalcioecus, whereupon the Ephors caused the doors of the building in which he lay to be built up, and left him there to starve. This outrage against the sanctity of the temple of Athene is supposed to have occurred in 470 B.C. or thereabouts. Shortly afterwards the Ephors were guilty of a second and similar act of sacrilege. Suspecting the helots of treasonable relations with the late king, they seem to have taken repressive measures, in consequence of which a number of helots fled for sanctuary to the temple of Poseidon at Taenarum. The Ephors caused them to be dragged away and slain.

§ 6. As Sparta declined, Argos rose. Argos had been steadily nursing her strength for a generation, and had now recovered from the losses inflicted upon her by Cleomenes. She had, moreover, restored the old constitution as it was before that disaster, expelling the democratic extremists who had then seized the reins of government. The Persian wars had left her unharmed. It was she who had enabled Tegea to keep the field against Sparta, and had protected the Mantineans in their recent revolution. She was looking about for other means of annoying Sparta when chance sent to her help the ablest man in Greece. This was Themistocles, who, having been ostracized in 471 B.C., betook himself to Argos. Themistocles was the declared enemy of Sparta, and he possibly owed his ostracism to this fact. Failing to find at Athens the means to put his policy into effect, he naturally turned to the state where his views and abilities would be most certain of welcome.

It was probably by his efforts that the remaining portions of Arcadia were induced to make war on Sparta. Their coalition was dispersed by the single victory of the Spartans at Dipaea near Mount Maenalus; but the mere fact that they had ventured to fight was itself an additional blow to Spartan pretensions. This battle cannot have been fought earlier than 469 B.C.

Sparta probably owed her easy victory over the Arcadians to the fact that the Argives were at the moment too busy elsewhere to put in an appearance at Dipaea. Mycenae and Tiryns had of late reasserted their independence of Argos, and had furnished retreats for the democratic party lately expelled from Argos. Seizing the opportunity when Sparta was occupied with the Arcadians, the Argives attacked and destroyed both cities. After the destruction of these greater fortresses, it was an easy task for Argos to bring the lesser towns of Argolis into a convenient position of dependence. It must have taken some little time, but Sparta did not interfere to prevent it. What with the war in Arcadia and the dangerous condition of the helots at home, she had her hands full. The Ephors, however, contrived by peaceful means to rob Argos of the services of Themistocles,* whom they rightly believed to be the guiding spirit in the restoration of the Argive power. This was in 466 B.C.

§ 7. In 464 B.C. we find Sparta once again taking the aggressive, and this time against Athens. The Athenians had, during the previous sixteen years, advanced by leaps and bounds, and, under the name of the Delian Confederacy, had built up an empire wider than any which had been witnessed in historic Greece. Now, in 466 B.C., there occurred a revolt of the island of Naxos, a member of the Delian Confederacy, against the articles of the alliance. As will be seen in the next chapter, such a revolt was by this time neither more nor less than a revolt against Athens. The Athenians had small difficulty in repressing the Naxians, but Sparta welcomed with pleasure this symptom of internal weakness in the Athenian Empire, and did not trouble to conceal her pleasure. When,

* See below, ch. viii., § 8.

therefore, in the very next year, the Thasians also revolted, they at once threw themselves upon the protection of Sparta. The Spartans at once set about preparing to invade Attica, without, however, an open declaration of war. At this critical moment there occurred a terrible earthquake throughout Laconia. Scarce a building was left standing in Sparta itself, while there are said to have perished twenty thousand of its inhabitants. In every part of Laconia and Messenia the results were proportionately disastrous, and, to crown all, the helots rose in revolt. The condition of the helots was, at the best of times, so intolerable that they were prevented by fear only and by the secret murders of the *Crypteia* from turning upon their masters, and at this time they were more than usually dangerous in consequence of the intrigues of Pausanias and the sacrilegious murder of some of their number at Taenarum. Now the serfs imagined that their day of vengeance was come. It required all the energy and skill of Archidamus to beat off the rebels from Sparta itself. The rising, however, was badly organised, and moreover, at the moment Sparta had nothing to fear from external enemies. The helots were gradually driven out of Laconia and penned up upon Mount Ithome in Messenia. Here they held out with such obstinacy as to defy the assaults of the Spartans, even when supported by many of their Peloponnesian allies. In despair, the Ephors appealed to Athens for further aid; and as the Ephors' late purpose of breaking faith with Attica had luckily not transpired, Athens, in accordance with the terms of her alliance, sent the aid requested. The statesman who persuaded her to this act of generosity was Cimon, who was in person appointed commander of the relieving force of four thousand hoplites (463 B.C.). Now the Athenians had a great reputation for ability in siege-warfare. It was for this reason that the Ephors had appealed to them, and on this ground they expected Cimon speedily to rid them of the helots. But Cimon was not more successful than others. Hereupon the Spartans became unwarrantably suspicious of Cimon's good faith, and finally dismissed the entire Athenian force without ceremony or acknowledgment (462 B.C.), conduct which

led to a momentous change of attitude in Athens. Cimon was banished (461 B.C.), the philo-Spartan party lost favour, and the party which inherited Themistocles' animosity towards Sparta again came to the front.* Alarmed anew by news of this change, the Spartans decided to offer terms to the helots, whom they allowed to evacuate Ithome on condition of their quitting the country. Many of them found protection with the Athenians, who settled them in a new home at Naupactus, on the northern shore of the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf, whence many years later their descendants returned to revive the ancient state and people of Messenia (460 B.C.).

* Below, ch. viii., § 10

CHAPTER VIII

THE RISE OF ATHENS.

§ 1. Formation of the Delian Confederacy.—§ 2. Articles of the Confederacy. Speedy Modification of its Form.—§ 3. Expulsion of the Persians from Eion and Doriscus: Athenians at Scyros and Carystus.—§ 4. Revolt of Naxos. Battle of the Eurymedon.—§ 5. Abortive Attempts to colonise Ennea-Hodoi: Revolt of Thasos.—§ 6. Decline of Themistocles.—§ 7. Aristides Leader of the Liberal Party: Revival of the Areopagus: Cimon Leader of the Conservative Party.—§ 8. Ostracism of Themistocles: Ascendancy of the Conservative Party: Themistocles Condemned for Medism: he Escapes to Persia.—§ 9. Character of Themistocles.—§ 10. Ostracism of Cimon and collapse of the Conservative Party.

§ 1. It has been said * that in 478 B.C. the larger portion of the combined Greek fleet assembled at Byzantium disowned the further authority of Sparta, and placed itself at the command of Athens in the person of the admiral Aristides.

The misconduct of Pausanias, if the immediate cause of this transfer of authority, was not by any means the only cause. To begin with, the seceding squadrons were mainly Ionian, or at least non-Dorian, and therefore inclined to serve under the flag rather of Athens than of Sparta. Secondly, they represented maritime communities, as Athens also did and Sparta did not. Thirdly, any sentiment of respect which they may have felt for Sparta's authority—and it was naturally weak amongst communities at once maritime, distant, and in the main non-Dorian—had been shaken by recent events just in the same way as in the Peloponnese. On the other hand, Athens was Ionian, and in many instances the traditional mother-city

* Above, ch. vii., § 4.
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of the allies. She was the greatest maritime power in Greece; and for the protection of maritime communities is required a maritime power. She had already shown herself zealous in the cause of the islanders and Asiatic Greeks, as Sparta had shown herself careless, in the council of war which followed the victory of Mycale¹. Athens was strong enough to set them free and vigorous in her resolve to keep them so. To all these reasons must be added the immense attraction of Aristides' personality, ably seconded by that of his younger colleague, Cimon. As Sparta manifestly was not fitted for the post, and as there was no third power to be considered, Athens was naturally selected as the leader in the war of liberation.

It must be borne in mind that the new Confederacy which was thus formed about Athens was in its origin purely defensive. Its avowed purposes were, firstly, to protect those communities which had already revolted against Persia; secondly, to complete the expulsion of the Persians from Europe, from the Aegean Islands, and from the Greek towns upon the Asiatic coast; and, thirdly, to maintain such a force as should prevent any revival of Persia's authority in those quarters.

§ 2. With these ends in view the articles of the Confederacy were speedily arranged. These articles were briefly as follows:—

- (i.) Membership of the Confederacy was open to all Greek states or communities without distinction.
- (ii.) All members of the Confederacy were to be accounted equal in respect of votes.
- (iii.) Each member paid into the Confederate chest a fixed annual sum of money (*φόρος*) or its equivalent in ships of war; and each provided also a fixed number of armed men when called for.
- (iv.) Each member was entitled to send a delegate, or delegates, to an annual Synod held at Delos,[†] for the discussion of matters concerning the administration of the Confederacy.
- (v.) The Chest of the Confederacy was at Delos, in the custody of a Board of ten Hellenotamiae.
- (vi.) No member of the Confederacy could withdraw therefrom without the consent of all.

* Above, ch vii., § 1.

[†] Delos was certainly selected as the centre of the Confederacy in order to emphasise the non-Dorian and decidedly Ionic kin of the Confederates; for Delos had in ancient times been the scene of a recurring Pan-Ionic festival.

As a matter of fact the Confederacy was practically confined to maritime states and communities of non-Dorian origin, so as speedily to become the tacit rival of the less formal Dorian league of Peloponnesian states under Sparta. The theoretical equality of the members was speedily lost sight of : certain states came to be more privileged than the mass of members, and almost all came to be regarded rather as the subjects than the allies of Athens. The quotas of ships, men, and money were fixed originally by Aristides, the total of the *φόρος* amounting to four hundred and sixty talents annually ; but irregularities in the way of omission or composition soon appeared, and eventually the obligations of the mass of the Confederates took the form of a simple annual tribute paid to Athens ; and Athens usurped the rights both of readjusting the amount of this contribution at her pleasure, and of expending it at her own discretion, without consulting her Confederates. The history of these various modifications is the history of the growth of the Athenian Empire.

§ 3. Such was the origin and first form of the famous Confederacy of Delos. Its lasting effect was to place Athens in command of an immense force ; and for the first few years she used that force exclusively for its original purpose, viz. against Persia. Her first concern was naturally to expel the Persians from their few remaining strongholds in Europe. Eion, a town on the Strymon, where Boges commanded for the Great King, made a desperate resistance. It was eventually taken by Cimon. This was perhaps in 476 B.C. Doriscus held out until the death of its commander Masicamas, falling at an unknown, but probably considerably later, date. Hereupon many of the Greek communities on the Thracian coast joined the Confederacy. It is not known whether any further European ports remained in the hands of Persia.

At about the same time Athens annexed the island of Seyros. The Scyrians were Dolopians, and they seem to have retained the piratical habits which were common in other tribes of the same pre-Hellenic stock. These habits now got them into trouble with the Thessalians, and the latter laid an information before the Delphic Amphictyony,

whereof both themselves and the Dolopians were members. The Amphictyonic Council ruled that the Scyrians were in the wrong. Armed with this judgment the Thessalians called upon Athens to secure for them the restitution which the Scyrians refused to make; whereupon Cimon landed on the island, sold its inhabitants into slavery, and left the soil free for occupation by a number of Athenian cleruchs.

We are told that Athens was the more ready to undertake the chastisement of the Scyrians because she had been ordered by an oracle "to bring home the bones of Theseus," which bones were said to be interred in Scyros. The excuse was an excellent one of course, but Athens had reasons enough in the wish to secure her own commerce from piracy and to obtain for herself an island sixty miles in circuit. Cimon's reputation, both as a general and as a patriot, was greatly increased by the success which attended him in his fulfilment of the oracle. Very evidently he was in favour with the spirit of the national hero, who was forthwith provided with a new temple, the Thescum, and honoured with a new annual festival.

Somewhat later we are told that the Carystians of Euboea, singlehanded, resisted for some time the attack of Athens, ultimately coming to terms with their assailants. We do not know what the war was about; possibly, at this date, Carystus was the only community in Euboea which did not acknowledge the League, and Athens took advantage of its isolation to compel its inclusion. A decent excuse would be found in the meism of Carystus in the year of Xerxes' invasion.* Besides, the Carystians, like the Scyrians, were an alien people,† and therefore enjoyed the less claim to consideration. But whereas the Confederation originally declared that any state or community *might* become one of its members, we now find it laying down the command that all whom the Synod desired to enrol *must* become members. The Confederacy is no longer defensive and voluntary, it is compulsory and aggressive. This change of feeling soon led to complications.

* On the same excuse it had been chastised and fined after Salamis. But in 490 B.C. it had been loyal and had suffered for it (ch. ii., § 6).

† They were Dryopians, the remnant of a population of the same character and age as the Dolopians.

§ 4. In the year 466 B.C., only twelve years after the first foundation of the Confederacy, the island of Naxos formally seceded. It was at once attacked, besieged, and compelled to return to its allegiance. Thucydides says it was "enslaved," meaning possibly that it was deprived of the right of independent action. Unluckily we are not told for what reasons it seceded, or whether it was alone in its secession, or whether any of the Confederates were inclined to approve of the course which the Naxians adopted. We have only the fact that in this year occurred the first symptom of dissatisfaction within the Confederacy, and the first instance of a compulsory continuance of membership.

At the same juncture news reached the Confederacy of fresh activity on the part of Persia. The Great King was busily collecting a large fleet and force on the river Erymmedon in Pamphylia. It was evidently the intention of Xerxes to follow the plan of Darius, and to endeavour to throw an army into Greece by sea. The navies of Phoenicia and Egypt were already mustering for the purpose. The Confederate fleet was at the time in the neighbourhood of the Carian coast, commanded as usual by Cimon. He had with him two hundred sail. Putting out from Cnidus, whence he had been watching the movements of Persia, he arrived off the mouth of the Erymmedon to find a fleet of between two and three hundred sail already assembled there, while a further flotilla was hourly expected to arrive from Cyprus. The army of invasion lay encamped on the shore under the command of Pherendates. Cimon decided to attack before the expected Cyprian flotilla could come up. With little trouble he drove the enemy's whole fleet ashore, capturing the greater part of the vessels; then disembarked his men and stormed the Persian camp. Within a few hours Cimon again stood out to sea, intercepted the Cyprian fleet of eighty sail at a place called Hydron, and captured

* One of the articles of the Confederacy provided that no member should withdraw without the consent of all. It is possible that this article was ignored in the case of Naxos; but it is highly probable that the secession of Naxos was regarded as connected with the renewed activity of Persia, and even without such representations, the occurrence of the secession at the moment when Greece was menaced with a new Persian invasion would suffice to alarm the rest of the Confederacy and to alienate their sympathies from the Naxians. See below. ch. xi., § 8.

or destroyed the whole. Many towns of Caria and Lycia at once went over to the Delian Confederacy, and the power of the Confederates was immensely extended towards the south and south-east. Cimon returned to Athens with an enormous spoil in ships and prisoners, and with popularity greater than ever.

§ 5. The next event in Athenian history was of less creditable sort. In pushing her naval supremacy far and near Athens did not forget to push also her commerce. She had in particular long looked enviously towards the gold mines of Pangaeus and Scapto Hyle in Thrace. In part, these were in the hands of the native Thracians, but a considerable portion of them belonged to the Thasians, who had at different times planted some half-dozen mining colonies on the gold-coast opposite, and at the present date derived from the mines an annual revenue of eighty talents or more. For the rest, they were loyal members of the Delian Confederacy, possessing a considerable navy and a strongly fortified capital town. But Athenian trade jealousy would not leave them to enjoy their advantages in peace. Already, upon the capture of Eion, in 476 B.C., there had been made an unsuccessful attempt to plant there a colony of Athenian settlers. Some ten years later the attempt was repeated, with similar ill-success, the ten thousand colonists who were conducted to Ennea-Hodoi by Cimon being attacked and annihilated by the Edonians, a Thracian tribe. Ennea-Hodoi—the Nine Roads—on the banks of the Strymon, the spot subsequently to be famous as Amphipolis, was in every way a position of the first importance. Strategically it held the fords of the Strymon, and commanded both Macedonia and Thrace; its wide and safe estuary might be developed into a superb naval port; and commercially it controlled the entire traffic up and down the Strymon, as well as that passing along the coast route from Asia through Thrace to Macedonia and Greece, while it was convenient for the opening up of mining operations.

Naturally the Thasians took offence at this infringement of their monopoly, and, finding remonstrance vain, they went to war with Athens. It was an unwise act on the part of the Thasians, who had just seen Naxos brought to reason

and the prestige and power of Athens vastly increased by the victory of Cimon on the Eurymedon. Cimon destroyed or captured the Thasian navy, overran the island, and laid siege to the town. The Thasians now turned to Sparta. The Ephors, concerned to see the power of Athens rising, and rising, too, in a sphere inaccessible to Spartan arms, even faster than Sparta's authority was declining, and being moreover at the moment free from wars nearer home, resolved to assist the Thasians. They formed the design of suddenly invading Attica, and of raising the siege of Thasos by compelling the Athenians to recall their fleet for service nearer home. It was a foolish plan, as the Spartans found out in the days of the Peloponnesian war. It was also a dishonest plan, for Sparta was at peace with Athens. Chance intervened to save the Ephors from the guilt of such a breach of their oaths, for at the moment when the Lacedaemonian army was about to march out occurred the great earthquake and the consequent Helot Revolt. The Thasians accordingly, left to defend themselves, were compelled to surrender after a siege of two years. They abandoned all claim to their possessions in Thrace, allowed their walls to be razed, and agreed to pay a war indemnity. Their navy was already lost. This was in 463 B.C. In the same year, as has been already related, Cimon conducted an Athenian force to the aid of the Spartans against the revolted helots on Ithome, and two years later (461 B.C.) he was banished. To explain this it is now needful to trace the workings of party policy in Athens since the year 479 B.C.

§ 6. The victory of Salamis, by removing the peril to which Themistocles owed his ascendancy, deprived him also of some of his authority; and at the same time, by no fault of his own, he became the object of invidious attacks, as being the recipient in his own person of all those honours which had been unjustly denied to the Athenians at large for their share in the victory.* He was superseded by his old rivals—by Xanthippus and Aristides, once the leaders of the Old Democrats. But when, after the Persians were driven from Greece, the Athenians found themselves at

* Above, ch. v., § 6.

variance with Sparta on the question of the fortification of the city,* Themistocles again came to the front, and by the address with which he met and defeated the aims of Sparta, he gained such a measure of renewed popularity as enabled him at once to carry through three costly schemes which he had at heart—the fortification of Athens on a roomier and grander scale, the fortification of the Peiraeic peninsula, and his scheme for maintaining the navy by the addition of twenty ships yearly. He had scarcely accomplished this when Xanthippus returned with the fleet from Sestus (spring, 478 B.C.), bringing the news that the Persian navies were swept from the Aegean, and that the Greeks of the Asiatic coast were ready to unite all their forces to guarantee at once their own liberty and the freedom of the seas as against Persia. With this news the Athenians felt themselves secure. The crisis was past, and Themistocles was no longer the man of the moment. He sank again into a position of secondary importance, and for the next four years the confidence of the Ecclesia was given to Aristides.† It is only in questions affecting the relations of Athens with Sparta that we hear of Themistocles again. His countrymen do not seem to have had confidence in him in regard to any but grave crises in foreign affairs; and, indeed, his genius was not of the sort to shine in domestic politics.

There was, moreover, another and a very weighty reason why Themistocles lacked influence in domestic politics: he was a man without ancestry, and therefore without traditions. The men who led the Ecclesia in its best days were the representatives of great families and long-standing traditions—members of the Alcmaeonid house, such as Cleisthenes, Xanthippus, and Pericles, or of the house of the Philaidæ, such as Miltiades, Cimon, and Thucydides.

The leader who would maintain any lasting authority over the Ecclesia must be a man of birth. This Themistocles was not. When no grave dangers lifted the average Athenian above purely personal considerations, he preferred to have for a leader one whom he felt to be his social

* Above, ch. vii., § 2.

† Xanthippus seems to have died about 476 B.C.

superior. Men like Aristides, Xanthippus, and Cimon were therefore at an advantage as against Themistocles, who seems, moreover, to have been more skilful in making enemies than in winning friends. He lacked the cultivated tact of the aristocrat who is born to office.

§ 7. The shelving of Themistocles left the arena of politics open to a number of his "beiters,"* between whom had still to be decided the question of rival policies. Now Xanthippus and Aristides, lately the leaders of that section of the democracy which, by contrast with the Themistoclean section, we have called the Old Democracy, had at an early date adopted the policy of their whilom rival in its more important point—viz., as concerned the navy. Aristides in particular did more than any other of his time to broaden the basis upon which rested the maritime power of Athens, and to consolidate it, for it was his honesty and integrity which gave shape to the Delian Confederacy and settled once and for all the delicate question of the assessment of the various members. These two statesmen represented the party which ultimately made Athens the mistress of the Confederacy, an Imperial city, the constant and avowed rival of Sparta; though this last position was with them not so much the purpose which it had been in Themistocles' mind, as an inevitable result of other purposes. They were the leaders of the Liberal Party, the party of progress, the democrats. On the other hand, they were men of birth and high social position, and substance—three facts which constitute, as it were, the ballast of a politician, preventing his drifting too rapidly into reforms which break down old ties without substituting new ones in their place. When the Ecclesia came to follow the lead of men who possessed nothing but the opinions of a liberal policy, without the needful ballast, it speedily learnt the difference. But at the period now under notice, whatever slight tendency in that direction had made itself manifest in the support accorded to Themistocles, had received a great and lasting check. The conduct of the Areopagites—that is, of the aristocrats—on the occasion of the first evacuation of Athens, and,

* The classical use of the word. In Greece the aristocratic party were ἀριστοί, καλοκάγαθοί, their rivals κακοί.

indeed, throughout the whole of the war, had won for them new respect. The Persian Invasion left the old nobility of the state, whatever their political attitude, in a stronger position than ever, and for many years they were strong enough to withstand any attempts to modify the constitution on more liberal lines.*

Opposed to Aristides and the liberal party was the Conservative Party under Cimon. Cimon was the son of Miltiades. He had married a daughter of the Alcmaeonidae, thereby additionally strengthening his position. He was a man of great wealth and considerable culture, a brilliantly successful commander alike on land and sea, the embodiment of the Greek ideal of the virtue of *megaloprepeia*—handsome conduct and character. He was, in fact, the type of the genuine oligarchic noble controlled and improved by democratic influences. He represented the old Eupatrid nobility which had once ruled Athens, but now shared its powers with the democratic party; and from his forbears he inherited the tradition that Sparta was the rightful hegemon of Greece, with the corollary that it was the duty of Athens to cultivate always the best relations with Sparta. His party constituted the great external check upon an unduly rapid extension of liberalism, and for nearly twenty years the foreign policy of Athens swayed to and fro between the philo-Laonism of the Cimonian party and the miso-Laonism of Themistocles, until it found equipoise in the independent national policy of Pericles.

§ 8. For several years the parties of Aristides and Cimon worked harmoniously together. They formed a solid coalition, against which Themistocles was powerless, so that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the latter was ostracised in or about 471 B.C. But we have no means whatever of discovering the particular charge upon which he was got rid of, whether meidism, corruption, aggressive miso-Laonism, or (as Plutarch says) extreme liberalism. Possibly the last-named was the chief question—a question

* The student does not need to be reminded that it is quite possible for a nation to be governed well and long by a liberal statesman without any modification of its constitution in a liberal direction. The constitution is a fact behind and above party politics.

provoked by the persistence with which Themistocles continued to push his efforts for the development of the powers of the sea-faring and purely commercial element in the State—and the other charges were merely raked up to lend weight to the whole indictment. Whatever the reason, he was ostracised, and withdrew to Argos, choosing to live in that state which promised to afford the greatest scope for his hatred of Sparta. We have seen to what extent he was able to satisfy that hatred. But his banishment, by removing the one element of opposition which had thus far kept united the other two parties in the State, speedily led to the disruption of the coalition. It was, in fact, a triumph for the conservative party, and gave to Cimon an ascendancy which, for the present, silenced Aristides. The liberal party now entered upon a period of decline; the conservatives drew closer and closer their relations with Sparta. When, in 466 B.C., the Ephors, alarmed by the ascendancy of Themistocles in Argos, took definite measures against him, they found willing abettors amongst the Cimonians in Athens. They professed to have found in the documents seized from Pausanias evidence incriminating Themistocles in the same medism for which Pausanias had lost his life. As the matter was only set afoot some five or six years after Pausanias' death, we may question the alleged documentary evidence. There were, however, certain well-known facts in Themistocles' life which could be readily twisted into corroborative evidence—for instance the correspondence of Themistocles with Xerxes before and after the battle of Salamis, and the fact that he was now residing within a state more than suspected of medism. Leobotas, an Alcmaeonid, undertook to impeach* the absentee, and was of course supported more or less actively by Cimon. Themistocles was condemned as a traitor, and much of his property confiscated.

Officers were at once sent to arrest him at Argos. He

* Ostracism was, of course, a very different thing from condemnation in a court of law. In the usual course of things there was every likelihood that Themistocles would soon return to Athens (for a sentence of ostracism did not by any means always hold good for the theoretical ten years). It was Sparta's design to rid herself once and for all of Themistocles by running him in the legal sense before he could have the benefit of any reaction in his favour at Athens, and at a time when he was unable to appear and defend himself in person.

fled to Zacynthos. The Zacynthians dared not shelter him, and he passed on to Epeirus, throwing himself on the mercy of the Molossian King Admetus. Admetus sent him safe to Pydna, in Macedonia. Thence he took ship to Ephesus, narrowly escaping seizure by the Athenian fleet at the moment investing Naxos; and proceeding boldly to Susa, declared his identity and demanded protection on the ground that he had enabled Xerxes to escape from Greece in 480 B.C. Xerxes welcomed him cordially, and appointed him Governor of Magnesia, with large revenues for his expenses. This was about 464 B.C. We hear no more of him. He must have died soon afterwards, without having done—probably without having intended to do—anything on behalf of Persia to the damage of Greece. There is not a shred of evidence, either in his earlier or in his later years, that he ever harboured the designs of treachery for which he was condemned while alive, and with which his memory was blackened after death. He was merely a victim of Spartan enmity. He had pitted himself against Sparta, and had been worsted.

§ 9. Herodotus disliked Themistocles, and says nothing in his favour except what he could not avoid saying. Thucydides is juster: “His strength of character was quite exceptional and peculiar. With him natural wit supplied the place of experience. He grasped a situation instantly, and his power of foresight was extraordinary. His skill in working out a plan was on a par with the success which invariably attended him. He was beyond all others the man of resource in any emergency.” Nothing can be added to Thucydides’ brief outline of the man’s character. In regard to his conduct, so many of the charges made against him are manifestly groundless, that we have excuse to doubt them all. We are told that he was always open to a bribe; but if we admit that he accepted the bribes as alleged, the circumstances are usually such as to lead to the belief that he only took in order to give. He was not himself a man of means, and therefore he was forced to accept from others the means of influencing a Eurybiades or an Adeimantus. A Pericles or a Cimon would have paid the required sums out of his own estate without feeling the

loss. Themistocles, in pursuing the same means to his ends, was compelled to expose himself to the charge of personally receiving bribes. There are various stories also representing him as a man utterly devoid of scruple and honour. There is no evidence to support them, and they one and all bear the likeness of parables invented to justify the bad name of Themistocles and the high reputation of his rival Aristides. The message which he sent to Xerxes after Salamis, a message which went far towards ridding Greece of Xerxes, has been already mentioned.* Events drove him at last to seek shelter with Xerxes, and his ready wit enabled him to turn to his own protection the very message which had been sent in the best interests of his country. It had been prompted, he alleged, solely by regard for the Great King's safety: by preventing the destruction of the Hellespontine bridges he had saved both Xerxes and his army. His conduct in thus re-interpreting the message at a moment when his life was no longer safe in the country which he had saved, is the worst piece of falsehood which can be alleged against him. Could any one blame him for it?

§ 10. In the very same year in which Themistocles was condemned Cimon won his great victory at the Eurymedon, and Naxos was reduced by siege. It was clear that, however willing to oblige Sparta in minor matters, the party of Cimon were not less bent than the party of Aristides upon advancing the power of Athens to the utmost. But now that the arch-enemy was hounded out of Greece, the Ephors took courage. Finding an excuse in the appeal of the Thasians, they would have attacked Athens but for the revolt of the helots. Had the projected invasion ever occurred, the ascendancy of the Cimonian party would have been at an end at once. It is doubtful whether the treacherous intention of the Ephors was known for some little time after the event: possibly the Cimonians were able to put another interpretation upon Sparta's warlike preparations when these became matters of common knowledge. They may have even advocated the sending of assistance to Sparta against the helots as a means of disarming the jealousy which they knew to exist at Sparta,

* See above, ch. v., § 6

At any rate, when Sparta applied for an Athenian force to assist in the reduction of Ithome, Cimon prevailed upon the Ecclesia to assent, and personally commanded the force. The result has been already related. The Athenian force returned to Athens, not only without success but publicly insulted, and Cimon, as responsible for the whole business, was made the scapegoat of Athenian wrath. The liberals, now led by Ephialtes, seized their opportunity, and instantly gained complete ascendancy in the Ecclesia. After a few preliminary skirmishes* with the rival party, by way of testing their relative strength, the liberals found themselves strong enough to appeal to ostracism. Cimon was banished, and thus, in 461 B.C., the liberal party were left in complete possession of the political field. Their first step was an open renunciation of all connection with Sparta, and a formal challenge of the position of that state as hegemon of the territorial states of Greece. Athens was already the maritime power of Greece; they resolved that she should be a territorial power also. In fact, they abandoned the moderate liberalism of Aristides, and took up the extreme position in which Themistocles had so long and vainly stood alone.

Of Ephialtes and his achievements little is known. He is supposed to have been of comparatively humble parentage and estate, as was Themistocles. He led the democratic party to its victory of 461 B.C., and we are told that he followed up this success by an attack upon the Council of the Areopagus, first securing the condemnation of a number of its more distinguished members on charges of corruption, and thereafter proceeding to curtail the powers and privileges of the Council as a whole. His leadership was short-lived. He was assassinated within a few months, and his place and power passed to Pericles.

* Cimon was impeached on vexatious charges, according to the method of political annoyance common to Athens and Rome. He is said to have been indicted for peculation, and of course acquitted. The prosecutor was Pericles, of whom we now hear for the first time.

CHAPTER IX.

ATHENS A TERRITORIAL POWER.

§ 1. Alliance of Athens with Argos, Thessaly, and Megara : Occupation of the Isthmus.—§ 2. Athenian Expedition to the Nile : War with Aegina and Corinth : Victories of Myronides in Megaris.—§ 3. Commencement of the Long Walls of Athens : War of Doris and Phocis. Nicomedes enters Boeotia.—§ 4. Battle of Tanagra and recall of Cimon.—§ 5. Battle of Oenophyta and Occupation of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris : Reduction of Aegina.—§ 6. Affairs in Egypt. Double Disaster to the Athenian Fleet : Athens makes Truce for Five Years with Sparta.—§ 7. The Double Victory at Salamis : Death of Cimon and cessation of the Persian Wars.—§ 8. The Problematical Peace of Callias.—§ 9. Character of Cimon —§ 10. Pericles.

§ 1. THE first act of the new government was publicly to disown the philo-Spartan policy of the fallen Cimonian party by renouncing the alliance which had for twenty years subsisted between Sparta and Athens. The two states were now declared rivals, if not actually enemies. The enemies of Sparta were therefore the friends of Athens, and accordingly an alliance was made between Athens and Argos, and between Athens and Thessaly. Neither the one nor the other state proved of any great use to Athens.

This change of front on the part of Athens speedily involved her in new and more costly complications. The past twenty years had brought with them a vast increase in the numbers and activity of the Athenian commercial class. The city was rapidly becoming a city of merchants, and increasingly jealous of the commercial position of the rival merchant-states upon the Saronic Gulf, viz. Corinth, Aegina, and Megara, all of which were members of the Peloponnesian Alliance. When, therefore, there occurred a dispute between Corinth and Megara, and the smaller state

appealed to Athens for support, the Athenians readily responded. The moment seemed opportune for damaging the commercial power of Corinth, for bringing that of Megara within Athenian control, and for taking away one ally of Sparta and crippling another. There was another and more important object to be gained: in accepting the task of relieving Megara, Athens would occupy the Megarid, and whereas at present her western frontier was weak and liable at any moment to attack by way of the Isthmus, she would now secure a new and eminently defensible frontier along the line of the Geranean Mountains, would hold the keys of the Isthmus, and thereby would not only prevent any Peloponnesian force from reaching Attica by land, but would further cut off Sparta from her allies in Boeotia. Megara was at once occupied, as were also its two ports of Pegae and Nisaea, respectively on the western and eastern shore of the Isthmus. To further secure the town two parallel walls were built to unite it in one system of fortification with the eastern port, Nisaea. But what gave yet greater offence at Corinth was that, by the occupation of Pegae, the greatest and most grasping naval power of Greece had forced its way within the Corinthian Gulf, the peculiar waters of Corinthian trade. But the Corinthians lay passive. They were not yet certain that Sparta was free to support them in forcible interference, and, on the other hand, Athens, if attacked, was at this juncture free to employ her whole strength against any single aggressor.

§ 2. The energies of Athens did not long remain undivided. The new government did not venture to break at once with every tradition of the last twenty years and to renounce those pledges upon the strength of which the Delian Confederacy had gathered about Athens. Nevertheless, the step which they now took proved as disastrous as it was unwise. In 462 B.C. the Egyptians, led by the Libyan prince Inaros, for the second time revolted from Persia. The Confederate fleet was at the moment employed as far south as the coasts of Phoenicia and the island of Cyprus. It seemed but a step farther to Egypt. Accordingly two hundred sail of war were sent to the Nile to

support Inaros. The liberation of Egypt was of course desirable, because it would rob Persia of the half of her small remaining navy, would doubtless open new and lucrative markets to the Athenian merchants, and would bring to the Confederacy new forces and new revenues. But for Athens to undertake a scheme so difficult and costly, in so distant a land, at the very moment when she had rudely challenged the hostility of the whole Peloponnesian Alliance, was an egregious blunder which soon made itself felt.

The Egyptian fleet sailed, and with it went one half of the navy of Athens (460 B.C.). But the Ecclesia, flushed with the easy acquisitions of the preceding year, was not content to await results. It was resolved to strengthen its grasp upon the Saronic Gulf and to draw closer its communications with Argos. It was desirous to obtain a convenient port of communication between Peiraeus and Argolis. The site selected was on the southern shore of the Argolic peninsula, in the immediate neighbourhood of Hermione, and in the occupation of a community called Halieis, who were the more objectionable because they had given shelter to the fugitives from Tiryns, and because they preferred the friendship of Sparta to that of Argos and Athens. The position, moreover, commanded the trade-route from Cenchreæ to the south. Naturally the Corinthians were alarmed : they joined with the Epidaurians to prevent the projected landing of the Athenians. A land battle followed, in which the Athenians seem to have had the worst, but matters were balanced by the victory of their fleet off the islet of Cecryphalea. Shortly afterwards they seem to have persuaded the Troezenians to join them, and thus obtained, without further trouble, the port and fortress which they desired.

Hereupon Aegina took the alarm ; for the establishment of the Athenians at Troezen menaced Aegina and Corinth alike. The Aeginetans still possessed a considerable navy : jointly with that of Corinth it might hope to do great things, particularly at a time when so large a portion of the navy of Athens and her Confederates was absent in Egypt. But the Athenians desired nothing more than an occasion to

rid themselves once and for all of Aeginetan rivalry. Their fleet forced a battle off the island, captured seventy of the Aeginetan warships, and landed a large force which forthwith laid siege to the town of Aegina. The Aeginetans appealed to Corinth for relief. The Corinthians, fancying that Athens now had her hands full, attempted to compel the retirement of the force which was investing Aegina by invading the Megarid. Against Megara itself they could of course effect nothing, but they could lay waste the surrounding country. They were so engaged when confronted by a hastily levied Athenian army of time-expired and ephebi, under the command of Myronides. Neither side gained any great success in the ensuing battle, but the Corinthians withdrew homewards, and Myronides occupied Megara. Twelve days later the Corinthians came back, burning to redeem the disgrace of their repulse by such an army. Myronides surprised them at a place called Cimolia, slew some hundreds, and chased the survivors out of the Megarid. Not a man or ship had been withdrawn from Aegina or elsewhere, and yet the redoubtable Corinthians had been twice disgracefully beaten (458 B.C.). The blockade of Aegina went on by land and sea, and Athens was mistress of the Saronic Gulf.

§ 3. About this date Pericles commenced to improve the fortifications of the city. Under his directions were now constructed the famous Long Walls connecting Athens with Peiraeus. Experience had already shown the value of such works in the case of Megara and Nisaea. The walls now built were two, the northern wall and the southern or Phaleric wall; the third, or middle wall, was of later date. The work is believed to have been originally projected, if not actually begun, by Cimon; but now that most of the Peloponnesians was at feud with Athens, Pericles had an additional reason for carrying it through. He knew that Athens could not hope always to pen the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, and that if once they passed the Isthmus, Attica would lie at their mercy. He wished therefore to provide his countrymen with a fortress strong enough to withstand all assaults, and large enough to shelter the entire population of Attica. The Peloponnesians

might sit without as long as they pleased, but they could never hope to take by siege the fortress-city of Pericles' ideal; and so long as the Athenian navy was supreme, the city could laugh at all threats of blockade. Time proved Pericles to be in the right.

If the Spartans had regarded with apprehension the building of the walls of Themistocles in 479 B.C., much more apprehensive were they on observing the dimensions and progress of the Periclean walls. Yet the new works were almost completed when at last the Ephors took action. In 457 B.C. the Phocians made war upon the tiny state of Doris. Doris at once appealed to Sparta. The Spartans could not refuse the call of their mother-state, and forthwith put into the field an army of fifteen thousand men. Their leader was Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, and regent on behalf of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias. The appearance of a Spartan army in Central Greece would at any rate serve as a warning that Sparta had still to be reckoned with.

Ten thousand of the allies joined Nicomedes on his march to the Isthmus. The march was made so rapidly that he was able to put his entire army across the Corinthian Gulf —he did not venture to attempt the passage of the Isthmus —before any Athenian vessels could arrive to prevent it. Nicomedes, easily effecting his purpose in Phocis, was soon ready to return home. But by this time the Athenians were on the watch; their guardships commanded the Corinthian Gulf and their hoplites blocked the road through Megaris. He decided to wait awhile, and accordingly halted in Boeotia, where his presence was cordially welcomed by the oligarchic party, however distasteful to the patriotic factions, in the various towns of the Boeotian Confederacy.

§ 4. But Nicomedes soon came to entertain hopes of greater things than the re-organisation of Boeotia under Spartan influence. His presence in Central Greece excited to activity all those who leaned towards Sparta. Particularly was this the case in Athens. Since the day of Cimon's dishonoured return from Ithome the philo-Spartan party in Athens had been humiliated. The exile of its natural leader had made way for others who pretended to

that position; but none of them were capable of recovering the party's ascendancy by legitimate means, while the triumphant liberals pursued their advantage with vigour. Already the Areopagus, the last stronghold of conservatism—that is, of oligarchy—in politics had been rendered powerless.* The more extreme members of the party, those who placed self-interest before patriotism, were desperate, and ready to adopt any of the usual oligarchic means to recover power. The presence of Nicomedes in Boeotia appeared to offer a reasonable hope of effecting a *coup d'état*. A secret correspondence was at once opened between Nicomedes without and the oligarchs within, and everything was arranged for a sudden march of the Spartans to the city and its betrayal by the conspirators within. In due course Nicomedes moved towards the Attic frontier and encamped at the petty town of Tanagra, on the Asopus, five or six miles beyond the border.

The facts were not lost upon Pericles and his party. Determined to anticipate treachery, Pericles marched out of Athens with some twelve thousand Athenian troops, a thousand Argives, and a small body of Thessalian horse, and at once attacked the Spartan army. The Spartans were probably the superior in point of numbers, owing to the presence of Boeotian auxiliaries, and in particular they had the support of the famous Boeotian cavalry. Nevertheless, it was only the defection of the Thessalians which gave the victory to Nicomedes, and even so his victory was indecisive. It enabled him indeed to make good his retreat by way of the Isthmus, but it left him powerless to do anything for the oligarchic conspirators within the city. This fact is proof how small were the numbers of the extremist section in Athens. Another fact proves that they were not acting in unison with the mass of the conservative party: for on the eve of the battle, Cimon, having heard of the rumoured treason with which of course his party as a whole was indiscriminately charged, appeared in the Athenian camp and begged leave to fight as a volunteer. The request being refused, he charged all those in the army who shared his political views to vindicate

* See ch. viii., § 10.

their loyalty with the sword. When the armies engaged on the following day the bravest of the Athenians were the conspicuous partisans of Cimon. A hundred of them fell in the fight, and, dying, redeemed the honour of their party and their chief (457 B.C.). The Athenians showed their appreciation of this by immediately recalling Cimon from banishment.

§ 5. The battle of Tanagra led to unforeseen results. Very early in the following year (456 B.C.), before any Peloponnesian force could arrive to interfere, the Athenians under Myronides suddenly entered Boeotia again. At Oenophyta, close to Tanagra, they met the forces of the philo-Spartan Boeotians, and gained a decisive victory. The Boeotian Confederacy collapsed instantly, the several towns were declared independent allies of Athens with the obligation of providing troops when called upon, the government of each was handed over to the democratic patriots, and the leading men of the philo-Spartan party were sent into exile. The whole thing was so sudden that it took the entire Peloponnesian Alliance by surprise. Nor was this all. The Phocians, who had felt the hand of Sparta in the preceding year, at once made alliance with Athens. Locris was treated like Boeotia. Practically the whole of Central Greece was enrolled in the Athenian Empire. At the same moment, after a siege of three years, Aegina surrendered and became a member of the Delian Confederacy, thus placing Athens in complete control of the Saronic Gulf; and in the west the seizure of Naupactus, and the settlement of the exiled helots there, secured Athens' hold upon the Corinthian Gulf. A fleet under Tolmides circumnavigated the Peloponnesus and destroyed the town of Gytheum, the naval arsenal and dockyard of Sparta, captured Chalcis in Aetolia, a dependency and colony of Corinth, and even assaulted the powerful Dorian community of Sicyon. The last movement was a failure, but the mere fact of its being attempted dismayed the whole Peloponnesian Alliance. But the Athenians were not yet content. Their ambition was not to be satisfied until their power was as great in the Corinthian as in the Saronic Gulf. Accordingly, about 454 B.C., Pericles appeared in the western waters

with a strong force. His diplomacy won over to the Athenian side the whole of the maritime towns of Achaea. Next repeating the late assault upon Sicyon, he gained a victory on the river Nemea, but withdrew upon the appearance of the Lacedaemonian army. To fight pitched battles by land was never a part of Pericles' policy. He now turned his attention to Acarnania, and assaulted the town of Oeniadae, which was almost as valuable a position for the control of the Corinthian Gulf as was Naupactus itself. Here again Pericles failed in his main object, although skilful enough to get away without any positive reverse. The year's efforts, however, had resulted in no material gains. Athens had already reached the summit of her territorial power, and the decline soon began.

§ 6. The first reverse occurred in Egypt. The great fleet of two hundred sail which had been despatched in 460 B.C. to the support of the rebel Inaros against Persia had sailed up the Nile as far as Memphis, destroying *en route* a Persian fleet of eighty vessels. The revolted Egyptians had already inflicted a terrible defeat upon the Persian land forces at Papremis, and had shut up the survivors in the citadel of Memphis, the "White Fortress." To this the combined forces of Inaros and Athens now laid strenuous but futile siege. Meantime Artaxerxes, the successor of Xerxes, set himself vigorously to recover the revolted satrapy; a grand army was collected in Cilicia, and a secret envoy was despatched to Sparta to induce that state, by bribes or other arguments, to create a diversion by vigorously attacking Athens. Sparta, however, who had been already proved unable to assert her own interests against Athens, was in no position to further those of Persia. The envoy went home again without attaining his object, and Artaxerxes had to be content with still further augmenting the strength of the army which was to invade Egypt. The army mustered three hundred thousand men, well armed and drilled, and supported by a fleet of three hundred ships of war. Its commander was Megabyzus. Persian methods were not more rapid now than formerly, so that it was only in 455 B.C. that the army advanced upon Egypt. But when it at last arrived it effected its object: Inaros was utterly defeated by land,

the siege of the White Fortress was raised, and the forces of Athens and Egypt were in their turn shut up within the island of Prosopitis in the Nile Delta. The Persians kept them there beleaguered for eighteen months, forcing them at last to capitulate upon the assurance of an unmolested retreat to the Greeks and honourable captivity to Inaros. The Greeks, of whom six thousand survived out of forty thousand, having already been compelled to burn their ships, retreated overland to Byblus in the Delta, ignorant of the fact that a reinforcement of fifty Greek ships was at the moment passing up the Nile in the hope of relieving Prosopitis. This fleet also was surprised and destroyed, and only a few of the whole number of Greeks ultimately made their way back to Greece (454-53 B.C.).

The news of this disaster perhaps reached Athens in the early months of 453 B.C. It amounted to this, that Athens had lost one half of her fleet, besides a fearful number of her best seamen and a large amount of treasure. It was, in fact, a calamitous blow, and it came at a moment when the Ecclesia's aggressive policy had raised up enemies on every side. No one knew how soon the Persian fleets would again appear in the Aegean. The Cimonians, now re-organised under the lead of Cimon himself, seized the opportunity to reassert their policy of cultivating friendly relations with Sparta. The liberals did not venture to fight against the drift of public feeling. Cimon in person undertook negotiations, and in 451 B.C., about ten years after the split with Sparta, a truce of five years was sworn to by the two powers.

§ 7. The complaisance of Sparta is to be accounted for only by her dread of the combined strength of Athens and Argos. Once rid of the hostility of Athens she might hope to deal effectually and finally with Argos, and thereby to recover once more freedom of movement as far as the Isthmus. The Argives were quite alive to the danger which threatened them, and at once concluded, on their own account, with Sparta, a peace of thirty years. This peace secured to them, as far as Sparta was concerned, the undisputed enjoyment of that enlarged and consolidated power which had been given to them by Themistocles.

They took no further part in the affairs of Greece for the full term of the peace (451—421 B.C.).

The fear of Sparta had thus brought Cimon again to the front, and when that fear was removed there still remained the fear of renewed activity on the part of Persia. The disaster at Plataea had put the Persians once again in possession of Egypt, to whom the continued resistance of the Egyptian Amyrtaeus, who long held out in the marshes of the Delta, gave little trouble. The army and fleet of Megabyzus were ready for further conquests, the latter now augmented by the navy of Egypt. Athenians of all parties expected an immediate attack upon the remoter Asiatic members of the Delian Confederacy, and all were united in the resolve to defy any such attack. The vessels which were no longer needful in the home waters were at once despatched to the Asiatic coast, and in 419 B.C. Cimon assumed command as admiral of a fleet of two hundred sail. Hearing that the Persian Artabazus was approaching Cyprus, he sailed to Citium on the southern shore of the island, at the same time detaching sixty vessels to proceed to Egypt and so draw off a portion of the Persian fleet. He then laid siege to Citium; but the town was still uncaptured when the Persian fleet appeared off the coast. The Greeks at once manned their ships, and moving as far as Salamis there found the enemy's fleet riding off-shore under the protection of an army encamped behind it. The numbers of the Persians are unknown. The Greeks had now only a hundred and forty sail. Nevertheless, they attacked without hesitation, drove the Persian vessels ashore, and, instantly disembarking, routed the land-army also. In position, tactics, and result, this battle was the duplicate of that of the Eurymedon seventeen years earlier. The victory was brilliant, but it was rendered useless by an irreparable loss in the death of Cimon. The Greek fleet at once returned homewards, leaving Cyprus to its fate (449 B.C.). The alliance of Athens with Egypt ceases from this date.

With the battle of Cyprian Salamis ends the story of the war of the Delian Confederacy with Persia. Blows so sudden and so decisive as those delivered at Eurymedon

and Salamis were calculated to dishearten any power, and especially an Oriental power. Moreover, Artaxerxes had domestic troubles which kept him constantly busy at home, for the late revolt of Egypt was but one out of many similar attempts to throw off the Persian yoke. The most divergent and remote portions of the empire of Artaxerxes required at one time or other to be recalled to obedience. Megabyzus himself, the conqueror of Egypt, led a formidable revolt in Syria, and the final reduction of Amyrtaeus cannot be placed earlier than 443 B.C. From the year 419 B.C. to the later years of the Peloponnesian War (412 B.C.) there was no further overt collision between the Achaemenidae and Athens.

§ 8. To determine the precise nature of the relations subsisting between Greece and Persia during the years of inaction subsequent to the battle of Cyprian Salamis is one of the problems of history. Was there, or was there not, a formal treaty of peace between the two? It seems to be a fact that for forty years no Persian forces appeared in Ionia, no Persian vessels of war were seen in the Aegean, and that the river Phaselis or the Chelidonian Isles marked the westward limit of Persia's naval operations. But, on the other hand, the Great King never abandoned his claim to receive tribute from the Ionic cities,† and in 440 B.C.‡ the arrival of a Persian fleet off the Ionic coast was generally anticipated. The simple explanation is that, without the ratification of any formal peace and without any definite delimitation of Greek and Persian power on the Ionic coast, the battle of Salamis was followed by the tacit cessation of hostilities and by an informal understanding that for the present things should remain upon the *status quo*.

There were no negotiations, no ratifications, for Thucydides or Herodotus to record. And neither writer mentions any. But the difficulty arises from the fact that later writers, especially the orators, from the next century onwards, constantly allude to the peaceful attitude of Persia

* See Vol. III., ch. ix., § 1.

† See above, ch. i., § 4, and the passage of Herodotus there cited. Also Vol. III ch. ix., § 1.

‡ On the occasion of the revolt of Samos (ch. x., § 6)

during the forty years after Salamis as due to the obligations of a formal peace, variously styled the Peace of Callias or the Cimonian Peace. There was a Greek named Callias at Susa at this date, or soon afterwards, but we have no information as to his business there, unless we accept as true Demosthenes' assertion that he was heavily fined for misconduct in his capacity as envoy to the court of Susa. But in all likelihood the alleged Peace of Callias was a myth, born of the actual peacefulness of Persia in conjunction with unwarrantable analogies drawn between the Callias above mentioned and his more famous namesake, who, in 371 B.C., negotiated with Persia to secure the pacification of Greece.* There is no reason to prefer the loose statements of a Diodorus† or a Plutarch to the silence of a Thucydides, while it is easy to see how an informal state of peace might in time come to be magnified into a formal triumph of Athenian power, coupled either with the name of Callias or with that of the hero Cimon.

§ 9. The death of Cimon was a blow to Athens: it was still more a blow to Greece, for it removed the one man in whose aims and power it lay to maintain a friendly attitude towards the rival pretensions of Sparta. Men who looked back in later years regretted that Cimon had not, when opportunity offered, left Sparta to struggle unaided against the foes she had provoked—that he had lent moral and material assistance to rid her first of the statesman whom most she had reason to fear, and secondly of the helots who threatened her very existence. But Cimon was of a nobler mind than were his critics.

As a general he had no equal. He fought with like success against almost all and every foe; but his especial bent was against Persia, for in harrying the barbarians he felt himself to be advancing the cause of Greece, and to advantage Greece was in his eyes nobler even than to ad-

* See Vol. IV., ch. viii., § 9.

† Diodorus professes to give the terms of the alleged Peace, of which the leading articles were that (a) no Persian ships of war should sail westward of the Phaselis on the South and of the Cyanean Rocks (Bosphorus) on the North, that (b) the Great King should send no troops farther West into Asia Minor than a distance of three days' march from the coast; and that (c) the Greeks should refrain from making war upon any communities which were accounted subjects of the Great King. For Callias at Susa, see Herodotus, vii. 151.

vantage Athens. To him Athens owed the glorious days of Eurymedon and Cyprian Salamis, and doubtless a dozen less notable triumphs, each sufficient to have made famous a less brilliant leader. What he won in the field he lavished upon his city, for he was the first of the great builders and art patrons of democratic Athens. Of his benefactions to the city something will be said later; ¹ of his deeds we have spoken already. As leader of the aristocracy—that is, of the dominant party—between the years 471 and 463 B.C. he appears to have conducted the government with praiseworthy moderation and tact. His fall from power entailed the fall of his party and of the Areopagus. It is customary to attribute the future developments of the city, for good or ill, to the removal of the moral dragweight of the Areopagus. It may perhaps with more justice be put down to the removal of the moderating and tolerant influence of Cimon.

§ 10. From 449 B.C. onward to his death in 429 B.C. Pericles was leader of the state. Pericles, born about 493 B.C., was the son of Xanthippus. His mother was Agariste, daughter of the Alcmaeonid Hippocrates, so that he was directly related both to Cleisthenes of Athens, his grandfather's brother, and to Cleisthenes of Sicyon, the grandfather of Hippocrates. But his married life was not happy, and of his two sons one at least was a scapegrace. Pericles, therefore, as the morality of his day allowed, formed a more congenial union with Aspasia, a lady whose wit and brilliance were as remarkable as her private life was unconventional, and who is said to have inspired Pericles to some of his most successful undertakings. By her he became the father of an illegitimate son. In 430 B.C. the plague swept away his two legitimate heirs, and in compassion for his desolation the Athenians passed a bill to legitimise Aspasia's child, who forthwith took his father's name.

Pericles enjoyed the advantages of the best education attainable. He had a taste for art, science, and philosophy, and spent much of his leisure in the society of men like Pheidias, Anaxagoras, and Democritus of Abdera, the

* See below, ch. xii., § 2.

propounder of the Atomic Theory. He was a brilliant orator in a time when orators were not rare, and knew as did no one else how to guide the Ecclesia while seeming to indulge it. Already a leading figure in the days when Ephialtes overthrew Cimon and attacked the Areopagus, he succeeded without question to Ephialtes' place, and, faithful to the traditions of the Themistoclean policy, combined with the domestic programme of Ephialtes Themistocles' studied hatred of Sparta. In the last fifteen years of his life his policy had broadly but two notes: the first, to make Athens the envy of the world; the second, to make her strong enough to defy that envy. And with Pericles, as with Themistocles, the outer world was identical with Sparta. Greater in no single point than in another, Pericles was magnificent in the complete development of every power which his times allowed. He was the personification of that cosmopolitan culture which was the prime article in the Athens of his ideal. But he was greater still in the "Olympian calm" of the resolution wherewith he worked towards the realisation of his ideals.

CHAPTER X.

ATHENS UNDER PERICLES.

§ 1. War of Phocis with Delphi —§ 2. Revolt of Orchomenus and Chaeronea · Battle of Coronea, and Loss of Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris.—§ 3. Revolt of Euboea and Megaris · Pleistonax invades Attica —§ 4. The Thirty Years' Peace · Ostracism of Thurydias, and Collapse of the Oligarchic Party —§ 5 Completion of the Fortification of Athens and Peiraenus · Foundation of Thurii: the Periclean Cleruchies.—§ 6. Revolt of Samos.—§ 7. Colonisation of Amphipolis.—§ 8. Conclusion.

§ 1. THE territorial empire of Athens was shortlived, its fall speedy. The oracle of Delphi was the prime cause of the catastrophe. It had for centuries been an article of Dorian state-craft for Sparta to pose as the champion of Delphi and the Delphians. Now, the oracle was a source of great wealth and power to those who enjoyed control of it; and as it lay within the borders of Phocis, the Phocians very naturally regarded with unfriendly feelings the independence of the Delphians and their monopoly of so lucrative a source of revenue, jealously watching for an opportunity to make it their own. Such an opportunity seemed to offer now, when Athens, the ally of the Phocians, was mistress of all Central Greece, and in apparent command of all the approaches by which the Spartans could bring aid to their *protégés*. Accordingly, in 448 B.C. the Phocians forcibly took possession of Delphi, and usurped the management of the oracle. Much to their surprise, however, the Spartans, in response to the appeal of the Delphians, contrived to throw across the Corinthian Gulf a force sufficient to expel the Phocians and reinstate the Delphians. The Athenians in turn expelled the Delphians, and established the Phocians

as stewards of the oracle ; but they failed to overtake the Spartan army, which made good its escape as it had come. To all appearance the Spartans were satisfied if they could get away unharmed, nor did they make any effort to champion the Delphians a second time ; and so far the honours lay with the Athenians. But, nevertheless, the affair was a fatal blow to the Athenians' prestige, for it showed that their boasted control of the approaches to Central Greece was unreal, and that disaffected parties even northward of the Isthmus might still count upon the support of Sparta as against Athens.

§ 2. The immediate result was the revival, throughout the dependent territories, of the party hostile to Athenian supremacy ; more especially in Boeotia, where the domination of Athens rested on no more stable ground than was furnished by the repugnance of another faction to the superior claims of Thebes. There had been no national *rapprochement* between Boeotians and Athenians, nor had either Athens or the victorious faction taken any efficient measures to secure and safeguard their victory. Those who had been driven into exile by the revolution had been permitted to return in large numbers, and found convenient rallying-points in Chaeronea and Orchomenus. In 446 b.c. these towns openly revolted from Athens, and appealed to all patriotic Boeotians to support them in the liberation of their country.

Athens was taken by surprise. At the moment the vigour of the government was hampered by the revival of party feuds within the city ; for we know that the miserable force of a thousand citizen-hoplites which, together with a few auxiliaries, was now despatched into Boeotia under Tolmides, was largely composed of wealthy aristocrats, and was from the outset condemned by Pericles as entirely inadequate. Had Pericles' party been strongly in the ascendent so small a force would never have been sent, and the only reason why his party was not in a position to have its own way must be found in a revived antagonism of the party claiming to inherit the traditions of Cimon. And as a fact, that party, under the leadership of Thucydides, son of Melesias, was now thoroughly re-organised and braced

for a final attempt to check the ever-growing influence of Pericles and the democrats.

Tolmides marched direct to Chalconea, which he seized. But the necessity of leaving a garrison behind him to hold the place still further diminished his weak column, so that he was easily surprised and slain by the revolted Boeotians in the vicinity of Coronea. Such of the Athenians as were not slain with him fell into the hands of the victors, who utilised them as hostages to extort from the Ecclesia their own terms. These terms amounted simply to this : that Athens should at once evacuate Boeotia and acknowledge its independence. To secure the liberation of the prisoners the Athenians consented at once to these demands. Such a course was, to a Greek's thinking, inevitable, but it was disastrous in the extreme ; for the evacuation of Boeotia left to their own resources the other allies of Athens farther afield, so that the loss of Phocis and Locris was the immediate consequence. By the single battle of Coronea Athens lost the whole of her empire in Central Greece.

§ 3. But her troubles were not yet ended. The oligarchs of Boeotia, who had so speedily and easily realised their purpose on the field of Coronea, had largely resided in Euboea during the period of their exile, and it is reasonable to attribute to their influence and example the spirit of defection which at once developed in that island. The Euboean malcontents probably relied on support from Boeotia : they were in communication with Sparta, whose five-years' truce with Athens would expire in 445 B.C. ; and either they or the Ephoralty were intriguing with the Megarians. The latter move seems to have been kept entirely secret, but the loyalty of Euboea itself was speedily a matter of question in Athens ; so that the city, where Pericles was again for the moment all-powerful, in consequence of the failure which had attended the methods of Thucydides in the previous year, was more or less prepared for the revolt which declared itself in 445 B.C. Pericles hurried to the island in person with a considerable force, only to be recalled within a brief space by the news that the Megarians had also revolted, and that the Spartans, under the lead of the young king Pleistoanax and his

guardian Cleandridas, were in full march for Attica. Pericles at once decided how to act. He knew that Athens, whose land-force was always her weakest arm, could not hope to hold the field against the levies of Peloponnesus. He knew also that, at whatever cost, she must free herself from other complications, in order instantly to deal with Euboea and thus to check in its infancy a spirit of revolt which threatened to ruin her hold upon the Delian League, and therefore her maritime ascendancy. How it was done was never clearly known. Only the fact remained that Pleistoanax, after advancing as far as the Thriasian Plain, suddenly and without apparent cause withdrew his army. Bribery was the natural explanation to a Greek. So the Ephors interpreted the facts, condemning their king to a fine of fifteen talents. Pleistoanax fled, and lived for nearly twenty years in sanctuary in Arcadia.*

Upon the retreat of the Peloponnesians Pericles returned without delay to Euboea with a fleet of fifty warships and five thousand citizen troops. The Boeotians sent no aid to the revolted islanders, who were rapidly reduced in detail. The inhabitants of Hestiae were expelled *en masse*, and their territories given over to two thousand Athenian cleruchs. The constitutions of the chief towns of the island were reformed in the interests of the democratic party—and the entire island was degraded from the condition of equitable alliance to that of complete subjection. Considering the enormous importance of Euboea to Athens, Pericles' measures were not severe.

§ 4. The manifest decline of the power of Athens had a bad influence upon other members of the Athenian Confederacy. To this, presumably, was due the fact that a considerable number of tributary towns, on the remote coasts of Caria and Lycia, fell away from the League. So great was the shrinkage in the receipts from this quarter—the “Carian Tribute”—that its few remaining members were presently included with those of the Ionian Tribute.†

* He was recalled to Sparta 426 B.C., and reigned there until his death in 408 B.C. He was the son of the medizing regent Pausanias, and succeeded to Pleistarchus in 468 B.C., when still a minor, under the regency of Nicomedes, who led the Spartan force into Doris in 457 B.C. The throne, during the years of Pleistoanax's exile, passed to his infant son Pausanias, with Cleomenes as regent.

† See below, ch. xii., § 8.

Pericles was alive to the significance of these signs of the times. The power of Athens had shot up too rapidly to be stable. To his thinking, this collapse was but the necessary pruning of overgrown shoots, certain to re-act for the solidification and re-invigorating of what remained. His task, therefore, was henceforth to see that there should be no further overgrowth—that the state's energies should not be wasted on schemes which weakened rather than strengthened its powers—that the root and trunk of its growth, the sovereignty of the seas and the Athenian League, should be safeguarded and consolidated. And for the development of the state's power within the first requisite was peace with all powers without. The war with Persia was already dropped: peace must now be made with Sparta. Callias acted as agent, and in the winter of 445 B.C. was concluded between Athens and Sparta the Thirty Years' Peace. Athens surrendered all that she had gained in the Peloponnese, viz. Troezen and Achaea, and withdrew her garrisons from Pegae and Nisaea. Subject to this preliminary sacrifice, each of the contracting parties was to retain its own, with full permission to obtain what further allies it could, so long as these were not yet committed to alliance with the other party.

Pericles had thus rid himself of external enemies: by a fortunate coincidence the animosity of his enemies at home resulted in ridding him of all serious opposition in internal politics. The aristocratic party under Thucydides—or, as it now began to be styled, the oligarchic party—hoped to find their advantage in the momentary depression of the Ecclesia in view of recent defeats and losses. Immediately after the conclusion of the Peace, recourse was had to ostracism. The suggestion apparently came from the oligarchs, who never doubted that Pericles would be the victim. But they had forgotten that the troubles of the state had commenced with the ill-advised expedition of Tolmides into Boeotia, and that this expedition was their own work. On the other hand, Pericles had proved his ability by saving Attica from the ravages of Pleistoanax, and obtaining peace for his country when she sorely needed it; and he had effectually and cheaply chastised the revolted

Euboeans. The Ecclesia gave its support to Pericles, and sent Thucydides into exile. His disappearance involved that of his party. From this date onwards until the Peloponnesian War broke out, Pericles stood alone and almost unopposed.

§ 5. Pericles' first care was to complete the fortification of Athens by the construction of the third of the Long Walls, viz. the middle wall uniting the city with Peiraeus, and running parallel to the earlier Peiraeic wall at a distance of some six hundred yards.* At the same time the port itself was completed under the direction of the architect, Hippodamus of Miletus, who laid out the streets in regular rectangular blocks.

In the next year (443 B.C.) the same architect was employed to lay out the new town of Thurii, which is noteworthy also as being the first attempt towards a system of Panhellenic colonisation. It was designed primarily to provide a new settlement for the homeless descendants of the citizens of the once wealthy Sybaris, which had been razed by its neighbours the Crotoniates in the year 510 B.C. The refugee Sybarites appealed to Athens. The idea found favour with Pericles and with the commercial classes of Athens. But, to disarm jealousy, settlers were invited from all parts of Greece. Amongst those who sailed to the land of promise were the historian Herodotus, the orator Lysias, and the poet-philosopher Empedocles. But the Sybarite element proved intractable, with the result that they were expelled. Whereupon the non-Athenian element amongst the remaining settlers gained the upper hand, and the town disowned all obligation towards Athens.

To Pericles also was due the great development of the system of colonisation by cleruchies—that is, by the deliberate appropriation of suitable localities for the settlement of Athenian citizens, who thus obtained lands in freehold while they retained all their rights and privileges as citizens of the mother-city. Although it is impossible to determine the exact date of most of the cleruchies, it seems that this establishment was a principal article in the policy of Pericles, who made use of them, not only to relieve

* See the Plan on p. 155.

congestion at home, but still more as fortresses for the consolidation of the power of Athens abroad. Thus he planted a thousand cleruchs in the Chersonese to prevent the advance of the Thracian barbarians towards the Hellespont; others at Sinope and Amisus to guard the southern shore of the Euxine; and yet others at Nymphaeum in the Crimea for the security of Athenian traders visiting that region. For, according to the policy of Pericles, it was of paramount importance to keep control over the trade-route between Athens and the great corn-markets of Southern Russia. He also annexed the islands of Lemnos and Imbros. Again, after the re-conquest of Euboea, Hestiaeia was appropriated for cleruchies; and, to anticipate a little, the long-desired footing in Thrace was obtained by the colonisation of Ennea-Hodoi in 437 B.C.⁺

§ 6 Now occurred an event which threatened seriously to disturb the relations of Athens with her allies. The three great island states of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos had for many years been upon a footing different from that of the rest of the members of the League. These alone were allies of Athens in the proper sense of the word, enjoying complete independence and maintaining to the full their defensive and offensive strength. And suddenly in 440 B.C. Athens found herself at war with Samos.

The government of Samos was an oligarchy. A dispute arising between Samos and Miletus touching the small town of Priene, the two states went to war. The Milesians were worsted. They appealed to Athens, and at the same juncture the democratic party of Samos made complaint to Athens as to the oligarchic government. Athens decided in favour of Miletus as regarded Priene, and with the democrats against the government of Samos, forthwith expelling the oligarchs and putting the democracy in power, and leaving a garrison in the town to maintain the new order of things. The oligarchs, however, by the aid of Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, contrived to recover the town. Byzantium is said to have revolted at the same moment. No other community, small or great, threw in its lot with the Samians. Chios and Lesbos joined heartily

with Athens, sending twenty-five ships to Samos. Sixty sail were commissioned from Peiraeus, and amongst the ten Strategi were Pericles himself and the poet Sophocles. Pericles defeated a greatly superior Samian force off Tragia, and being now joined by forty additional sail from Athens and the twenty-five ships of Chios and Lesbos, he laid siege to the town of Samos and blockaded its harbour; but upon a false report of the approach of a large fleet from Phoenicia, he was compelled to draw off sixty ships to meet the expected attack from the south, leaving behind him so small a force that the Samians were able to raise the blockade. Pericles presently returned, fresh reinforcements came up, and the blockade was re-commenced. The Samians now appealed to Sparta for aid. Sparta declined to interfere. The Samians therefore, finding themselves isolated and friendless, came to terms at the expiry of nine months. They agreed to dismantle their fortifications, to surrender their navy, and to pay tribute, on condition that the Athenians should not interfere in their domestic politics. Presumably the government remained much as it had been before the revolt. But Samos was no longer a free ally of Athens, but an unarmed tributary subject, on the same level as any smallest community in the League (439 B.C.).

§ 7. It has been mentioned * that about the year 465 B.C. Cimon led out ten thousand colonists to Ennea-Hodoi, with a view to securing for Athens the most defensible and advantageous position in the north-west of the Aegean. This was the second attempt made by Athens in this direction, and, like the earlier one, it came to disastrous grief: the Thracian bairarians took umbrage at the intrusion of these new colonists, attacked them while as yet in a condition of weakness, and destroyed them all. In 437 B.C. a fresh body of colonists founded the town of Amphipolis. The commercial and strategic advantages of the site have been already noted. The new colony was in fact another, and one of the most important, of Pericles' outlying fortress-colonies for the defence of the Athenian Empire. It rapidly attained to a considerable degree of prosperity; but less than

* See above, ch. viii., § 5.

fifteen years later * Amphipolis went over to the enemies of Athens, and the Athenians never recovered the place.

§ 8. The colonisation of Amphipolis is the last recorded event belonging in strictness to the present period. What other events occurred in the next five years are, so far as we know them, less a portion of the history of the supremacy of Athens than the introduction to the overthrow of that supremacy.

In 435 B.C. Athens stood higher than ever before. Envy, jealousy, spite, chagrin—half a dozen motives combined to make her hated by all who stood outside the circle of the League. Moreover, she was feared. Every community which was not of the League felt, or professed to feel, fear that it might itself be the next to fall within her grasp. The mass of the Peloponnesians in particular were ready to rush to arms against her on the least excuse.

The excuse came in 433 B.C., when the naval state of Corcyra, possessing a navy only second to that of Athens, made a defensive alliance with Athens. The enemies of Athens saw themselves now shut in between Athens and her new ally, and their fear drove them into war.

Corcyra was a colony of Corinth, and Epidamnus (Dyrrhachium, Durazzo) in Epeirus was a colony of Corcyra. Political troubles in Epidamnus provoked the interference of Corinth. This interference the Corcyreans resented; they went to war with their metropolitan state, and in a great sea-fight off Actium they completely defeated the interfering forces (435 B.C.). To revenge the defeat Corinth put forward all her energies. The Corcyreans were compelled in self-defence to seek allies. Only a naval state could aid them, and the only naval state now remaining strong enough to deal with Corinth was Athens, at the head of her League. To Athens, then, the Corcyreans appealed, and on the advice of Pericles their request was granted (433 B.C.). The immediate result was that Corinth became the furious adversary of Athens, and forthwith studied how best to kindle into war the prevailing disquietude of the Peloponnesian states.

* See Vol. III., ch. vi., §§ 3, 7, and Vol. V., ch. iii., §§ 4, *foli.*

In 432 B.C. the whole fleet of Corinth and her allies gave battle to the Corcyrean fleet at Sybota, off the coast of Epeirus, and gained a decisive victory. But the conduct of a small Athenian squadron, commissioned to watch events on behalf of Athens, afforded ground for a technical charge of breach of the peace on its part. The Corinthians at once set about avenging the alleged injury. They provoked to revolt the town of Potidaea, a Chalcidic town, a colony of Corinth, but long a member of the Thracian Tribute in the Athenian League. Athens proceeded to bring Potidaea back to its allegiance. At about the same time Pericles caused the Megarians, allies of Corinth and Sparta, to be excluded from all ports under the Athenian flag.* Under cover of these several excuses—the coercion of Potidaea, the boycotting of Megara, and the alleged breach of the peace at the battle of Sybota—the Corinthians aroused to action the Spartans, the nominal leaders of the Peloponnesian states. At a congress held in Sparta at the close of 432 B.C., it was resolved to declare war upon Athens before that state could still further extend her power. Before the Spartans could bring themselves to make a definite move, the Thebans, deadly foes of Athens since the days of the Athenian conquest of Boeotia, attempted to surprise the town of Plataea, an ally of Athens, but situated on Boeotian soil. This was the first overt act of war, the prelude to the famous struggle of seven-and-twenty years' duration, known to later days as the Peloponnesian War.

* The date cannot be determined. It was before 432 B.C.

CHAPTER XI.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ATHENS.

§ 1. The Archonship.—§ 2. The Strategia.—§ 3. The Areopagus.—
§ 4. The Dicasteries.—§ 5. Finance.—§ 6. Domestic Policy of
Pericles.

§ 1. In the original constitution of Cleisthenes the archons were the Executive, and therefore the most important magistrates of the state. The archonship, moreover, was the medium by which the Areopagus was reached; for on laying down his office the ex-archon became at once a member of that great Council. But the constitutional history of the sixty years following the reforms of Cleisthenes is largely made up of two factors—the decay of the Areopagus and the development of the *Strategia*. Both these re-acted upon the archonship; for while the development of the *Strategia* diminished the executive powers of the archonship, the decline of the Areopagus deprived the archonship of its value as a stepping-stone to something higher.

In Cleisthenes' time the archons were elected by vote. The result was that the office tended to fall more and more into the hands of a select circle of families or individuals whose wealth and influence commanded the votes of the electors, to the exclusion of less favoured candidates. In the most extreme form of democracy such an issue would have been obviated by allowing any person to come forward as a candidate, and submitting the choice entirely to the hazard of the lot. But the Athenians, not yet prepared to proceed so far, yet anxious to avoid the exclusiveness of the existing system, adopted a compromise: they arranged that five hundred candidates should be nominated by the

demes, and nine of these should be chosen by lot. The date of this law is 487 B.C.,* and its proposer was Aristides. This arrangement was in effect a revival of that made by Solon, with some modification as to the number of candidates allowed.

Henceforward, then, a candidate for the archonship need not court the suffrages of the people at large, but only those of his own tribe; so that, as regards ultimate selection, a man of small means and purely local influence was on a par with the wealthiest Alcmaeonid. But there still remained the statutory limitation as to the property qualification required for the archonship. In Solon's days none but citizens of the richest class could obtain that office, and even Cleisthenes had not ventured to open it to more than the first two classes. Ultimately even men of the third class—Zeugitae—were made eligible for the office; but at what date is unknown. Aristotle, a reliable authority, says that it was effected in 457 B.C. By this date, as will be shown, the archonship had ceased to be an office of such importance as to demand much circumspection in the filling of it, while it nevertheless retained an outward dignity sufficient to make it an object of desire to the ordinary man.[†] Another account attributes to Aristides this reform also. Aristides was almost certainly dead in 457 B.C., but he may well have been the first statesman to suggest the reform, if he did not live to effect it.

§ 2. As the archons declined in power the Board of Strategi rose. In the time of Solon the Strategi were merely a temporary body appointed to deal with a particular emergency. From 501 B.C. onwards they were elected each year, one from each tribe. They commanded the men of their tribe, while the Polemarch retained the command-in-chief of the whole army. The office was always filled by vote, for to have entrusted the conduct of a considerable war to the arbitrament of the lot would have been to court defeat. The ten Strategi, therefore, for many years to come represented all that was most able in Athens. After

* But Herodotus speaks as if the arrangement were in existence in 490 B.C. See above, p. 19, note.

[†] As Abbott puts it, it was now little better than a Board of Aldermen.

a time they ceased to be elected one from each tribe. When the taxiarchs had become the commanding officers of the separate tribes the Strategi were elected from the whole body of citizens, without respect to tribes. This change was effected at some unknown date before 441 B.C.

As the energies and activities of Athens developed, the powers of the *Strategia* rapidly increased; for in time of war the Strategi disposed of all the forces of the state, naval and military, superintended their equipment and appointment, and at the same time performed the duties of a Foreign Office in regard to those states with which Athens came into collision or connection. The Board was a school for the training of commanders and diplomatists; and though from the outset liable to the same restrictions in regard to time and responsibility as any other office in the state, it escaped the most dangerous effects of annual change; for at Athens there was no rule to prevent the election of the same individual for any number of years in succession, and thus a man of brilliant and successful parts, like Cimon or Pericles, was returned year after year to the *Strategia*. Hence, not only did the state enjoy the full benefit of the abilities of such men, but constant tenure of this office gave to them better opportunities for the display of their powers. An Athenian strategus could in many cases formulate and carry into effect a policy which demanded many years for its development. It was through the *Strategia* that Cimon carried on his anti-Persian policy, and Pericles his policy of consolidation. And this continuity of persons and of policy gave in turn an added strength to the office, quite unlike anything to be found in the lot-ridden discontinuity of the archonship.

Apparently the order of election carried with it the order of seniority; and seeing that the Board was composed of ten members, we may suppose that one of the ten acted as chairman, possessing a casting vote.* But the practical permanence of a Pericles as member of the Board would

* At the battle of Marathon the casting vote lay with the archon-polemarchos, but as this officer shortly ceased to have any military functions whatever, the date evidently marks the transition from the earlier system (in which the Strategi were in a measure subordinate to the archons) to the later one (in which the Strategi were independent and paramount in their own department).

give to him an influence with his less permanent colleagues tantamount to that of the head of a modern Cabinet. In many ways the position of Pericles, at least in his later years, was as autocratic as that of Peisistratus himself.

Besides their duties in connection with the navy, naval ports and docks, the army, the defences of Attica, the maintenance of the walls of Athens and Peiraeus, the personal direction and control of the squadrons and armies in commission and of the garrisons stationed amongst the states of the League ; besides the burden of supervising and providing for all matters of commissariat, supply, equipment, and recruiting ; besides a certain financial authority as regards the outlay required for the year's expenses under these heads, including the allotment of the tierarchic liturgy ; and besides their functions as a Foreign Office ;—the Board of Generals was further responsible for the assembly of the Ecclesia, both on ordinary and extraordinary occasions ; for the maintenance of order during such meetings ; and for the introduction of all *ayendu* to the assembled people. Whoso pleased might address the people when a question was once raised, but the raising of the question rested primarily with the Strategi. And from this it followed that to be a successful strategus a man must also be a successful orator. It was certainly to his powers of oratory as much as to his abilities as a commander that Pericles owed his long ascendancy.

§ 3. The Council of the Areopagus was a survival from the time when the government was in the hands of a few great houses. The bulk of the powers of government had now passed to the people, but the Council still remained to represent the old *régime*. In the time of Peisistratus it had been recruited from the ranks of the archons, and as the archonship was then the hereditary office of the great houses connected with the ruling dynasty, the Council as Cleisthenes found it represented only those houses. Its character began to undergo modification when, in 487 B.C., Aristides made his change in the method of filling up the archonship. But despite this covert invasion, the Areopagus continued to maintain its aristocratic character ; for its members remaining such for life, the new blood introduced was absorbed by

the pre-existing elements representing the exclusive aristocracy of the time of Peisistratus, and the traditions and policy of the earlier members modified the feelings of the new-comers far more than it was modified by them. True, the Council had, so far as can be discovered, no positive voice in the government, but was at most only a permanent supreme court of justice for the investigation of certain grave classes of crime ; yet its peculiar traditions, its permanence, and the sanctity with which it was surrounded as something established by the immediate voice of the old gods, gave to it a moral weight and dignity not to be seen elsewhere. It seems to have usurped a sort of censorship over the lives of the citizens, and even in matters solely judicial its utterances were regarded as carrying an authority very different from those of an ordinary court. Strong enough to resist the less aristocratic influence of new members, and even at certain junctures re-asserting itself in a more positive degree, as in the crisis of the year 480 B.C., it was the sheet-anchor of the aristocratic party.

Now, although it cannot be shown that the Areopagus possessed or claimed any positive control over the functions of government (for even its judicial prerogatives were greatly limited by the institution of the *heliastae*), yet its mere existence was a challenge to democracy. That it fulfilled the functions of an aristocratic and therefore conservative club, was but of small account ; of more importance was the fact that it was an absolutely irresponsible court, from the decisions of which there was no appeal, and that its members enjoyed their office, such as it was, for life. Irresponsibility and life-tenure are two facts opposed to the democratic theory. There presently came, therefore, a time when the democratic party, provoked by the long ascendancy of the aristocratic and conservative party under Cimon, resolved to interfere. When Cimon and his party fell from power in 462 B.C., Ephialtes felt strong enough to proceed against the Council as a whole.

Knowing so little as we do of the powers of the Council up to this date, we cannot say what was taken from them.

* Aristotle says that what powers the Areopagus lost were made over to (1) the Ecclesia ; (2) to the law courts ; and (3) to the Senate, and this, Abbott suggests,

But, on the authority of Aristotle, and on the evidence of history, the Council of the Areopagus ceased henceforth to exercise any influence in the government, although Ephialtes did not abolish the Council or interfere with its constitution. The Council shrank into a mere minor court for the trial of cases involving homicide, and the chief conservative influence in the state was for ever destroyed. From this date the advance of democracy, being more unfettered, became more reckless: in fact, as Aristotle expresses it, the result was the removal of all restraint upon the democratic spirit.

§ 4. The powers of the Areopagus, so far as they were statutory, seem to have been purely judicial. When the Council was stripped of these powers, it was necessary to transfer them to some other body. They were transferred to the people, and with this transfer is associated the political invention for which Pericles is best known, viz. the institution of the Dicasteries and of the payment of jurors.

Heretofore the prerogative of interpreting the law had been divided between the archons and the Areopagus. The latter, as has been said, was a court in itself. If the archons required a court, they found it in the *heliastae* of the Cleisthenic Constitution. But the heliast was not paid for his services as juror, and therefore he had no inducement to incur the loss of time and business consequent upon serving on a jury. Pericles accordingly devised a new system.

Firstly, the juror (or dicast) was to be paid for his services, at the rate of not more than three obols *per diem*. With this inducement to serve, it was not difficult to enrol yearly six thousand citizens, who were bound to attend the courts whenever required. The six thousand were divided into ten panels of five hundred each, with a thousand supernumeraries. These panels were the dicasteries, which now superseded the several courts of the archons and the Areopagus.

The innovation was great. In the first place the payment gave a livelihood to six thousand citizens. Secondly,

implies that the Areopagus was deprived of (1) the right of supervising the legislature, thenceforward exercised by the Ecclesia by means of the *graphe paranomon*, (2) the bulk of its judicial prerogatives; and (3) certain indeterminable administrative functions,

the new courts being composed of men whose first concern was to find themselves fully employed in so light but remunerative a duty, there was offered, as it were, a premium for the multiplication of cases, and each dicast, actual or possible, was constantly on the look-out for opportunities of accusation; and being of the class which is in all states the natural foe of the wealthy, they turned their scrutiny in particular upon the wealthy members of the aristocratic or oligarchic party, so that Pericles found his new invention useful as a political engine against the party opposed to his own. Thirdly, the interpretation of the laws was given over to the class which alone had no interests at stake, and no moral character to maintain, while there was no other check upon their decision than the formal oath which each dicast took "rightly and honestly to discharge his duty."

By creating the dicasteries Pericles purchased a new *clientèle*. The next essential was to keep it in good-humour by keeping it employed. The Greek character loved litigation for its own sake, and there was now a new inducement on the jurors' part to provoke litigation. The ordeal of *eisbýavn* (audit) through which every out-going officer of the state must pass at the termination of his year's service offered, in a particular degree, opportunities for accusation. But the courts were still hungry for more apparently, when Pericles introduced the arrangement whereby a large number of cases arising in the dependent communities of the Athenian League were brought to Athens for trial.

There was a certain, a considerable, amount of good in the system. It was the consummation of that palladium of liberty, public surveillance of the law. It taught the very lowest classes what the law was, and interested them in its maintenance. It provided, in some sense, a useful livelihood for men who must otherwise have become either useless recipients of relief or criminals. And to the credit of the courts it must be added that cases of corrupt judgment were rare.

In the new system the three great archons were reduced to little more than honorary presidents of the courts, their administrative functions passing to the Strategi. The six

lesser archons (*Thesmophorae*) continued to act as a Board of Scrutiny for the revision of the laws and the prevention of anomalous or contradictory legislation.

§ 5. The system by which payment was given for services rendered to the State was peculiarly a feature of the policy of Pericles. The five hundred members of the *Bouλί* (Senate) received each one drachma *per diem*. The office of strategus carried with it a large remuneration. Service by land or sea was likewise remunerated. It is not known whether the archons received salaries, and the Areopagites of course did not; but there were numberless other officials who did—police (including a body of three hundred hired Scythian bowmen); the Eleven (who were charged with the custody and execution of criminals); inspectors of the markets, or of weights and measures, and what not. It is possible even that Pericles introduced payment for those who attended the Ecclesia. It was he certainly who instituted the *Theoricum* (Θεωρικόν), or *Diolely* (διωβελία), the distribution of two obols *per man*, to all who cared to apply for it, on the occasion of the representation of the great tragedies of the year at the Great Dionysia. Two obols was the price of one of the cheapest seats in the theatre, and the distribution was intended to enable even the poorest to be present at what was accounted a solemn religious festival.

The funds to provide for all these various outlays, as well as for the more ordinary expenses of the government, were supplied by the normal revenue—that is, by customs, by royalties on mines and other monopolies, and by the protection-tax levied upon metics or resident aliens. The latter was the only class directly taxed, and as it was a part of the democratic policy to encourage the metics, this source of revenue was very considerable. Moreover, the treasury was materially assisted by the system of liturgies, an arrangement whereby the cost of certain extraordinary calls was thrown wholly or in part upon the purses of the richer classes. For instance, the chorus necessary for the production of each of the prize tragedies and comedies of the year was found, appointed, and trained, at the expense of one wealthy citizen; and, in the same way, when the state was suddenly called upon to find a fleet larger than ordinary, the dockyards

furnished the hull and a portion of the fittings, but the duty of finding the remainder of the equipment, and of collecting the crew, was made over as a liturgy—the Trierarchy—to selected individuals of the needful means. And such calls were considered not so much a burden as a compliment, at least in the city's days of prosperity, the various Choregi and Trierarchs vying with one another in performing their duties most efficiently and effectively. When the treasury was exhausted—and this did not occur within the limits of the present period—an extraordinary direct tax (*eisphorá*) was levied from the citizens ; but, like the *tributum*, or war-tax at Rome, this was looked upon as a loan which the state would presently repay. Besides these various sources of revenue, there was always the yearly tribute from the League. This, however, was treated as something different from the home revenue : from it were drawn the funds to equip fleets for war on behalf of the League, whenever this was necessary ; but during the years of peace Pericles caused it to be used in great part for the construction of his costly public works, such as the Parthenon and the Propylaea, the balance being put by as a special reserve-fund, to be used only when the state was driven to extremities.

But, speaking generally, the public finance was of the simplest and most thriftless kind, the rule being simply to give back to the citizens at the year's end whatever balance remained to the state's credit out of the revenues drawn from the citizens. In putting by a small sum annually from the four hundred and sixty or six hundred talents paid by the League, Pericles, and the Athenians at large, we must suppose, believed that all the requirements of prudence and economy were satisfied. They did not perceive that the system, apart from other faults, amounted to the statutory plundering of the rich and industrious for the indulgence of the poor and thriftless—that it was, in fact, an embryonic form of the system whereby the population of Rome was reduced to the condition of state-fed paupers, without principles, without self-respect, and without higher ambitions than the desire for a crust of bread and a public show.

§ 6. But the evils latent in the policy of Pericles did not

show themselves within his lifetime. His policy amounted to this, that he would make Athens mistress of a naval empire, that he would make her a beautiful city, and that he would make her people happy and contented. By his measures for the consolidation of the League; by his lavish outlay upon public works; by his system of cleruchies; by payment of all public services; and by giving even to the lowest some share in public duties, he secured the present success of each and all of these three objects. In his day Athens was at her highest—powerful abroad and prosperous at home, the emporium of all the riches, arts, and sciences of the Greek world. But she owed it all to the single personality of Pericles, and when Pericles passed away there was none to take his place. It was his strong will which prevented his creation, the perfected democracy, from overstepping its bounds. When he died, the “many-headed monster thing” got beyond control. In place of the single, broad-minded will of Pericles came the discordant quarrels of half a dozen wills, all equally unlike his own in their incapacity and narrowness of view; and none being strong enough to take the lead permanently, the people swayed backwards and forwards from one to another, without fixed purpose or fixed policy. Thereupon the parties of aristocracy and oligarchy, held in check so long as the democracy was of one mind, gathered flesh head, and yet further distracted the state. Five-and-twenty years after Pericles’ death the democracy was overthrown.

CHAPTER XII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAGUE.

§ 1 Original Purpose of the League—Athens the Leader of the League, but not its Master—Naxos.—§ 2 The *φόρος*. General Dislike of Active Service.—§ 3 Thasos—the States Compound for Money Payment.—§ 4. Various Classes of Unarmed States—§ 5. Decay of the Synod: Transfer of the Chest to Athens—§ 6 Athens Mistress of the League· Effective Strength of Athens and her Armed Allies.—§ 7. Athens and the League after 449 B.C.—§ 8 The Organisation of the League: the Five Tributes· the *φόρος* not heavy—§ 9. Attitude of Athens towards Internal Affairs of Subject States.—§ 10. Charges against Athens.

§ 1. It is known that the Delian Confederacy was first organised in the year 478 B.C., mainly, if not wholly, by the influence of Aristides. Something is known also of its arrangements and of the duties to which the constituent members bound themselves, as stated in an earlier chapter.* Further there are extant a number of inscriptions—the so-called Tribute Lists—from which may be learnt the names of many of the contributory communities from the year 454 B.C. onwards, together with something as to the sum which each contributed to the chest of the Confederacy. We have also incidental information, usually bare in the extreme, as to the position of one or two of the member-states from time to time, as for example Thasos, Naxos, and Samos. But we have nothing in the way of a complete sketch of the original constitution of the League, no continuous history of its development, and no sufficient materials from which to reconstruct satisfactorily either the one or the other. Almost everything which may be asserted on these subjects is matter of conjecture only.

* See ch. viii., § 1.
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At its first institution the island of Delos was made the formal centre of the League. There the Synod met and there was deposited the chest of the League. But from the year 454 B.C. onwards, we have the evidence of inscriptions that the chest was now in Athens. It will be convenient to take this date as dividing the history of the League into an earlier and later period.

As originally conceived, the League was an offensive and defensive alliance of the maritime communities of the Aegean *against Persia*. The alliance was purely voluntary, and save in regard to Persia each member-state was at liberty to go its own way in matters of policy, internal and external alike. The League was designed firstly to drive the fleets of Persia from the Greek seas, to expel her garrisons from the European shores of the Aegean, and to free from her control such Greek towns of Asia Minor as cared to be set free; and thereafter to maintain such a force as might suffice to prevent any revival of Persian power in these quarters.

To these ends the first essentials were a fleet, funds to maintain it, and a leader to direct it. Inasmuch as the vast majority of the original members were maritime communities, the required fleet was easily obtained. The needful funds for its maintenance were raised by voluntary contributions according to the assessment made by Aristides and of course ratified by the confederate Synod. The desired leader was of course Athens.

But although Athens was the leader of the Confederates, she was originally in no sense their master. She was not even their better. All were equal, from smallest to greatest, and all possessed an equal voice in the Synod—this Synod, which was to be, so to say, the legislative body to which Athens stood as the executive. It was to meet once a year to lay down the plan of campaign. But we do not know how the several delegates were chosen, how many they were, or what arrangements were made for dealing with the probable contingency of a difference of opinion.

* Grote lays stress upon the fact that Thucydides very carefully distinguishes the early years of the League, when Athens was merely hegemon, from the later years in which she more or less openly claimed to exercise *ἀρχή*—sovereign authority—over her whilom allies.

The first recorded instance of such an event is in the case of Naxos, 466 B.C. Naxos was forcibly coerced, and by Athens, so we are told. But we must believe that Athens was acting in conjunction with a majority of the Synod; for in 466 B.C. Athens had certainly not arrived at a position in which she was able to ignore the wishes of her allies.

§ 2. The equality of the Confederate communities was expressed in the assessment of Aristides, for each made to the general forces and funds a contribution carefully proportioned to its resources. This contribution was calculated in money, and ranged from a few *minae* to many talents. The total yearly value of the *φόρος* was four hundred and sixty talents—a sum sufficient to find and maintain some sixty ships of war for seven months. But the *φόρος* was not originally intended to be paid entirely in money: certain member-states furnished ships; and such as did so, deducted the value of those ships from the total of the yearly *φόρος*, paying only the balance, if any, in cash. We must suppose that it was intended that the Synod should decide which of the member-states should furnish ships, and to what extent. The fact that the obligations of a state were, in certain cases, commutable for money, did most to alter the character of the League. In the first flush of their new-born liberty the mass of the Confederates were ready enough to pledge themselves to great undertakings; but when once the novelty had worn off, and when the Persian had been once driven out of Europe and the nearer waters of the Aegean, the energies of the Confederates flagged. Their obligations became irksome. Now be it remembered that amongst the wealthiest and most powerful members of the League were the great islands lying immediately off the Asiatic coast, and the great commercial cities of the same coast; and that it was precisely these member-states which, in proportion as they lay nearer to Persia's hand, were most concerned to see the League effectively maintained. Their prosperity depended entirely upon the League's presenting with them a strong and united front to the enemy at their gates, and this they could ensure only by loyally fulfilling their own obligations to the League and by jealously holding other

member-states to the same duty. While, therefore, there would from the very first be a tendency on the part of those member-states which lay farther away from Persia—Athens of course always excepted—to shirk their obligations and to fall away from the League, the more easterly portion of the Confederates would display an exactly opposite tendency. There was, in fact, a conflict of interests within the League. This may enable us to explain the fate of Naxos. There must have been grave interests and great influences involved if that state, largest and wealthiest of the western isles, could be attacked, besieged, and reduced, without provoking dangerous ill-feeling towards the conquerors. Doubtless the Naxians had ventured to voice the feelings of the discontented portion of the League—*i.e.* of those member-states which were inclined to shirk their engagements—and were crushed, not for the gratification of Athens merely, but by Athens acting on behalf of the other section of the Confederates.

§ 3. The punishment of Naxos involved the confiscation of her navy. In other words, from this date forward the Naxians paid their share of the *φόπος* in coin, and were no longer called upon to find and man ships of war for the service of the League. Nevertheless, the fate of Naxos did not put an end to the discontent of the party of inaction. It rather increased that discontent; and when the Thasians followed the example of Naxos, they probably relied upon the increased discontent which it provoked, not less than upon the aid of Sparta. But the Thasians were disappointed, and shared the fate of Naxos, and therewith disappeared another of the free navies of the Aegean Islanders. The fate of Naxos and Thasos, two of the strongest of the western member-states, clearly proved that discontented members could not hope to see their grievances remedied by force. It only remained to remedy them by compromise. The chief grievance being the burthen of personal service on shipboard, the obvious course for the aggrieved com-

* Their quarrel was with Athens, not with the League, and its immediate cause was the encroachments of Athenians upon the Thracian gold-coast (see ch. viii., § 5). But, on the one hand, the Thasians would seek to make allies amongst the discontented portion of the League by representing their war with Athens as a protest against the burdens of the League, and, on the other hand, Athens, by so treating it, would assure herself of the support of those in favour of maintaining the integrity of the League.

munities was to obtain the Synod's permission to pay their shares of the *φόρος* entirely in coin, and this was exactly what the more energetic portion of the League desired, for such a compromise was tantamount to the disarming of the discontented member-states, and relieved the League from the odious contingency of being called upon to coerce by force of arms a series, or even a coalition, of discontented communities. In consequence the roll of member-states which furnished ships, *i.e.* the roll of free and independent flotillas, steadily and rapidly decreased, while the amount of the League's annual receipts in money increased proportionately. Athens, and her steady allies the great naval states of Ionia, could view the process with pleasure: they had ships enough to meet any requirements of the Synod; in the persons of the crews with which their fleets were manned they reaped all the benefit of the contributions of the other allies; the less various the composition of the annual fleet, the more easy was the task of directing it and the less probable the likelihood of friction; and finally their ever-increasing and continuous service at sea, while it made necessary the further development of the fleets of those few member-states which still performed naval service, brought their seamen also to a degree of confidence and skill in maritime warfare entirely eclipsing anything to be found in the rest of Greece. Thus it came about that, within a few years, the entire power of the League was concentrated upon its eastern and western borders, where, in fact, it was most needed.

These early modifications of the methods of the League were in no sense the purposed work of Athens. They were the direct and natural result of the indolence and lack of stamina of the Confederates themselves.

§ 4. Thus the theoretical equality of the Confederates speedily disappeared. On the one side were member-states like Athens, Chios, Samos, and Lesbos, which retained their original position, maintained between them the navy of the League, and to an ever-increasing extent usurped the entire direction and administration of the League. On the other side was the mass of the member-states, now disarmed and contributing money alone. And of these again there were

many grades : the condition of Naxos, for example, which had forfeited its position by defection and conquest, was harder than that of communities which had voluntarily chosen to surrender their right to perform naval service ; and of the latter some had perhaps lost ground further by declining to assert their representative rights in the Synod ; while inevitably, where so many communities were but the defenceless tributaries of an armed few, such communities must have commanded more or less consideration in proportion to their individual size and the amount of their contributions to the general chest. And of status inferior even to that of Naxos were such communities as Carystus, which were probably in fact not members of the League at all, but private acquisitions of Athens in much the same kind, if in less degree, than was Scyros.

§ 5. The concentration of power in the hands of a few member-states was probably accompanied by other modifications. But we have no evidence. Possibly the Synod began to lose its representative character even in these early days. The policy which concentrated all power in the hands of a few members must have been at the outset the policy advocated by a majority in the Synod. How far their support of such a policy was voluntary we cannot say. It was presumably enforced upon any communities which joined the League after the first ten or twelve years of its existence, by the simple expedient of ignoring the right of new members to furnish ships in lieu of money-tribute. But such an arrangement was not regarded by them as any hardship. On the contrary, it appeared to assure to them all the advantages of membership without any of the burdens thereof.

A more significant change occurred when the Chest of the League was transferred to Athens. This transfer was an accomplished fact in 454 B.C. ; and it is supposed that the transfer was a precautionary measure adopted under pressure of the alarm excited by the political situation in or about the year 458 B.C. At that date Athens was at open feud with Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, while a large portion of her effective fleet was absent on service in Egypt, if it had not already been destroyed there. The

accumulated savings of the League during twenty years probably now amounted to a considerable sum—sufficient to tempt an enemy less indigent than Sparta.* Seeing that the financial officers of the League had from the outset been Athenians, it was only natural that the Chest itself should be transferred to Athens, and probably the measure was originally intended to be only a temporary arrangement. We are told that it was suggested by the Samians.

The position of a leader necessarily carries with it wide discretionary powers; and if the same leader be suffered to retain his position for a length of time, his discretionary powers rapidly develop into official rights. This tendency inevitably threw more and more authority, firstly, into the hands of the three or four active member-states, and secondly, into the hands of Athens as their leader. Whether or no the Synod underwent any outward change, it is certain that the chief part of its functions passed rapidly into the management of Athens as Executive of the League, and the Synod itself tended to become nothing but a form.

§ 6. From the year 454 B.C. we may date the Empire of Athens. Hitherto she has been hegemon of the maritime states; henceforth she enjoys, not ἡγεμονία, but ἀρχή. And the sphere of her sovereignty is the same as had been that of her hegemony: they are now, with few exceptions, her subjects who had hitherto been her allies. It is impossible to say exactly when the one state of things ended and the other began. The process of change was going on from the outset, and hegemony developed into sovereignty without violent external change.

It has been pointed out how identity of interests gave to Athens the support of the three great naval states of the Ionian coast, and how the spontaneous action of the majority of the Confederates constantly increased the power of these four allies in proportion as it weakened that of the rest. The united strength of the armed states must have

* Thucydides is responsible for the epigram that “the allies of Sparta were ready enough with their persons but not with their purses.” Exactly the opposite was the case with the allies of Athens.

amounted under normal conditions to at least three hundred sail of war, and on emergency to nearly twice that number* —a force in face of which any contumacy was absurd. The remaining allies, so called, possessed no regular ships of war, and even if they possessed them, they must have manned them with raw and unskilled crews, very different from the life-long seamen of Athens and her three coadjutors. They were, in plain fact, defenceless. Such of them as lay upon the mainland possessed indeed walls which they were compelled to keep more or less in repair, according as they were more or less liable to attack from neighbours upon the landward side; but the island states, amply defended by the sea so long as the League retained its power, took no care to maintain even their fortifications, and the majority of them were either quite unwalled or provided only with neglected and feeble defences. In the case of Thasos and Naxos, indeed, this result had been brought about by force; but in general it was the natural outcome of the indolence of the Greek character and of the security which the protection of the League guaranteed to its constituents. In origin spontaneous, this general disarming of the subject-states had now become covertly an object of policy with the dominant states, exactly as had the extinction of all minor navies, as a means towards securing the passive obedience of the merely tributary members of the League. And seeing that Athens alone was superior in strength even to the combined forces of her partners, the three great free states, to a degree scarcely less than that in which, in conjunction with these partners, she was superior to the whole force of the residue of the League, she was free to take what further steps she pleased for the consolidation of her sovereignty of the seas.

§ 7. After the victory at Cyprian Salamis (449 B.C.), the war with Persia came to an end. It was, therefore, open to the inferior members of the League—the subject-states, as they may now be styled—to plead that it was no longer

* The effective Athenian fleet was certainly two hundred sail, and, to judge by the events of the Peloponnesian war, could easily be raised to three hundred on emergency. The Samians kept in commission a fleet of thirty-five sail, and could double it on occasion, and Chios and Lesbos were almost on a level with Samos in point of strength.

right that they should pay an annual φόρος for the maintenance of a fleet no longer required. But even if the virtue of the Athenian Ecclesia had been so far more than human as to dispose that assembly to abandon the collection of the tribute, yet such a course would have been most unwise. In the first place, Persia, if brought to pause, was not by any means put *hors de combat*; and should opportunity arise, it was certain that she would recommence her aggressions upon the Greeks. Her opportunity would come when the League should fall to pieces, and the remission of the φόρος would have amounted to nothing less than the dissolution of the League. And, in the second place, the past thirty years had brought about great changes in the politics of Greece. Sparta had been content to look on when the League was founded; she had not interfered even when it had grown strong; but she had lately shown a different disposition, and already, to such as could look beyond their own immediate interests, it was plain that any sign of weakness in the League would be followed by immediate attack from the side of Sparta and the Peloponnese. Besides Persia, the Athenians and their well-wishers had also to fear Sparta; and unless the members of the League were to become, one by one, the subjects of either Persia or Sparta, it was imperative that the bonds of the League, so far from being relaxed, should be tightened, and that Athens should make use of the League to maintain that naval supremacy which was her own and the League's one guarantee against Sparta and Persia alike.

Consolidation, therefore, rather than extension, was the motto of the foreign policy of Athens from the year 454 B.C. onwards. Its exponent was Pericles. If Pericles could brook to see his country's territorial empire torn from her at a blow, he held fast by her maritime power; and if he was the first statesman of authority who ventured publicly to speak of that power as an ἀρχή, he had also the ability to make its subjects proud of their position. The proof of his greatness in this regard is to be seen in the Peloponnesian War, when for more than twenty years her subjects, almost without exception, held loyally by Athens. Nay, the bulk of them did so until the end of the war, in defiance

of the combined attack of Sparta and Persia; and one at least, Samos, fought on even when Athens herself was crushed.

§ 8. The League, therefore, continued to exist, if in a different form. Year by year the *φόρος* was collected * by Athenian vessels commissioned for the purpose, and was paid into the treasury at Athens. For purposes of collection the whole roll of subject-states was divided after 442 B.C. into five groups, according to their geographical position. The westward islands from Imbros † on the north to Anaphe on the south, including Euboea and Aegina, constituted the first or Insular Tribute. The subject-states of the north and north-west coasts, from Aenus to Thermopylae, with the islands of Thasos and Sainothracia, and the group about Peparethos, formed the second or Thracian Tribute. The third or Hellespontine Tribute extended from Aenus, Tenedos, and Antandrus, through the Hellespont to the few outlying subject-states on the shores of the Euxine. From Antandrus southward to Iasus the coasts and islands made up the fourth or Ionian Tribute. The fifth or Carian Tribute embraced the islands east of Calymna, Astypalaea, and Carpathus, together with the coasts southward from Caryanda and Myndus. The three islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos were free allies, paying no tribute. The Dorian isles of Melos and Thera were not included in the League.‡

The number of the subject-states in each Tribute varied of course from time to time as new members joined the League. In the south-eastern or Carian Tribute it varied more largely, from the fact that a number of communities which were absorbed into the League prior to the battle of Cyprian Salamis fell away again when, after that battle, the Athenians abandoned Cimon's aggressive policy in the direction of Cyprus. But this was the only quarter in which variation is known to have resulted from losses to the League. Further, it must be borne in mind that, excepting in the cases of the

* The collecting-officers were termed *ἐκλογεῖς*.

† Imbros of course ceased to pay *φόρος* when occupied by Athenian cleruchs, but at what date this occurred is unknown.

‡ Melos was compelled to join the League in 416 B.C. (Vol. III., ch. vii., § 7).

coast of western Asia * from Cyzicus to Telmessus, and of the peninsulas of Chalcidice and the Thracian Chersonese, only isolated coast-towns belonged to the League. Chalcidice was a stronghold of Athens' power in the north-west, just as her control of the Thracian Chersonese gave to her the command of the Hellespont; but along the whole of the intervening stretch of coast there were but some half-dozen member-states, and on the coasts of Thessaly there were none at all.

The tribute was not heavy. Byzantium, the greatest commercial city of the north-east, paid at the most only twenty-one talents. Miletus, the mother-city of more colonies than any other single community, but less flourishing now than before the Ionic revolt, paid ten talents. Aegina paid thirty talents, an exceptionally heavy tribute; but Aegina was a conquered Dorian state and was always viewed with distrust. Yet to find and man a single ship of war for eight months would have cost each community at least nine talents, and Aegina's whilom fleet of thirty sail would have meant an annual outlay of two hundred and seventy talents. The heaviest *φόπος*, therefore, was light, seeing that it purchased the protection of the Confederate fleet of three hundred sail. The actual amount of the *φόπος* varied from time to time; we hear of cases in which it was reduced, or even remitted entirely for a time. On the other hand, we do not hear that it was ever unfairly increased, and seeing that its total only amounted to six hundred talents † at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.), we must allow that the rating was moderate; for although, speaking generally, any one subject-state would, after some five-and-forty years of peace, be in a position to pay a much higher *φόπος* than that which Aristides had appointed, and although there were now many new members to share the burden, the gross increase was only a hundred and forty talents. The subject-states of course still remained under obligation to furnish fighting men when called upon.

* But even in Ionia proper there were isolated communities which remained aloof from the League—e.g., Smyrna, and the two Magnesias, and Priene (440 B.C.); while other communities were the private subjects of one or other of the three great free states, and therefore not members of the League.

† The equivalent of £4,200,000 of modern money.

§ 9. Provided the tribute was regularly paid, the sovereign-city did not interfere with her subjects. It was a matter of indifference to her whether the government of the subject-state was democratic or oligarchic so long as it was tractable, loyal, and peaceful.* If *stasis* broke out, she interfered to restore peace, because *stasis* was detrimental to the prosperity of the community, and loss of prosperity re-acted upon its ability to pay the tribute. It was found necessary to maintain garrisons † in a few of the more restless states, but we never hear that these garrisons acted with violence. Inasmuch as it was apparently to the intrigues of the oligarchic parties that Athens owed her occasional difficulties with her dependents, it is much to her credit that she did not adopt a partisan policy in favour of democratic forms of government. In this spirit she made no objection to the attempts of her free allies to extend their private domains, always provided that this was not inimical to the interests of other subject-states. In that event she interfered, as, for example, when the Samians were at issue with Miletus as regards Priene. But Athens insisted that she alone was arbiter of all questions which reached beyond the borders of the subject-state, and that she alone was the supreme court of appeal.

This brings us to the engine of government of which the invention is most peculiarly connected with Pericles, viz. the rule that in certain legal cases judgment was to rest with the Athenian dicasteries. Apparently these included all cases involving disputes between Athenians and citizens of subject-states, between the citizens of different subject-states, and probably also between citizens of the same subject-state where the interests at stake exceeded a certain fixed limit. In all such cases the subject-citizen, whether prosecutor or defendant, was compelled to plead before a court in Athens. On the face of it such an arrangement appears unfair and onerous, but in effect it was probably of direct benefit to the parties concerned. It guaranteed to

* We are told that Athens even encouraged oligarchic forms of government in certain of the subject-states. The government of Samos was oligarchic before the revolt of 440 B.C., and was allowed to remain so. See above, ch. x., § 6.

† Φρουραχίαι, commanded by φρουράρχοι.

the litigant an impartial judgment if he cared to go on with his case; but more often it rendered him agreeable to submit his case to private arbitration at home, thereby saving the cost of the journey to Athens. The cost of such a journey—rarely a journey of more than two days' sail—was trifling, we may suppose, in comparison with the interests at stake, so that if the case was worth fighting it was worth the journey; while, on the other hand, the conditions were sufficiently expensive to prevent, at least in the majority of instances, the frivolous and vexatious petty litigation to which the Greeks were addicted. Of the cases which were brought before the dicasteries of Athens the greater number were probably such as any imperial state might fairly claim to decide upon—cases involving in a very grave degree the lives and properties of her own citizens or the relations of one subject-state with another.* Finally, the arrangement was admirably devised to enable Athens to keep the severest control over any of her citizens exercising authority in the subject-states. Any abuse of such authority, whether on the part of a revenue-officer, a military official, or a garrison trooper, was sure of prompt publicity and immediate chastisement.

§ 10. Enemies of Athens, anxious to make mischief, talked loudly of the injustice of this rule. They represented Athens as a tyrant city exercising an absolute and irresponsible tyranny over a multitude of defenceless subjects, who paid tribute for what they did not enjoy, and suffered injustice to go unpunished because of the cost of litigation in Athens—subjects who groaned under the loss of freedom and their inability to realise the particular form of government most congenial to them, persecuted and dangerously discontented. As the event showed, these were bogus allegations, got up in the interests of a few disappointed oligarchs, whose self-seeking was sternly checked by a government which honestly endeavoured to foster the best interests of each community under its control. Only

* Amongst ancient states, Rome pushed this prerogative of judicial administration much further; e.g., in sending annual *prefects* to many subject-towns of Italy, and in holding periodical assizes in her provinces. In modern days much the same thing is to be seen: the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is the court to which certain cases affecting the interests of our colonists are referred.

in one point did the indictment approach the truth, viz. in the assertion that the *φόρος* was no longer expended in the interests of those who paid it, but on the glorification of Athens alone. But even on this point Pericles had the complete and sufficient answer that Athens still fulfilled her engagement to her subjects in that she guaranteed their safety against all trespassers, and in return for a merely nominal tax maintained for each a fleet of overwhelming strength; and that, so long as she did this, she was at liberty to employ as she pleased the surplus revenues of her empire, provided always that this was not for the purpose of maltreating her subjects. The Confederate chest was now at Athens, under the tutelage of Pallas Athene; and to employ a portion of the surplus revenue—a small portion only—upon the erection and maintenance of a fit dwelling-place for that goddess, was a pious peculation to which no right-minded Greek could demur.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE IMPERIAL CITY

§ 1. The Original City; its Growth · Walls of Themistocles (Plan) — § 2. Buildings of Cimon — § 3. Peiraeus · the Long Walls — § 4. The Acropolis and its Temples.—§ 5. The Parthenon — § 6. Propylaea and Erechtheum — § 7. Buildings of the City — § 8 Population — § 9. Pheidias, Myron, Polygnotus, and Others

§ 1. THE original Athens, the city of the so-called Mycenaean age, lay clustered round the foot of the Acropolis hill. Down to historical days was preserved the tradition of Pelasgian fortifications—the *Pelasgicum*, or *Pelargicum*—on or about this rock ; and upon the summit may still be seen fragments of curtain walls belonging to that remote age, as well as portions of the foundations of buildings, supposed to have been palaces of the same type as those traceable on the citadels of Mycenae, Tiryns, and Troy.

At the time of the invasion of Xerxes the city had grown to larger dimensions ; but then, as always, the Acropolis remained its centre, alike in the topographical and in the religious sense of the term. It extended southward as far as the small stream of the Ilissus, and northward to include the *Agora*, or market-place. The barbarians left the city a ruin. Even at that date the citadel was adorned with temples and with numbers of statues. All were destroyed, and the broken fragments of these early sculptures are still being turned up in the course of excavations on and about the hill.

The new city which rose from the ruins after 480 B.C. was on a larger and altogether a grander scale. It covered an area more than twice as large as before, and its fortifications were on a scale unparalleled in Greece. The exact course


of the walls erected by Themistocles is disputed ; but the total circuit was not less than six miles, embracing the entire area of the earlier city and much additional space to the north and east.

§ 2. Cimon, and after him Pericles, seem to have rebuilt or strengthened various portions of the walls which showed signs of weakness. Cimon was as active an improver as Pericles. He gave particular attention to the fortifications of the Acropolis. But the outer wall once completed, the Athenians had no need to hurry over the restoration of the ruined works of the Acropolis ; and here Cimon had an opportunity to display at once his patriotism and his generosity. But he did not confine his efforts to military architecture : he erected several temples, of which one was the Theseum,* for the reception of the relics brought from Scyros, and another was the diminutive temple of Athene Nike outside the entrance to the Acropolis. A third of his buildings was a magnificent temple of Athene on the citadel. Whether or no this latter was ever completed, upon its substructures Pericles reared the famous Parthenon. To Cimon also the Athenians owed the *Stoa Poecile*, or Painted Portico, looking upon the *Agora*. It derived its name from the fact that it was decorated with paintings of the Marathonian campaign from the pencils of Micon and Polygnotus. Yet another of Cimon's works was the laying out and construction of a great *gymnasium*, or place for athletic exercises and outdoor amusement, beyond the Dipylon Gate, in the direction of the Academy.

§ 3. A distance of some five miles divided Athens from Peiraeus, a name which includes three originally separate villages lying upon the shores of the several harbours of Peiraeus, Zea, and Munychia. Of these the Peiraeic port, or Cantharus as it was sometimes called, was far the largest. Here were the docks and shipyards, and the hundred subsidiary trades which combined to build, maintain in repair, equip, and provision a fleet of at least two hundred sail-makers of sails and oars and ropes, traders and artisans in timber and metal, warehouses of every kind, and a dense

* Probably not the temple of which the ruins now bear this name. See § 7, below.

- F. Port of Peiraeus.
 G. Port of Zea.
 H. Port of Munychia.
 I. Naval Dockyards.
 2. 8. 8. Porticos and Corn-market.
 9. 9. Eetionea.
 10. Tomb of Themistocles.



ATHENS AND HER PORTS.

population whose existence depended upon the sea. All round the great harbour ran docks and quays, and behind these long porticoes or other buildings which were used as warehouses for grain and other bulky goods. Zea being exclusively a military port on a smaller scale, and Munychia but a small and comparatively inconvenient basin, all the commerce of the Athenian world centred in the port of Peiraeus.

The entire peninsula was ringed with a wall of tremendous strength, and yet of not more than half the height to which Themistocles had wished it to be carried, and so wide as to allow two waggons to pass along it abreast. Following the fretted line of the cliffs, the walls ran down to the water's edge immediately opposite to the point of Eetionea, which forms the northern side of the entrance. From Eetionea it commenced anew, sweeping round to the shallow water at the extreme head of the harbour, through which it was carried on piers, and so across the neck of the peninsula and back to Munychia and the western point of the Bay of Phalerum. Where the walls abutted upon the entrance of the port they terminated in strong towers, while the entry was still further protected by moles which jutted out from either shore, leaving between them a passage so narrow as easily to be closed by a heavy chain. The total circuit of the Peiraeic Walls, including the loop which protected the small haven on the western or outer side of Eetionea, was more than seven miles.

The Long Walls, as originally planned, if not commenced, by Cimon, started from the south-western wall of Athens and ran divergently—one, the Northern Wall, direct to the northern angle of the walls of Peiraeus, the other or Phaleric Wall, direct to the eastern extremity of the Bay of Phalerum. But without still further works to defend the long and flat beach of the Bay, there was no means of preventing an enemy from landing between these two walls; for which reason Pericles erected the third or Middle Wall, close to and immediately parallel with the Northern Wall, thus securing the means of access between the city and her ports. The Phaleric Wall, if not actually dismantled, was at any rate neglected, after this date. The length of the Northern and Middle Walls was four and a half miles each,

or nine miles in all. Thus the total length of wall to be defended in the event of war was not less than twenty miles ! *

The space between the Long Walls proper, *i.e.* the Northern and Middle Walls, was left mainly unoccupied ; for according to the policy of Pericles, in the event of a hostile invasion of Attica the entire rural population was to be received within the fortifications of the city. This could not be effected unless ample room was left. The event actually occurred in the Peloponnesian War ; but unfortunately for Athens the space was insufficient, and the consequent overcrowding of the city's boundaries provoked the outbreak of a deadly pestilence.

§ 4. Within the city proper lay the Acropolis. Originally the citadel in fact, it was now such in name only, albeit still fortified in some sort. It was *par excellence* the sacred precinct of Athens, where were located all her most venerated and most costly buildings. The patron divinity of Athens from the first was Athene, surnamed Polias—“ warden of the city.” In the most ancient days she possessed a temple—the temple of Athene—almost at the centre of the platform of the Acropolis ; and about this original temple grew up in course of time others dedicated to divinities less revered than herself, but still ancient and venerable. Chief of these were Erechtheus and Poseidon, who in very early days had temples or shrines close to that of Athene. Xerxes levelled with the ground every building upon the Acropolis ; but amongst the first acts of the Athenians upon their return to the city was the reconstruction of the temples of Athene, Erechtheus, and Poseidon. But whereas the former was re-built upon its old foundations, the two secondary divinities seem to have been provided with one temple between them, the building known as the Erechtheum. As the city grew in wealth and power, it was decided to build a new and worthier Athene-temple near the middle of the southern edge of the Acropolis. Cimon probably had this in hand when he died. Pericles

* Thus : City Wall, six miles ; Peiraean, seven miles ; Long Walls, nine miles ; total, twenty-two miles. But we must deduct the two portions of the City Wall and the walls of Peiraeus respectively which lay between the two Long Walls—a deduction which amounted certainly to less than two miles.

pulled down the bulk of Cimon's work, and upon its substructures he erected his famous masterpiece, now known as the Parthenon—that is, the Hall of the Virgin Goddess.

§ 5. This, the type of all temples of the Doric style as modified by Attic canons, was only completed in 438 B.C. The platform upon which it stands measures some 221 feet in length by 97½ wide. Of the actual temple two-thirds were taken up by the enormous hall (*cella*) in which stood, behind a screen or grille, Pheidias' famous statue of Athene, the remaining third (*opisthodomos*) being as usual utilised as a treasury or store-chamber. The ceiling of the great hall was carried on twenty-three slender columns, that of the lesser on four columns of much larger size. Round the great hall ran a lofty gallery. At each end of the building was a portico supported on six columns, and round the whole ran a colonnade or *peripteros* of forty-six columns more—eight at each end and seventeen on either side. The whole was approached by steps at each end, and the level of the *peripteros* again was some steps lower than that of the temple proper. The material employed was white marble throughout, painted in various colours, and the frieze surrounding the great hall was adorned with sculptures representing the Panathenaic procession. The pediments were filled with groups representing the birth of Athene and her conflict with Poseidon; while the metopes were carved with a variety of subjects drawn from the legends of the Giants, the Amazons, the Centaurs and Lapithae, and the Trojan Wars. Of these sculptures, a large number are now in the British Museum, having been brought to England by Lord Elgin.* The whole were designed by Pheidias, and probably executed by his disciples. Pheidias himself was occupied in executing the statue of Athene in marble, gold, and ivory, nearly forty feet in height, which was the one sufficient ornament of the great hall. The chief architect was Ictinus, a man whose skill and painful nicety are still the wonder of all architects. Callicrates was his subordinate. To give some idea of Ictinus' labours it may be mentioned that there is hardly a mathematically straight line of any extent in the whole edifice, but in every case where the lines appear to

* Hence their common title of "the Elgin Marbles."

be straight, this effect is the result of carefully calculated curves of the minutest degree; and with the same design of avoiding unpleasing optical effects, each column tapers, not directly, but with an imperceptible outward bulge, while instead of standing mathematically perpendicular, each is inclined at an equally minute angle inwards.

The older temple continued to exist, and within it was stored the treasure of Athens. When, therefore, the chest of the League was transferred to Athens, this also was lodged in the same temple and placed, as it were, under the tutelage of Athene; a fact which gave to Pericles a plausible excuse for appropriating out of it a certain percentage annually "for the office of the goddess" and expending a large amount of it in erecting the new temple and other edifices for the glorification of the city of Athene.

§ 6. Of these further buildings the grandest was the Propylaea, the great portal of the Acropolis, of which the architect was Mnesicles. It covered the western end of the Acropolis, and consisted of a superb approach of wide marble steps flanked on either side by a lofty colonnaded *loggia*, between which one passed to a magnificent central hall and so to the level of the sacred precinct within. The marble ceiling of this building was one of the wonders of Athens, and the style a wonderfully happy combination of the more majestic Doric with the lighter Ionic. The northern *loggia* did duty as a picture gallery. This building was completed about 433 B.C.

A still later development in architecture was employed in the restoration or re-construction of the Erechtheum, the third, and in some ways the most beautiful, of the buildings of the Acropolis. In this case the style is purely Ionic, but the work belongs, at least in its completion, to a later period, subsequent to the Peloponnesian War. It must be mentioned here as being at least in course of erection in Pericles' day, and it is notable also as being of extraordinary irregularity of design, a fact due to the architect's desire to enclose within one and the same edifice some half-dozen sacred sites —the grave of Cecrops, the imperishable olive of Athene, the spot where Poseidon had left the impress of his trident, as well as the sites of the older temples of Erechtheus and

Poseidon. The most famous feature of this building is its beautiful Caryatid portico.

But it is impossible to give any idea of the wonders of the Acropolis. The whole plateau was a museum of religion, tradition, and art, crowded with beautiful buildings, gleaming with polished and painted marbles, and strewn with scores of statues of every style and subject. Polygnotus the Thasian painter, Myron the sculptor of the wonderful *Discobolos*, Pheidias, Ictinus and Mnesicles the architects, are but the most splendid names amongst a host of others. One of the statues alone need be mentioned—namely, the colossal bronze figure of Athene Promachos—Athene Armed—the work of Pheidias, which stood between the Parthenon and the Propylaea, rising to such a height that mariners doubling the point of Sunium, forty miles away, could see the gleam of the sunlight reflected from its brazen helmet and spear-head. It was erected in Cimon's time.

§ 7. The adornment of the surrounding city was by no means neglected. Temples and porticoes, drinking fountains and conduits, public halls for the Council, for the dicasteries, for the Prytans—in fact, for each and every class of public official—rose on every hand. In the southern face of the Acropolis, slightly to the east of the Parthenon above it, was excavated the gigantic theatre of Dionysus in which were produced annually in March the prize dramas of the year. Its elevation was such that the audience, at least from the upper tiers, could look out over the whole Saronic Gulf and the island of Salamis. East of this again was the Odeum, another work of Pericles, to whose peculiarly-shaped head the Athenian wits likened its conical roof. It was used on the occasion of the musical competitions instituted by Pericles as an adjunct of the Panathenaic festival. Nothing is now left of it. Beyond the *Agora*, in the north-western region of the city, stood the Theseum so called, a peripteral temple of six columns to the front, in a severer style of Doric art than the larger and more elaborate Parthenon. Although called after Theseus, it is not certainly known that this is the temple erected by Cimon for the housing of the hero's bones. The innumerable fountains and their accessory works were constructed by

Meton, and the personal comfort of the denizens of this favoured city was further provided for by the planting of plane-trees in various public places.

§ 8. The population of the city at this date has been variously calculated as high as two hundred thousand and as low as a hundred and twenty thousand souls. Of these at least three-quarters, and probably five-sixths, were slaves, and the proportion of alien residents was unusually large, it being the studied policy of Pericles to encourage that class. As for the states of the League, their population may be computed at the lowest at two millions.

Of the wealthier and older families, although perhaps mostly resident in Athens, many yet maintained the traditional ways of the old aristocratic days, taking pride in their estates beyond the walls, and living the lives of country gentlemen. For although the soil of Attica was poor, it was nevertheless highly cultivated, and the country was covered with forests of olive- and fig-trees. The more immediate and staple necessities of life were almost entirely imported from Euboea, Thrace, or the cornlands of the farther shores of the Euxine. This import-trade made the fortunes of a newer aristocracy of merchant-princes.

Even the life of the very poorest was a life of comparative ease. None need starve while the Ecclesia met constantly and the dicasteries sat daily, while a Cimon or a Pericles found employment for hundreds upon the erection of numberless public works, while there was a fleet of at least sixty sail to be manned for two-thirds of the year, and while the commerce of the world thronged the quays of Peiraeus.

§ 9. The man who acted as Pericles' adviser and manager in all matters of art was Pheidias, the son of Charmides, an Athenian by birth, and by training a pupil of Ageladas, one of the Argive School of sculpture. Pheidias seems to have been born about the year 500 B.C., and was so fortunate as to obtain the patronage of Cimon, for whom he designed and executed the colossal bronze *Promachos* of the Acropolis. At any rate, from about the year 455 B.C. onwards he never lacked employment. To him was entrusted the production of the colossal figure of Zeus which adorned the great temple of Olympia--a forty-foot seated figure in gold

and ivory. As a rule he seems to have merely designed the figures required for the decoration of Pericles' buildings, leaving their execution to his pupils and disciples. Indeed, he could not have found time personally to execute one tithe of the work for which he was responsible. From 450 B.C. onwards he resided permanently in Athens, busied with the adornment of the Parthenon, the Propylaea, and a score of minor works. As the guiding spirit of Pericles, he was eventually made the scapegoat of the ill-feeling which gathered to a head against his patron at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He was banished from the city which he had made beautiful. He died almost immediately after his ejection (432 B.C.).

Somewhat earlier than Pheidias was Myron, who attained to a perfection in the expression of transitory emotions and physical movement as absolute as that to which Pheidias attained in the expression of the ideal and divine. His *Discobolos*—youth hurling the discus—is known to every one, and his statue of the Olympic foot-racer Ladas, expiring at the moment of his victory, was equally realistic. Myron was as skilful in dealing with lower forms of life: probably no animal-statue has provoked so many and so eulogistic encomiums as his bronze figure of a cow. Polycleitus of Sicyon, another pupil of Ageladas, by his inimitable treatment of the nude figure, established the first canon for such subjects. His greatest works were the *Doryphorus* (boy with a lance), the *Diadumenos* (boy blindfolding himself), the *Apoxiomenos* (athlete using the strigil), and a beautiful figure of a Resting Amazon. Of all these there exist copies of varying degrees of merit.

Last amongst the masters we may name Polygnotus of Thasos, whose paintings decorated the *Stoa Poecile*, the Hall of the Cnidiars at Delphi, the Propylaea, and the Theseum. It is said that he was a suitor for the hand of Cimon's sister Elpinice, and this may have made him the more anxious to distinguish himself in furthering Cimon's efforts to adorn Athens. Aristotle said of him that his figures outdid Nature herself, and that he was a master in the expression of character. He is said to have used only four colours in his compositions.

CHAPTER XIV.

SICILY.

§ 1. Preponderance of Dorians in Sicily: Meaning of the Term "Tyrannis" the Age of Tyrants.—§ 2 Causes of the Permanence of Despotism in Sicily. Thalaris.—§ 3. Dorieus Attempts to Colonise Eryx, Helaclea, Minoa: the Despots of Gela.—§ 4. Gelo: he Seizes the Despotism, and Captures Syracuse.—§ 5. History of Messana, the Samians.—§ 6. The Greeks appeal to Gelo: Battle of Himera.—§ 7. Gelo's Further Conquests and Death.—§ 8. Character of Hiero: he Expels his Brother: Quarrels with Thero: Betrayal of Himera. Anaxilaus: Foundation of Aetna.—§ 9. War with Etruscans: Battle of Cumae: Death of Thero: Thrasydacus makes War on Hiero, his Expulsion.—§ 10. Micythus of Rhegium: Death of Hiero: his Olympic Victories and Patronage of Literature.—§ 11. Tyranny of Thrasybulus: General Revolt of the Greeks of Sicily: Disestablishment of the Gelonians: Restoration of Camarina: the Thousand at Agrigentum: Petalism at Syracuse.—§ 12. Rise of Ducetius: his Surrender and Retirement to Corinth: his Return: Period of Peace.

§ 1. THROUGHOUT the history of Grecian Sicily the Dorian element is always in the ascendent. Syracuse and Gela, both direct Dorian colonies, and Agrigentum, an offshoot of Gela, divided between them the hegemony of the island; and the less powerful sections of the Hellenic peoples, Ionians and Achaeans, and the native Sicel states, and even the lesser Dorian towns, so far from ever rivalling the pretensions of the great Dorian cities, have actually no history of their own. They appear only as prizes to be fought over by the Dorians of Sicily, or by the Greeks of Hellas at large. Egesta and Leontini, Messana and Camarina, in turn appear as *casus belli*, and their continual seizure by one or other of the great states, or by the Carthaginians, prevented their ever attaining to an importance of their own.

The inherent antagonism of Dorian, Ionic, and Achaean

Greeks, while it still remained a powerful political factor, was nevertheless subordinated in Sicily to the self-interest of the individual in a manner unknown in historical Greece. Not only were Syracuse, Gela, and Agrigentum bitterly jealous each of the other, but it was a peculiarity of Sicilian Hellenism that, throughout its history, state jealousies should centre in the person of one individual. Thus the history of Sicily is the record of the endeavours of individuals to secure personal aggrandisement—the history of despots or tyrants.

By the term *tyrant* was meant, in Greece, one who put himself above the laws, refusing to be bound by them, while enforcing them at pleasure upon others. *Tyrannis* corresponds to the modern English phrase “unlimited monarchy,” and just as an unlimited monarchy may be good and equitable, or the reverse, so the Greek tyranny was not necessarily oppressive and unjust. The associations which are connected in our minds with the word “tyrant” are not essential features of the *tyrannos*, although, unfortunately, the great majority of Grecian despots confirmed only too well the evil reputation of autocracy. Nevertheless, one of the most famous of the despots of Sicily, Gelo of Syracuse, left behind him so fair a name that when the island was “liberated,” and the records of the tyrannies destroyed by Timoleon, popular feeling compelled him to spare the spot where the bones of Gelo were buried, and where his spirit was worshipped as that of a hero.

That tyranny should at some time or other arise in every Greek community was a recognised step in their development. Originally governed by kings, they passed gradually under the power of a council of nobles, who encroached upon the royal authority until they entirely replaced it. These constituted the oligarchic governments, the second stage in political evolution. At first governing mildly and well, they came usually in course of time to abuse their power, and to exercise it for selfish ends alone. The mass of the people submitted perforce to the few in whose hands lay all the instruments of authority, physical and moral, until their very distress gained for them a

champion. Sometimes he was one of themselves ; more often one of the oligarchs, grown dissatisfied with his fellows. In either case, by profuse promises, by inflammatory speeches, by professed sympathy—the recognised weapons of the demagogue, or popular leader—he secured the support of the multitude, and overthrew their oppressors, only to take up in his single person the despotic position lately occupied by an oligarchy which numbered perhaps several thousands. Having attained his aims by the aid of the masses, he now turned against them and constituted himself *tyrannos*. His government was the third stage. It might endure but for his own lifetime. It might be handed down from father to son even for a hundred years. But sooner or later it fell before a new rising of the people, who took the government into their own hands and constituted a *πολιτεία*, or democracy.

Through these stages passed, with the exception of Sparta, all the leading states of Greece. At Corinth, Sicyon, Argos, and Athens, in the Greek colonies on the coast of Asia, everywhere where Greeks came, the regular cycle was evolved. The period between 750—500 B.C. saw the *tyrannis* rise and fall in almost every community of Hellas proper, with a simultaneity which has secured for it the name of the Age of the Tyrants. And once overthrown, the tyranny rarely reappeared in Greece. But in Sicily the case was different. Arising about the same period as elsewhere, the Sicilian despots were able to reassert themselves despite all opposition until the last days of Grecian Sicily. When the rest of the island passed to the Romans (241 B.C.), Syracuse was still, as of old, under the dominion of a tyrant.

§ 2. The causes of the continuance of the despotism in Sicily were various. The original settlers in each colony formed a close oligarchy of aristocrats, who viewed with dislike all encroachments upon their privileges, and thus, by their intolerance, left an unfailing handle to the attacks of self-seeking demagogues. Their power was strengthened by the fact that, as the wealthy class, they maintained the “invincible cavalry,” for which Sicily was ever famous, and which gave them an immense advantage in point of force. Moreover, the indelible jealousies of state towards state,

apart from the ever-present dread of Carthaginian attack, kept all in a condition of constant warfare, the condition most favourable for any one man's concentrating in his own person the support and respect of his fellow-citizens. It will be seen hereafter how often and how easily the peril of his state was the despot's opportunity. Something must be set down, too, to the diminutive proportions of even the most important states, which exposed them to such sudden and disastrous onslaughts as are unknown in the enormous states of to-day, and which could only be guarded against by a vigilance alien to the taste of a people engrossed as the Sicilians were in mercantile and agricultural pursuits. Lastly, the isolation of Sicily, its distance from the progressive mother-country, the small influx of Hellenes from the older states now freed from despotism, and, not least, the continual contact with the Orientalism of the Carthaginians and Africa, induced a conservatism which strove to tolerate the original order of things—those oligarchies which were the hotbeds of despotism.

Most of these causes will be found to have been specially active at first in the western parts of the island, about Gela, Agrigentum, and Selinus, the farthest outpost of Hellenism in Sicily; and at Agrigentum accordingly we find the first recorded instance of Sicilian despotism. Phalaris, one of the original settlers of Agrigentum, and an exile from Astypalaea in Rhodes, contrived to overpower his fellow-settlers and make himself despot of the town as early as 570 B.C., within fifteen years of its foundation. When entrusted with the building of a magnificent temple of Zeus—and such magnificence was characteristic of the Sicilian towns—he collected a large number of artisans, whom he suddenly armed, and so mastered the place. It is possible that the citizens found it expedient to recognise as their leader one who was capable of holding in check the neighbouring Sicanian tribes. We know that he warred against them with considerable success, and two hill-fortresses guarding the passage of the Himera, on the western side of Agrigentum, retained in their names the memory of the despot whose reputation for cruelty was imperishable. He engaged one Perillus to construct a brazen bull, in which

victims could be enclosed and roasted to death, and the most wholesome deed with which he is accredited is the burning of its inventor as the first experiment with this piece of ingenuity. He maintained his position for sixteen years, being slain at the end of that period (*circa* B.C. 556) in a general rising under a noble named Telemachus. There is another, but improbable, story that he laid down his power voluntarily, with the remark that the people were like so many pigeons fleeing from a single hawk, whom, if they would but face, they were more than strong enough to destroy. In later times there was an attempt to re-establish his character, and in the so-called "Letters of Phalaris" * he appears as a humane ruler, and the patron of literature and art.

Whether or no Phalaris was the first of the Sicilian despots, his example did not lack imitation. The close of the sixth century B.C. saw despots established at Zancle (Messana), Himera, Selinus, Gela, and Leontini, and we are justified in assuming that many, if not all, of the remaining cities suffered from the prevailing tendency to tyranny.

§ 3. About 510 B.C.—the year of the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome—Sybaris was rased by the Crotoneates, and there occurred the last attempt at colonisation in Sicily by the mother-country. It happened that Anaxandrides, one of the two kings of Sparta, having no children by his first wife, was ordered by the Ephors to marry a second, in the hope of preventing the extinction of the direct royal line. This second marriage resulted in the birth of a son, Cleomenes, who was thus heir to the kingship. Unhappily, however, the first wife shortly afterwards gave birth to three sons, Dorieus, Leonidas, and Cleombrotus. Dorieus, chagrined to find himself, though son of the legitimate queen, nevertheless subordinate to the earlier-born Cleomenes, determined to lead out a colony, and win a kingdom for himself. An attempt to settle at the mouth of the river Cynips in Libya, between the two Syrtes, was

* More famous than the *Letters* is the dispute as to their authenticity, in which Dr. Bentley satisfactorily proved them a forgery—the work, probably, of some sophist. The story of his voluntary resignation probably arose at the same date,

frustrated by the hostility of the natives and the Carthaginians, whose borders were threatened thereby; and after a three years' strife Dorieus was compelled to return to Sparta. Putting down his ill-success to his not having consulted the oracles, he now sent to Delphi, and was ordered to colonise Heraclea. There was a legend that Eryx had been conquered by Heracles, and hither came Dorieus with a small force of Spartans. But the Carthaginians, relishing the advancement of Greek influence in western Sicily as little as in Libya, supported the native Elymi so successfully that the expedition was completely thwarted and Dorieus himself slain. The survivors, under Euryleon, crossed to the southern coast, and there seized Minoa, the colony of Selinus. Selinus itself was at the time under the despotism of Peithagoras. Euryleon united with the Selinuntines to expel the tyrant, and seized the despotism himself, only to perish in a speedy revolution. His followers, however, seem to have remained at Minoa, which was henceforth known as Heraclea Minoa.

It is about this time that the despots of Gela began to assert themselves in Sicily. Political division in that town had led to the expulsion of a body of the citizens who occupied Mactorium, an island town. Their return was effected by one Telines, himself a Geloan, apparently on the ground of religion; and in return for his services, in putting an end to domestic faction, he was invested with the hereditary priesthood of the Chthonian deities, whose commands he had obeyed. In the year 505 B.C. we find Cleander established as despot, so that the influence of Telines must very soon have failed. After a reign of seven years, Cleander was assassinated by a citizen Sabyllus, but the power merely passed into the hands of his brother Hippocrates, 498 B.C. The new despot was an indefatigable soldier. He turned against Greeks and Sicels alike the mercenaries whom his brother had levied; he reduced Naxos, and even Messana; then turned eastward, and captured Leontini; and carried on a continuous war with the "barbarians," probably the western Sicels and the Carthaginians. Finally, he attacked even the Syracusans, and defeated them in a battle on the Helorus. The latter appealed to

Corinth and Coreyra for arbitration, and a treaty was arranged, by which their colony Camarina, which had already proved troublesome,^{*} was surrendered to Gela, and the approach to Syracuse herself thus thrown open. Hippocrates fell about B.C. 491, before the walls of Hybla, where he was engaged in battle with the Sicels, leaving two sons, Euclides and Cleander.

His death was followed by an immediate rising of the Geloans, who declined to acknowledge the authority of his sons. The latter found, however, a pretended champion in their father's lieutenant Gelo, who brought up his troops, routed the disaffected citizens, and finally, setting aside the sons of Hippocrates, usurped the tyranny for himself.

§ 4. Gelo was descended from Telines, and therefore belonged to one of the principal families in the state; for the practice of a state priesthood in a Grecian community implies at once large resources and wide influence. He had enhanced this position by the brilliancy of his services in the campaigns of Hippocrates, and was probably high in favour with the mercenaries, the main body of every despot's army. He was thus well qualified to claim the position left vacant by Hippocrates, and he justified his usurpation by the vigour of his actions. What these were in detail we do not know, but they left him free to turn to the best advantage the troubles which shortly broke out at Syracuse. The aristocrats of that state—the *Gamori*,[†] or land-owners—had made so bad a use of their power as to provoke a coalition between their own serfs—*Cillicyrii*—and the free populace, and were compelled to take refuge at Casmeneae. They invited the help of Gelo, who lost no time in coming to their support with so powerful a force that the newly-erected democracy surrendered themselves and their city unconditionally, 485 B.C.

But Gelo had no mind to take up arms merely to gratify the nobles of another state. He had recognised the incom-

* Founded 509; it had disowned the authority of Syracuse as early as 550 B.C. and had been reduced by force of arms.

† The *Gamori* were the descendants of the old settlers, the landed aristocracy. The original inhabitants, whom they had disappropriated, became serfs bound to the soil, and known as *Cillicyrii* (or *Cillyrii*). Between these two extremes lay the mass of the people, independent, but landless, and mainly tenant-farmers or petty traders.

parable advantages of Syracuse, whose soil and climate made its situation the peer of any in Sicily; while its position secured it from the aggressions of Carthage as far as might be, and brought it into close relations with the cities of Magna Graecia and with Central Hellas; and the islet of Ortygia, commanding alike the two harbours and the adjacent lowlands, marked it out as intended by nature for the seat of a despot, who was bound by his very position to see an enemy in every man. Instead of restoring the city to its oligarchy, Gelo occupied it himself; and not content with the simple transfer of his residence thither from Gela, he proceeded to diminish the importance of the latter town by drawing off more than half its populace to Syracuse. Camarina he caused to be deserted, removing all its inhabitants in the same manner to Syracuse; and he even drew others from the neighbouring towns of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea, in both of which places the oligarchies resisted his usurpations, and were forced into migration. Strange to say, though it was the oligarchs who resisted him, he preferred to spare their lives on condition of their residing in Syracuse; while the mass of the populace, the demos, who had in no way opposed him, he expelled with an undeserved harshness, and even sold into slavery abroad. It was a maxim with him that "a demos was a thankless thing to live with"; and, doubtless, it appeared more profitable to dismiss a population which had no other possession than its innate love of autonomy, and promised to contribute neither by its wealth nor its enterprise to the aggrandisement of the new capital of Sicily. For Syracuse now at once assumed this position—a position which it ever afterwards maintained. From the borders of Messana to those of Agrigentum, the whole of the Greek towns, with their fertile conterminous coastlands, were now under the yoke of Gelo. In the interior many of the Sicels paid him tribute, while beyond his own dominions he possessed a powerful ally in Thero of Agrigentum. Anaxilaus, despot of Messana and Rhegium, and Terillus, of Himera and Selinus, alone were neither in alliance with him nor in subjection; while the latter town appears to have been a dependency of the Carthaginians.

§ 5. The history of Messana about this period deserves a brief notice, it being one of the few minor Sicilian towns of which we have any detailed account. Under its original name of Zancle it had passed under the despotism of a citizen named Scythes, who was still in power when Hippocrates of Gela attacked it and made Scythes his dependent. Between Messana and Rhegium there had always been, as is natural with neighbours, a violent feud, arising probably from the attempts of each town to monopolise the command of the Strait of Messina. Shortly after the assault of Hippocrates news reached Sicily of the suppression of the revolt of the Ionian cities by Persia, 494 B.C., and the consequent exile of many of their former citizens. Amongst these were a number of Samians and Milesians, who, while casting about for a new home, received an invitation from their fellow-countrymen in Sicily to form there a new town at Cale Acte—Fair Head—a position on the north coast some miles west of Messana. With the exception of Ilimera, the north coast could boast as yet no Grecian settlements, and the Zanclaeans undertook to establish the new-comers in the proposed position. Accordingly, the Samians and their fellow-fugitives crossed to Italy *en route* for Zancle, putting in at Locri on their way westward. Here they were visited by Anaxilaus, of Rhegium, who saw in them the means of crushing his rival on the opposite shore of the Strait. Scythes, he told them, was at the moment absent in the interior with the bulk of the armed force of the Zanclaeans, and he advised them to seize the defenceless city for themselves. With inexcusable ingratitude they snatched at the idea, and occupied Zancle. Scythes, finding himself thus ejected, appealed to his over-lord Hippocrates, who replied by putting him under arrest for having permitted the loss of one of the Gelonian vassal states, and forthwith marched northward to recover it himself. But the Samians persuaded him to an act of treachery as unwarrantable as their own, and he contented himself with seizing the persons and property of all the Zanclaeans without the walls, leaving all within the walls in the hands of their captors. The whole of the ejected inhabitants thus became the prisoners of Hippocrates,

who sold them into slavery. The Samians retained their ill-gotten gains but a little while, for they were in turn expelled by Anaxilaus, who thus constituted himself despot of that town as well as of Rhegium, and changed its name to Messana.

§ 6. Now undisputed master of the greater part of Sicily, Gelo stepped forward as the champion of Hellenism against barbarians and undertook the expulsion of the Carthaginians and Elymi from their possessions in the west of the island.* How far he succeeded we do not know; but his partial success seems to be proved by the subsequent efforts of Carthage to retaliate, and by the appeal now made to him for assistance by the Hellenes of Central Greece.

In the year 480 B.C. Xerxes invaded Greece. The Greeks, seeking for help on every hand, sent even to Sicily to request the aid of Gelo. How the Embassy fared has been described already.† Gelo either could not or would not come to the assistance of his distant kinsmen, for he was at the moment threatened with an attack scarcely less formidable from a Western foe. Taking advantage of the troubles of Central Greece, and probably incited by Xerxes, whose fleet was mainly levied from the Phoenician dock-yards, the Carthaginians were preparing a huge armament, which should sweep the Hellenes from Sicily, and avenge the recent aggressions of Gelo.

Their immediate opportunity arose from the expulsion of Terillus from Himera by Thero, despot of Agrigentum, at the invitation of the inhabitants of that town. Terillus put himself under the protection of Carthage, and his case was so energetically supported by his son-in-law, Anaxilaus, that in 480 B.C. Hamilcar, one of the *suffetes*, appeared on the west coast with an armament stated at three hundred thousand foot, with a proportionate number of horses and chariots, and a fleet of three thousand ships of war, besides transport vessels. Without delay he laid siege to Himera, whose inhabitants prepared for defence by blocking up the

* Herod., vii. 158. He declared himself the avenger of Dorieus' death, and seems to have asked the aid of the Greeks of Central Hellas, which was refused.

† See above, ch. iv., § 5.

gates of their town and awaiting the arrival of aid under Thero and Gelo. The latter is said to have brought with him fifty thousand foot and five thousand horse; and the Grecian army can hardly have numbered less than sixty thousand in all. The battle which followed lasted throughout the whole of the day. Before its commencement Gelo intercepted a message announcing the approach of a body of horse from Selinus in support of Hamilcar. He at once despatched a squadron of his own cavalry, who impersonated the Selinuntine reinforcements, and so gained ingress to the Carthaginians' camp. Thereupon throwing off their disguise, they put the whole host into such disorder that the simultaneous onslaught of the main body of the Grecian army sufficed, after a desperate resistance, to make good their advantage. The slaughter of the Carthaginians was immense—Gelo's victory was complete. The broken remnants of the enemy—native Carthaginians and Libyans, Iberians from Spain and Ligyes or Ligurians from the region of the Maritime Alps, Sardinians, Corsicans, and other mercenaries from all parts of the Western Mediterranean basin—escaped as best they could; their general was never seen alive again. His actual fate remained an insoluble mystery. According to one account, he was slain in camp by the cavalry of Gelo; the Carthaginians declared that he threw himself into the flames in which he had throughout the day been sacrificing for the success of his arms. The triumph of Hellenism in Sicily was coincident with the still greater triumph of the Greeks at Salamis, when the united fleets of Central Hellas utterly destroyed the Persian fleet and saved Greece. Legend said that the battles of Himera and Salamis were fought on one and the same day. Certain it is that the swarms of barbarians that threatened the Grecian race at the same moment in the east and in the west were both driven back at much the same date by forces immeasurably inferior in everything but courage. The result of the Xerxeian invasion did not, however, reach Gelo before he had prudently despatched a confidential envoy named Cadmus, the son of the above-mentioned Scythes of Zancle, to Greece, there to watch the course of events, and should the arms of Persia prevail, as

seemed inevitable, to do homage to the invader on Gelo's behalf. The event saved alike the name of Greece and the honour of Gelo; and the offerings which the Central Hellenes dedicated at Delphi in memory of their victory stood side by side with others far more magnificent, recording the triumph of their Sicilian brethren.*

§ 7. The victory of Himera left Gelo in a position never attained by any other Grecian despot. He was looked up to as a hero and the saviour of his people. All Sicily acknowledged his supremacy excepting the small western corner where the Carthaginians still maintained their footing. Whether he made any attempt to push his successes further in that quarter we do not know, but we are told that a peace was shortly after concluded with Carthage, at the cost, to the latter state, of two thousand talents as an indemnity. But there is reason to believe that patriotism has caused the historians of these events to exaggerate the truth, for within a very few years the Carthaginians once more assumed the aggressive—a course which they were usually slow to follow after any disastrous reverse. Himera, however, was saved and handed over to Thrasydaeus, son of Thero, and it may be regarded as certain that Anaxilaus was forced to acknowledge the supremacy of Gelo, and that when the latter died, within a year of his success, he left to his successor an undisputed sovereignty over all the Grecian states of the island. He died of a dropsy, 479 B.C., the most renowned of the Greeks of his day and the idol of the Syracusans, who raised to his memory a group of nine monumental columns, and abrogated in his favour the law which forbade expensive public funeral ceremonies, despite his deathbed wish that it should be adhered to in his case as in that of any meaner citizen. He was worshipped as a hero, as a being, that is, more than mortal if less than divine—and his name never faded from the grateful memory of his people. By his wife, Damarete, he left one son, still young; and his brothers, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, all survived him.

In the short reign of Gelo as despot of Syracuse, that city attained the position, which it ever afterwards held, of

* The ruins of a large temple, erected in memory of the victory, at Himera, were brought to light only recently.

mistress of Sicily. His efforts to aggrandise it had led to its rapid growth ; and not only did he people it with enforced colonists, but many new settlers came thither from Greece —in part attracted by his fame, in part to escape the threatened dominion of Persia. Previous to 485 B.C. the whole town had been comprised within the small area of Ortygia ; but at his decease it had spread to the large part of the adjacent mainland called Achradina. How large was the increase of the population may be inferred from the fact that he gave the citizenship to ten thousand of the mercenary troops which formed his standing army. Yet, despite the walls and arms by which he guarded his power, his rule was mild and paternal, rather than of a constitutional monarch than a despot ; and the proof of this is the voluntary immigration of free Greeks to Syracuse, the absence of all those dark deeds which branded the memory of a Dionysius or an Agathocles, and that dying request by which he bade the people obey their laws in his burial. Simonides, the elegiac poet, who composed the dedicatory couplets upon his offerings at Delphi, spoke of him as one who “ conquered the nations of the barbarians, and gave freedom to the Greeks with a mighty hand.”

§ 8. By the will of Gelo his power was divided between two of his brothers, of whom one, Polyzelus, obtained command of the army, while the other, Hiero, was appointed to the government of Syracuse. The latter was already known as something more than a despot's brother. As early as 488 B.C. he had gained an Olympian victory in the single-horse race, and had continued to enter for the palm at Olympia, Delphi, and elsewhere, year after year. He was a man of violent and selfish ambition, and little likely to share his empire quietly with any one. Moreover, he was brother-in-law alike of Anaxilaus and of Thero, and in every way a more prominent figure than was Polyzelus. The latter was supported by Damarete, widow of Gelo and now wife of Polyzelus ; and the quarrel between the brothers reached such a height that in 478 B.C. Damarete and her husband were forced to leave Syracuse, and appeal to the protection of Thero. That despot granted them an asylum at Agrigentum, but made no active efforts to restore them

to Syracuse. Hiero at once demanded that they should be expelled from Thero's dominions, and marched upon Agrigentum, with the whole force of Syracuse, to enforce his demand. He had already reached the river Gela, the eastern boundary of the territories of Thero, when the poet Simonides contrived to bring about a reconciliation, and Hiero abandoned his purpose.

His quarrel with Thero had, however, induced the Himeraeans to appeal to him for protection from the lawless despotism of Thrasydaeus, son of Thero. Headed by two cousins, rivals of Thero, the disaffected party in Himera prepared to revolt so soon as Hiero should appear before their gates. But Hiero, besides disappointing them by his reconciliation with Thero, committed an act of positive treachery. He betrayed the names and plans of the malcontents, and so enabled Thrasydaeus to anticipate their action, which he did with such severity that he found it necessary to recruit the numbers of the remaining populace by enforced immigration.

Meanwhile, Hiero proceeded to quarrel with his other brother-in-law, Anaxilaus, who was meditating an advance upon the Locrians. The latter put themselves under the protection of Syracuse, and the threat of war was sufficient to restrain Anaxilaus, who had not yet forgotten the ill-success of his efforts to shake the power of Gelo. He consented to abandon his design, and so maintained his position in peace until his death, 476 B.C.

Thus balked a second time of an excuse for extending his power by force of arms, Hiero had recourse to scarcely less violent means. It was the summit of the ambition of a Greek of his day to become the *oecist*,* or founder of a new town. Such a position was equivalent to a title to such heroic honours as Gelo had attained by his repulse of the Carthaginians. But the foundation of a colony in the orthodox way was too tedious and speculative a method for Hiero. He expelled from Naxos and Catana their Greek inhabitants, left the former town desolate, and handed over its lands to be shared, together with those of Catana, by settlers of his own providing, who occupied the old town of

* Οἰκιστής, one who establishes an ἀποικία, or colony.

Catana under the new name of Aetna, 476 B.C. These settlers, five thousand from Greece, five thousand mercenaries from Hiero's own guard, served as a bulwark to his power, seeing that their own position depended on the maintenance of their *oecist's* rule. Two years later the despot carried off the prize, with a four-horse chariot, at the Pythian games, and was proclaimed before all Greece as Hiero the Aetnaean.

§ 9. About the same time the Greeks of Cumae, the oldest Hellenic colony of Italy, being harassed by the attacks of Etruscan privateers, appealed to Hiero for protection. Etruria, though at this time falling away from her former mighty power in Central Italy before the growing strength of Rome and the pressure of the Gauls, was still mistress of that portion of the Mediterranean waters to which she left her name—the Tyrrhene, Tuscan or Lower Sea, between the shores of Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Gaul. Her pirates, starting from the seaport of Pyrgi near Caere, ravaged the Campanian and Latin coasts, maintaining thieves' honour with the Phoenician buccaneers of Sardinia and Africa. The news that Hiero meditated asserting himself as the custodian of the seas, affecting as it did Phoenician and Etruscan interests alike, led to the appearance of a formidable combined fleet of those two nations off the Italian coasts. The fleet of Hiero engaged them off Cumae, and gained a complete victory, and the spoils which the victor sent as offerings to the shrines of the Grecian gods reached their destination about the same time as occurred his victory at Delphi. Amongst those spoils was the bronze helmet of an Etruscan warrior which was dedicated at Olympia, and was there found, not many years ago, with the inscription recording its donor and the event—474 B.C. It may now be seen in the British Museum.

In the next year died Thero, after governing Agrigentum for fifteen years with a rule so mild that his memory was honoured as that of a hero. Like Gelo, he set an example of the better side of tyranny; like Gelo, he laboured to beautify and enrich his capital, of which the chief ruins are those of temples raised by him; and like Gelo, he won a Hellenic fame as an Olympian victor and the partner of

Gelo's triumph at Himera. But his death was speedily followed by trouble. His son Thrasydaeus, who succeeded to the despotism, was already notorious for his excesses at Himera. He practised at Agrigentum the same cruelties, and in a mistaken moment provoked Hiero to war. The latter forestalled attack by at once invading the territories of Agrigentum, where he met Thrasydaeus' army, and routed it with a loss of four thousand men. So utterly was that despot's power broken that, unable to regain his authority, he fled to Megara on the Isthmus of Corinth, where he learnt how his late behaviour was regarded by the free Hellenes. The Megarians at once put him upon his trial as a tyrant, and executed him 472 B.C. The Agrigentines, thus rid of their master, made terms as best they could with Hiero, to whom we must suppose they owed at least a nominal obedience, together with the other Grecian cities of Sicily.

§ 10. Even Messana and Rhegium must now have become acknowledged dependencies of Syracuse, for, about 470 B.C., Hiero dictated his wishes to the Reginas and was at once obeyed. The late despot Anaxilaus had left the government in the hands of a trusted freeman, Micythus, in wardship for his own young children. Micythus governed so equitably that the Reginas were well content to accept his dominion. But Hiero found here an opportunity for extending his influence, and presently ordered him to surrender the government to the rightful heirs, now grown up. Micythus did so at once, rendered exact account of his guardianship, and then retired to Tegea in Arcadia, where he lived as a private citizen. Hiero himself died 467 B.C. from a disease which had long invalidated him. His fame rests as much on the odes of Pindar, and on the Olympian and other victories which they celebrate, as on his warlike exploits. Twice was he crowned victor in the single-horse race, and in the year before his death he attained the desired place of conqueror in the race of four-horsed chariots. When we remember the treatment of the expelled Thrasydaeus by the Megarians, the anomaly of the position of other despots such as Gelo, Thero, and Hiero, and in later days Dionysius I., becomes striking

indeed. They were stigmatised as tyrants and *ipso facto* beyond the pale of law, and yet were allowed, could they deserve the honour, to be crowned with the olive of Olympia, the laurel of Delphi, or the parsley of the Isthmian games. In the case of Gelo and Thero there was a gentleness of rule and a great deliverance from the common foe to cloak their despotism; but Hiero had no such extenuating circumstances to plead, while his conduct was marked by avarice, violence, and espionage. Nevertheless, he maintained, and even extended, the power bequeathed to him by his brother; and only after his death could men see how much he had failed to consolidate it. One merit he had which seems ill consistent with the general tone of his character—he was a munificent patron of literature. Simonides and Bacchylides, Epicharmus and Aeschylus, either resided or visited at his court; and Pindar, the most famous lyric poet of that or any century of Grecian life, found it in every way worth his while to glorify the victories of Gelo, Hiero, and Thero at the national festivals of Hellas; and in 473 B.C. he personally visited the Syracusan court. Such hospitality cost little to Hiero, while it secured him the “monument more enduring than bronze”—odes and hymns superscribed with his name.

§ 11. Two rivals now claimed the *tyrannis*, one the son of Gelo, the other Thrasybulus, his uncle, the fourth and last of the sons of Deinomenes. The latter contrived to gain all real power, and commenced a despotism of the very worst kind, banishing and putting to death numbers of the citizens in order to confiscate their property. He disgusted even the Gelonians, but contrived to retain the favour of the mercenaries; so that, when a general revolt broke out in the year 467-66 B.C., he was able to rely upon the settlers from Aetna, Hiero's mercenary colonists, and to get together a force of some fifteen thousand in all, with whom he could garrison and maintain Ortygia. The insurgent citizens occupied the rest of the town—Achradiana as it was afterwards called*—within its own walls, and from these two positions, as if from camps, the two parties

* Syracuse was not yet extended to Tyche, Neapolis, etc.

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doubtless large bodies of Gelonians recently expelled from the other Sicilian cities. The latter party again occupied Ortygia, and it was only by the institution of a regular blockade that they were at length driven out. The struggle in turn affected most of the cities of the island, and finally centred at Aetna, where the dispossessed Catanaeans, supported by the Sicels under their chief Ducetius, succeeded at last in recovering their ancient home from the remnant of the Gelonians. They restored the name of Catana, overthrew the tomb and monuments of Hiero, while the fugitive Hieronians established themselves at Inessa, a Sicel town of the interior, which they re-named Aetna. Finally, the united Sicilians agreed to permit the occupation of lands at Messana and Camarina by the Gelonians, and this latter town, after having lain desolate for more than twenty years since Gelo had dismantled it, once more became a Hellenic city, 461 B.C., and it is surprising to find one of its new inhabitants proclaimed victor in the chariot-race at the Olympic games of 452 B.C.* This was Psamis, to whose efforts the re-establishment of the town was largely due. For some little time longer the troubles went on, but they were no longer caused by the attacks of any hostile faction, but by the disturbances natural before the newly created democracies could settle down into solidarity. At Agrigentum the first form of government was a limited democracy, controlled by a council of one thousand. But the tendency of the council to oligarchy, or even to despotism, led to a rising under the philosopher-poet Empedocles, and the subversal of the one thousand to give place to a complete democracy. At Syracuse, too, the pacification of the Gelonians was followed by many efforts on the part of rich men to re-establish the *tyrannis*. Thus about 454 B.C. a certain Tyndarion gathered around him a bodyguard of the poorer citizens and was only prevented from obtaining despotic power by a speedy trial and death. Accordingly a safeguard was introduced on the plan of the Athenian ostracism. By its means any citizen whose power threatened to endanger the state was open to a sort of impeachment. Every voter wrote upon an olive-leaf the name of the citizen whom he

* The most expensive ἀγών, and a sure sign of prosperity and wealth.

deemed dangerous, and the individual thus accounted the most formidable was constrained to go into exile, though only for five years. This Petalism* proved, however, so liable to abuse, sweeping away all well-to-do men who took part in politics, and thus intimidating others from following their example, that it was very shortly afterwards abolished, and the state slowly settled into rest and peace.

§ 12. Meantime, the Sicel chief Ducetius, set free from the dominion of the Gelonian dynasty, began to aim at a wider sovereignty for himself. He formed a federation of the petty communities of the interior, and with the support thus given him, he took the fortress of Morgantine and founded Palice as the centre of his league. The town took its name from the *Palici*, Sicel Nature-Gods, there worshipped; and its reputed sanctity, no less than its central position, made it an admirable place for the capital of a native league.† Ducetius now set himself to avenge the diminished power of the Sicels on the Greeks. He stormed and recovered Inessa, which the Hieronians from Aetna had occupied, and in the year 452 b.c. was bold and strong enough to march down into the territories of Agrigentum, the second city of Sicily. There he laid siege to a small fortress called Moty whole, and was fortunate enough to defeat a combined army of Agrigentines and Syracusans coming to its relief. But his success was shortlived. Unable to take Moty whole, he was attacked by a second joint army, and so completely defeated that he left his own kingdom, rode into Syracuse, and there placed himself as a suppliant at an altar. Probably the ill-success of his siege operations had spread dissatisfaction amongst his mountain troops, to whom all long service would be irksome, particularly if not brilliantly successful. The Syracusans, despite the reluctance of Agrigentum, spared the suppliant's life, and sent him to Corinth, where they undertook to provide for his maintenance, while he gave his word of honour to attempt no return (451 b.c.).

Despite the threatening attitude of the Sicel federation,

* πεταλισμός, from πέταλον, "leaf," from the leaf of olive used as a tablet. Cp. δογγράκισμός, from δογγράκον, "oyster-shell."

† Compare with the history of Megalopolis and Arcadia.

Syracuse had been able to send out fleets during the years 453—452 B.C. to suppress the piracy of the Etruscans. The death of Hiero had removed the hand which chastised them at Cumae, and their buccaneering had doubtless thereupon broken out with flesh violence. But the fleet which had sailed under Hiero's orders was still as effective as ever under the democratic administration. Ilva (*Elba*), a famous iron-producing island, was ravaged 453 B.C., and in 452 B.C. Corsica was plundered, Ilva annexed, and the coasts of Etruria itself insulted by the Syracusan admiral Apelles.

In 448 B.C. (?) Ducetius broke his word, and presented himself once more in Sicily, where he succeeded in founding a town at Cale Acte, the site formerly selected by the Samian refugees.* His old subjects rejoined him in numbers, and the Agrigentines, disgusted to see him again a dangerous foe, and to find their opposition to the leniency of Syracuse thus amply justified, declared war upon that city. The war ended in the Agrigentines being forced to sue for peace; but it gave Ducetius the opportunity of securing his new position. But his death, which followed soon after,† again broke up the Sicel league, and the Syracusans proceeded at leisure to reduce many of the towns of the interior.

The twenty years succeeding the death of Ducetius seem to have been years of general peace. During this period the Sicilian cities grew to that opulence and magnificence for which they were afterwards famous. Their commerce increased enormously, particularly the export trade in wine and oil from the southern coast to Africa, to which trade Agrigentum owed her proverbial riches. The overthrow of the despots and the development of free government, if it reduced the ranks of court poets, gave birth to the famous rhetoricians Gorgias of Leontini, Corax and Tisias at Syracuse, and the Agrigentine Polus; while Empedocles in Sicily won a name little inferior to that of the Eleatics in Italy—Parmenides and Zeno, the philosophers of Elea (Velia), near Paestum. The exponents of the fine arts in

* See p. 171.

† The date is uncertain; probably earlier than 440 B.C.

Sicily and Magna Graecia rivalled the descendants of Myron and Polygnotus in Central Greece, and the temples of Agrigentum were worthy that even the great Zeuxis should adorn them with his marvellous "Lacinian Juno," whose beauty was the combined beauty of the five fairest maidens in Agrigentum—and the beauties of Agrigentum are famous still. The coinages of Sicily had no rival for number and grace and workmanship.

CHAPTER XV.

LITERATURE.

§ 1 Lyric Verse : Simonides . Pindar — § 2 Tragedy : Origin and Early Modifications : the Early Dramatists — § 3 Tragic Representations : the Thesatre.— § 4. Aeschylus Works and Style : the Oresteia. — § 5. Sophocles.— § 6 Euripides and Others — § 7 Satyric Drama · Comedy : Aristophanes. — § 8. Sicilian Comedy. Epicharmus : Sophron.— § 9 Prose Writing : the Early Philosophers—Ionic, Italian, and Sicilian.— § 10. Early *Logopoi* : Herodotus.— § 11. The Rhetoricians : Gorgias.

§ 1. THREE facts distinguish the literature of this period : within it falls the consummation of lyrical poetry in the genius of Pindar, the perfection of the tragic drama in Aeschylus and Sophocles, and the development of prose-composition.

In the evolution of Greek literature lyrical poetry succeeded to the didactic and to the still earlier epic styles. Its infancy and growth are associated with the names—little more than names—of Callinus of Ephesus, Simonides of Amorgus, Tyrtaeus of Aphidnae, the Lesbians Alcaeus and Sappho, and the Sicilian Stesichorus of Himera. Of the form in which Callinus, the legendary inventor of lyrics, clothed his thoughts, we know nothing certain. His successors adopted metres of every kind—the elegiac couplet, the quatrains known from their chief patrons respectively as Alcaics and Sapphics, iambics, and a dozen other schemes of versification. The tendency, however, was towards metres of increasing complexity and elaboration, resulting at length in the metres of Pindar, to interpret which is the study of a specialist, and to a large extent a matter of dispute.

Rather earlier than Pindar, but little his inferior in the matter of mere technique, was Simonides of Ceos, 556—469 B.C. Few of his verses have survived, but those which remain are sufficient to justify the criticism of Catullus, who spoke of them as “tears of Simonides.” He was at the fullest of his powers when the Persian Wars broke upon Greece, and in these he found much of the material of his verses. His, for instance, were the epitaphs engraved upon the monuments of those who fell at Thermopylae, and he is said to have defeated Aeschylus in a competition for the best elegy on those who died at Marathon. He lived for some years in the court of the Peisistratid Hipparchus at Athens, and in various Thessalian courts, and finally withdrew to Sicily and attached himself to the circle of Hiero of Syracuse, where poets were ever welcome if they would but sing the praises of their patron. There he died, and was honoured with a splendid tomb in the city of his adoption.

Pindar also was one of Hiero's court, and of that of Gelo before him. A Boeotian, born at Cynoscephalae (522 B.C.), and a citizen of Thebes, he came of a family of flute-players, but early evinced a genius which was thought worthy of special education. He was sent to Athens to study under Lasus of Hermione, and rapidly rose to a fame which made him welcome at the courts of the despot princes of Thessaly, of the Battiae of Cyrene, and elsewhere. He does not seem to have spent much of his time in Thebes, albeit a house called his was standing there when Alexander rased the town, and was alone spared from destruction. Even Grecian poets must live, and the talents of great lyrists peculiarly fitted them to live upon the patronage of princes; for it was the ambition of these princes to win victories in the sacred games, just as the celebration of such victories was one of the principal subjects of lyrical song. And, moreover, a Hiero could afford to pay lavishly—with more constant and free-handed munificence than was to be found elsewhere. The extant odes of Pindar are all *epinicia*—that is, odes in celebration of victories at the games; and they are therefore classified according as they concern the great games at Olympia, Nemea, the Isthmian, or the

Pythian contests. Of his numberless other compositions—*encomiae* (panegyrics), *threni* (laments), *scolia* (drinking songs), etc.—none survive, perhaps because to such poems there did not attach the same quasi-religious character as was in those days, and for long after, associated with the four Great Games and all that concerned them. Pindar was intimate with the Athens of Cimon's day and its leading men—with Aeschylus in particular; and it has been noted as curious that the greatest of the lyricists should not be recorded to have won fame in dealing with such subjects as Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea. The answer is possibly that Pindar remembered the conduct of Thebes in the invasion of Xerxes, and preferred therefore not to handle a subject which was of no credit to his native city. More than this, out of the forty-four odes remaining to us only thirteen are concerned with the victories of Greeks of the great states of the mainland, and of these thirteen, four are devoted to the praise of Theban victors. No less than eleven, however, are devoted to Aeginetan winners, and as many as fifteen to Sicilians. It seems, then, that Pindar's best work was not given to Athenians, Spartans, Argives, Corinthians, or Eleans.

Pindar's language is as difficult as anything in Greek, partly because of its dialect (Aeolic, i.e. Boeotian), but much more by reason of his style, in which the two salient features are an exuberant superabundance of language and an unequalled rapidity of thought. Add to this that his allusions are multitudinous, his metaphors involved, and the order of his words often to all appearance haphazard, and it may be imagined that he is difficult. Yet in his peculiar branch he holds the palm of genius—has probably never been equalled by any poet. His knowledge of myth and legend must have been prodigious, his command of language inexhaustible, and his talent for picturesque word-painting quite unrivalled. He was fond of nature and its colours, fond of good living, and, most of all, fond of seeing and sharing in the prodigal magnificence of wealthy patrons. He died about the year 442 B.C., at the age of eighty.

A third great lyricist, and the last, was Bacchylides, a nephew of Simonides. Of his work there survive only two

epigrams and a few fragments, though he is known to have been an active composer of paeans, odes, and dithyrambs. He, too, was one of the Syracusan court-poets, flourishing about 475 B.C.

§ 2. In the meantime a new form of poetry had been coming to the front, viz. that of the tragic drama. In its essential parts this was merely a combination of the two earlier growths, the epic and the lyric styles; but it was speedily elaborated to be something entirely distinct from either. In its most perfect shape at least this was in a peculiar sense the production of Athens.

The patron god of the Dorians was Apollo, in whose honour choruses performed ceremonial dances, accompanied with hymns of praise. This was the original of that special form of lyrical poetry known as the dithyramb. But before the coming of the Dorians the earlier Ionian population of Greece had employed the medium of epic poetry for the honour of their god Dionysus. Borrowing from the Dorians the dithyrambic chorus, they grafted it upon the *epos*, and from this resulted the tragic drama.

Various modifications were introduced as time went on. The element of dialogue was added when the *Coryphaeus* (leader of the chorus) was permitted to exchange brief speeches with the *Rhapsode* who spoke the narrative portion (*epos*) of the piece. From this it was an easy step to substitute for the single rhapsode two or more performers, with a corresponding extension of the dialogue. As the characters were increased, the purely narrative portion of the performance gradually shrank to smaller limits, and the dramatic element grew in proportion. But to the last the Greek tragedy retained its essential elements—a certain amount of narrative and, interspersed with this, lyrical choruses. For the old epic hexameter was substituted the iambic senarius, as being more suited to natural enunciation, while the metres and style of the choric songs shared in all the improvements and elaborations which attended lyric poetry in its separate form, until in the hands of Aeschylus there is little to choose, save in subject, between a tragic chorus and a Pindaric *epinicion*.

Associated with the wine-god, the new creation was

originally but an extempore affair, its occasion the vintage-feast, its performers the country-folk ; and naturally the whole was of a turn rather jovial than serious. The original chorus were, in fact, dressed to represent Satyrs, the comic attendants of Dionysus and Silenus, from whose resemblance to goats the name of Tragedy was derived.* But as time went on Tragedy soon lost all connection, save that of name, with Satyrs and trivial themes. We know little of those to whom were due its first improvements. Thespis is said to have been the leader of the first professional band of strolling players, conveying his company and their few "properties" from place to place in a waggon. After him came Choerilus and Pratinas, still vaguer names, to whom succeeded Phrynicus, of whom it is recorded that, having dramatised the story of the capture of Miletus by the Persians at the close of the Ionic revolt (494 B.C.), his play so affected the Athenians that they fined him heavily "for venturing to remind them of their misfortunes." This must have occurred about the year 491 or 490 B.C. But the first, and in some senses the greatest, of the masters of Tragedy was Aeschylus.

§ 3. Every dramatic representation was a service in honour of Dionysus, in whose temple—the theatre—it was given. There were four festivals of Dionysus : (1) the Country Dionysia, in December ; (2) the Wine-press Feast (*Λύτραια*), in January ; (3) the Anthesteria, in February ; and (4) the Great Dionysia, or city-festival, lasting for ten days, in March. The last was chief, and at it were produced the new plays of the year. Dramatic exhibitions were also given at the first and second festivals, but the plays were mostly old ones.

At some period before the Great Dionysia, the poets who wished to produce plays applied to the Archon for a Choragus. This was one of the citizens whose property exceeded three talents, chosen by lot from that tribe to which fell in rotation the duty of providing and equipping the required chorus ; and this duty he had to perform at his own cost, it being one of the regular state burdens. The poet chose his own actors ; but the tragic chorus of fifty, and the comic

* Τραγῳδία (from *τράγος*, "goat")—“goat song.”

chorus of twenty-four, were dressed, trained, and maintained by the Choragus.

On a stated day five judges, chosen by lot, witnessed a private rehearsal and awarded the three prizes. The prizes were wreaths of bay and tripods. Unsuccessful competitors withdrew at once, and even prize-winning plays were never produced more than once, with occasional exceptions in favour of the three great tragedians.

When the *Dionysia* arrived, the populace assembled in the theatre at early morning and remained the whole day, while the three prize-winners produced each his work, consisting of three separate tragedies (a trilogy) and a satyric or tragic-comic drama. The performance lasted occasionally until after dark.

The Dionysiac theatre at Athens, which is a type of all the rest, was a semicircular excavation in the south-east face of the Acropolis. In the centre was a flat, sanded area,* where the chorus moved, and from it the seats rose in semicircular tiers to an immense height. The row nearest to the orchestra was assigned to public officials, ambassadors, etc., and other parts were set off for the young men, the women, etc., though the latter were not allowed to witness comic performances. Beyond the orchestra and facing the audience was the stage, backed by the boundary wall, built to represent the front of a palace with its doors and windows. This was a sufficient setting for the majority of the plays; for those which needed more, there was movable painted scenery. When necessary, the stage was concealed by a curtain. Masks suited to the characters were worn by all actors, and in tragedy the stature was increased by lofty head-dresses and shoes with enormous soles. Music was supplied by the flute, and the enormous size of the theatre was overcome by the use of sounding boards and similar contrivances. The price of admission was at the lowest two obols (about 3d.), and such as could not afford this small sum might obtain it by applying to the Theoric Fund.

§ 4. Aeschylus, son of Euphorion, of the deme of Eleusis, was born about 528 B.C. He fought at Marathon, where his brother Cynegeirus greatly distinguished himself; at

* The orchestra (*óρχιστρα*).

Salamis, where another brother, Ameinias, had the honour of striking the first blow for Greece; and at Plataea. In later life he retired, as Pindar had done, to the court of Hiero, and died at Gela, where he was buried with all honours. Various idle stories were current to account for his voluntary exile: one attributes it to his disgust at being worsted by Simonides in the matter of a prize-ode for those who fell at Marathon, while another and more probable account ascribes it to the rising power of Sophocles, his rival, who is known to have bested him in the tragic contests of 468 B.C. Aeschylus is recorded to have won his first victory in 484 B.C. The drama owed much to him—the elaboration of the dialogue by the introduction of a second leading actor, the determination of the proper sphere of the chorus, the invention of painted scenery, stage-machinery, appropriate dresses for the various characters, and especially the thick-soled tragic buskin (*cothurnus*) which lent added stature and dignity to the actors. He is said to have composed ninety tragedies: the titles of more than seventy are known, and seven survive complete, viz. the *Suppliants*, *Prometheus Bound*, *Persae*, *Seven Against Thebes*, and the famous trilogy of the Oresteia—the *Agamemnon*, *Choephorae*, and *Eumenides*.

Of the four plays first named, the titles of the *Prometheus Bound* and of the *Seven Against Thebes* tell sufficient of their subject. The *Suppliants* deals with the legend of the daughters of Danaus, and the *Persae* is noteworthy as being the sole surviving example of a Greek historical drama. It treats of the invasion of Xerxes, the rout at Salamis, and the ruin of the Persian King's vain-glorious pomp and boastings. It was produced in 472 B.C. But the chief interest of Aeschylus, from every point of view, lies in the Oresteia—the trilogy in which is unfolded the story of the murder of Agamemnon by Clytaemnestra, the vengeance which Orestes took upon his mother, and the subsequent purification of the matricide. This latter portion of the story, the *Eumenides*, is further of peculiar interest because it seems to have been written as a manifesto in favour of the Council of the Areopagus or a protest against the democratic attacks of Ephialtes—facts which date it as subse-

quent to the year 462 B.C. For Aeschylus was essentially an aristocrat and therefore a partisan of the great Council which represented the aristocratic traditions of his state; and in the *Eumenides* he musters all the legends of Athens to revive the memory of the sacred character of the Great Council—its heaven-appointed origin, its awful prerogatives, and its time-honoured traditions. As we know, the poet failed of his purpose; but he had at least the satisfaction of having acted up to his convictions.

As has been said, the choric portions of Aeschylus' plays strongly resemble the Pindaric ode. And the same lofty, superhuman grandeur, not always avoiding the suspicion of bombast, pervades all parts of his work, making it frequently difficult—it escapes the charge of affectation by its manifest sincerity—but making it always impressive. We have already referred to the *Persae* as illustrating, if in poetical language, a portion of the history of the time.*

§ 5. Sophocles, son of Sophillus, was born 495 B.C., so that he was sixteen years of age when the Athenians set up their trophy for the victory at Salamis (480 B.C.), and Sophocles is said to have himself led the chorus of, and probably composed the words of, the triumphal ode. At his very first appearance as a tragic poet he gained the first prize, defeating the famous Aeschylus, who was now nearly sixty (468 B.C.). Sophocles retained his position until 441 B.C., when Euripides, at the age of thirty-nine, first obtained the first prize. The two poets thenceafter shared between them the annual honours, with only occasional defeats by Agathon, Xenocles, etc. In 440 B.C. Sophocles was one of the ten generals in the war with Samos, and is said to have owed his election to that office to the success of his tragedy *Antigone*. In 412 B.C. he was one of the ten *πρόβοιλοι*, or Committee of Safety, appointed after the overthrow of the Sicilian Expedition, but in the next year supported the establishment of the oligarchy of the Four Hundred. He died 405 B.C., just too soon to witness the fall of the Athenian Empire, throughout the whole of which he had lived. His death was probably due to some lung disease.

* Above, ch. v, §§ 5 and 8.

Sophocles is believed to have written about one hundred and thirteen plays, of which seven remain. Amongst these the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, *Oedipus at Colonus*, and the *Antigone*, constitute a complete trilogy. He drew largely upon the Theban legends for his materials, whereas Aeschylus used little but Homeric myths. He introduced improved dresses and machinery, a third actor, and the use of scene-painting; and one of his plays, the *Ajax*, is the only extant play which needs an entire change of scene. He was well off, and, despite the moral tone of his plays, something of a sensualist; but all the Greek world respected him, and when he died the Spartans granted a truce for his burial at Decelea. He left two sons, Iophon and Ariston, who both wrote tragedies.

§ 6 Euripides, son of Mnesarchus or Mnesarchides, a foreigner, perhaps a Boeotian who had migrated into Attica, was born 480 B.C., fifteen years after Sophocles, in the island of Salamis, to which his parents had fled at the time of Xerxes' invasion. Tradition fixes the day of his birth on the very day of the great Athenian victory. He studied philosophy under Anaxagoras, Protagoras, and Prodicus, and was an intimate friend of Socrates. He exhibited his first play in 455 B.C., but it was not till 441 B.C. that he gained the first prize. He was a constant competitor, but only obtained the first prize five times in all, as against thirteen victories of Aeschylus, and eighteen of Sophocles. He was twice married, both times unfortunately. In his old age he removed to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedon, where he was received with great honour, and died two years later (406 B.C.), at the age of seventy-four, a year before his rival Sophocles.

Of the ninety-two plays said to have been written by Euripides the ancients knew seventy-five, but only seventeen tragedies (omitting the *Rhesus*) and one satyric drama, the *Cyclops*, have come down to us. These are by no means the best of his plays, but a merely average selection. In the outward form of tragedy Euripides made no changes, but he differed considerably from his predecessors in his method of handling it. He often departed from the received legends, and reduced the tone of his plays more to the

level of everyday life. The prologue in his hands became a means for expounding the plot, and the chorus often a vehicle for general reflections alien to the subject of the particular play. These defects, however, were amply compensated by a pathos so remarkable that Aristotle has called him "the most tragic of poets."

Of the other and less notable tragedians, numerous though they were, we have no remains. Chief of them were Ion of Chios (died before 419 B.C.), an imitator of the grander style of Sophocles in opposition to the innovations of Euripides; Agathon of Athens, a pupil of the rhetorician Gorgias and friend of Plato, who followed the example of Euripides in retiring to the court of Archelaus in his later years; Iophon, the son of Sophocles; a second Sophocles, grandson of his great namesake; and a second Euripides, nephew of him who wrote the *Alcestis*. But with the empire of Athens fell her great tragedians, in large measure for the vulgar reason that thenceforward the state was too much impoverished to maintain the costly dignities which had lent added lustre to the work of Sophocles and of Euripides.

§ 7. Tragedy was so called because the chorus originally represented satyrs, and there still survived a class of plays of the original nature, in which heroes and demigods were travestied, and a chorus of satyrs clad in goat-skins was introduced. These were the satyric dramas, of which the *Cyclops* of Euripides is the only surviving specimen; and they seem to have been meant as a popular set-off to the solemnity of the tragedies which they followed. For a similar reason, as tragedy became more and more dignified and less human, comedy was introduced. The name means "song of the revellers," and was first applied to the rude pasquines of the countryfolk at their vintage-feasts.*

But transferred to the city, and elaborated with the same form, metres, and expense as the tragedies, these revel-songs became the Old Comedy of Eupolis, Cratinus, and Aristophanes. Its chief feature was unbridled scurrility; and it was probably introduced into Athens (c. 450 B.C.) to serve as a means of ridiculing public men with impunity.

* Κωμῳδία, from κῶμος, "a band of revellers."

Of Aristophanes, the single comedian of whom any complete work survives to this day, we know next to nothing. He was an Athenian probably, albeit his paternity was not so unquestioned as to render impossible an attempt to disinherit him. His father's name is believed to have been Philippus, and he was born at some unknown date shortly before the year 444 B.C., being still "all but a boy" when his first comedy was produced in 427 B.C. With this first effort he obtained the second prize, and two years later he stood first with the *Acharnians*, in which he ridicules the party which advocated war with Sparta and attacks Peucles and Aspasia.⁺ Henceforward he produced plays without cessation until his death, about the year 380 B.C. Of forty-four comedies mentioned as his, there survive eleven, the majority being examples of the personal comedy of the old school. An aristocrat and a conservative, Aristophanes was avowedly hostile to all that was not as it used to be in the good old days of Periclean Athens; he attacked Cleon, a popular leader in the early days of the Peloponnesian War, in the *Knights*, and Socrates in the *Clouds*; he ridiculed the Athenian appetite for litigation in the *Wasps*,[†] the chauvinism of the war-party in the *Acharnians* and the *Peace*,[‡] and the mad spirit of enterprise which characterised Athenian policy in the *Birds*. His broad satire more than once got him into trouble, though he always escaped punishment; but when the empire fell, freedom of speech was largely curtailed, and Aristophanes, like other comedians, was driven to content himself with satirising philosophic ideas rather than the personal weaknesses of political figures. The *Frogs* contains a furious onslaught on the poetry of Euripides. In the *Ecclesiazusae* and *Thesmophoriazusae* he derided Plato, and in the *Plutus* he made material out of the politico-economical discussions of the times. His wit, however, suffered from the constraint thus placed upon it, and his later plays, at any rate as we possess them, do not come up to the level of his earlier work. His language is often coarse in the extreme, but his purpose is always sound

* See vv. 566, 530, 527.

† Also contains attacks on Cleon, vv. 342, 505, etc.

‡ Attac's Peacock, v. 608, Phaidias, v. 605; Cleon, vv. 48, 270, 652, 753

and honest; and so great were his abilities as a poet that even Plato, who did not love the comedian, declared that the "muses had made their temple in Aristophanes' heart."

Aristophanes stands alone in this period as the representative of comedy. Many years elapsed before he had successors, and these were not men whose works their posterity cared to preserve.

§ 8. The Sicilian Comedy, which attained perfection about a generation earlier than the Old Comedy of Athens, was developed spontaneously in Sicily. In character it was something between the Old Comedy of Aristophanes and the Comedy of Criticism to which the latter gave place. It consisted largely of mythological travesties, not unlike the later Satyric Drama of Athens, and contained at the same time sufficient of the political element to afford possibly a pattern for the Aristophanic Comedy. This is, however, doubtful. The political allusions in Sicilian Comedy must necessarily have been mild and guarded under the surveillance of a Gelo or Hiero, and it does not seem that this branch of the drama retained its characteristics later than the close of the Gelonian supremacy. More peculiar to it were the semi-philosophical and critical discourses with which it abounded, which were at once the prototype of the Athonian Comedy of Criticism (after 410 B.C.) and of the sententious dialogues of the Athenian Tragedy whose first master, Aeschylus, must have imbibed their style during his sojourn in Sicily.

Epicharmus, the father of Sicilian Comedy according to Plato, was a native of Cos who migrated early to Megara in Sicily, and was removed thence to Syracuse by Gelo. He is said to have been, like many Coans, a skilful physician, and he had considerable influence in the Court of Hiero. He died before 440 B.C. The *Menaechmi* of Plautus is said to have been modelled upon a play of Epicharmus.

The names of two other comedians of this school remain—Phormis and Dinolochus. The former was tutor to the sons of Gelo; the latter is said to have been the son of Epicharmus, and a native of either Syracuse or Agrigentum. He flourished about 480 B.C. Phormis is possibly the same as Phormus the Maenalian, who served in the

armies of both Gelo and Hiero with distinction. In this case he was by birth an Arcadian. He is said to have introduced the use of purple skins as a covering for the stage.

Sophron, son of Agathocles and a native of Syracuse, introduced his famous Mimes at about the time of the fall of the Gelonian dynasty. These were dialogues for all kinds of characters, written like the Comedies of Epicharmus in the Doric dialect, the prevailing dialect of the Sicilian Greeks. Whether they were in prose or verse is doubtful; Professor Mahaffy suggests that they may have been of a similar style to the poems of the American writer, Walt Whitman. They took their names from low-life, and were certainly coarse; but they were marked by a dramatic power and vigour which rapidly made them popular, and Plato is said to have studied them as the best model for his own philosophical dialogues. Sophron left a son, Xenarchus, who was sufficiently successful in the same line of genius to be hired by Dionysius I. when that tyrant wished to have the Rhegines lampooned on the stage of Syracuse.

§ 9. The development of prose writing, always a later growth than that of poetry, was due mainly to the Ionic philosophers. It is the only suitable medium for the exposition of philosophic thought, although as late as 445 B.C we find Empedocles using verse for this purpose, just as Lucretius did in Rome even in the golden age of Latin prose.

The first Philosophers so called were Physicists, *i.e.* they directed their inquiries—speculations, rather—to the material world, and attempted to discover the primary elements. This school of thought was characteristic of Ionia, and if we knew the truth, it probably owed something to the older philosophies of the oriental nations. Thus Thales of Miletus, who died in 546 B.C., postulated water as the primary element, and Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. 513 B.C.) claimed that honour for the element of fire. He was famous for his pessimism, which won for him the name of the Weeping Philosopher; for the obscurity of his utterances; and for having first propounded the now commonplace dogma of universal flux—πάντα ῥεῖ. More to the

purpose, he wrote down at least some portion of his lucubrations, and thus created a form of prose, sadly empirical indeed, but destined in the hands of Plato to become the most polished and sensitive form of Greek literature. After Heracleitus came Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, whose doctrine marks the transition from physicism to metaphysics; he propounded the theory of a cosmos made up of multitudinous elements vitalised by an all-pervading intelligence. Anaxagoras spent much of his life in Athens, where Pericles was one of his most attentive hearers. But when, towards the close of his life, Pericles became the object of revived party hatred, his enemies vented their spite upon his surroundings, and just as they caused Pheidias to be charged with embezzlement, so they caused Anaxagoras to be expelled the city on the charge of impiety. His theories in some measure influenced the more famous Democritus, an Ionian colonist of Abdera, in Thrace, who first expounded the Atomic theory, though in a very empirical form. He was a great traveller, and enjoyed the *sorriquet* of the Laughing Philosopher,—an allusion, perhaps, to his good-tempered disregard of the ills of life. He only visited Athens occasionally. His collaborator, possibly his teacher, was Leucippus.

Philosophic speculation went westward in the wake of the Siceliots and Italiots, and the town of Elea (Velia), in Lucania, obtained a lasting notoriety as the home of Zeno, the forerunner of Pythagoras. Nothing survives of their teaching except hints, often manifestly perverted or exaggerated, as to their views on the transmigration of souls—a doctrine apparently picked up by Pythagoras in Egypt and adopted later by Plato—and the virtue of numbers. The Pythagoreans of Italy fell under suspicion of political wire-pulling, so that as early as 500 B.C. the Crotoniates violently expelled the numerous disciples of the new philosophy who had made Croton their home. But Pythagoreanism held its ground in Italy, while in Greece one philosophy after another arose and disappeared again.

Of the native Sicilian philosophers the only one of whom any writings remain was Empedocles of Agrigentum, who flourished about 444 B.C., and was the teacher of Gorgias.

He was one of the leading actors in the revolution which expelled Thrasybulus, and in the later overthrow of The Thousand. His philosophy dealt mainly with natural phenomena, and he therefore ranks amongst the early physicists. He is said to have prevented the malaria which prevailed at Agrigentum by his schemes of drainage, and to have been so successful a physician as to win the name of a magician—a reputation which he studied to maintain. He even threw himself into the crater of Aetna, that the mystery of his disappearance might never be solved, and that it might be attributed to a deathless apotheosis. He wrote, amongst other works, all in poetry, a book explaining his system of natural philosophy ($\pi\tau\varsigma\pi\varphi\omega\varsigma$), and a poem entitled *Purifications* ($\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\mu\omega\varsigma$), recommending virtuous living as a means of avoiding maladies. Lucretius thought highly of him, and made him his model in the poem *De Rerum Natura*.

§ 10. It was in great part the work of these various thinkers which improved and developed the art of prose composition. They were not, however, its inventors, nor its sole patrons. Its invention was due to the Ionian Anecdots (*Lugapoei*, *Logia*) of the sixth century B.C., from whom came the historians properly so called. History and Philosophy worked side by side to develop the new form of literature.

Of these earlier names we may mention Cadmus of Miletus (fl. 520 B.C.), and Acusilaus of Argos, who made collections of myths and legends anterior to the Trojan Cycle; Pherecydes of Leros (or Scyros), who composed (c. 560 B.C.) a voluminous *History of Ancient Athens*, all unfortunately lost; and the geographers Charon of Lampsacus, Hellanicus of Mitylene, and Hecataeus of Miletus. Hecataeus was active in the year 500 B.C., and lived long enough to see historical prose receive full justice in the hands of Herodotus, who made use of materials collected by both Hecataeus and Hellanicus.

Herodotus was an Ionian of Halicarnassus, where he was born about 485 B.C., when that town was under the despotism of Artemisia, the heroine of Salamis. With others who disliked her government Herodotus went into

exile at Samos, and thence aided in a revolution which expelled Artemisia's successor, Lygdamis, and liberated the town alike from despotism and from the suzerainty of Persia. Subsequently, he travelled in Egypt and Cyrene, Phoenicia, possibly even to Babylon and to Pontus. Later he found his way to Athens, and in 443 B.C. was one of the volunteer-colonists who re-settled the town of Thurii. There he seems to have died, but at what date is uncertain. An allusion in his *History* proves that he was alive at any rate in 431 B.C., and possibly even in 424 B.C.

He is said to have compiled *Histories of Assyria and Arabia*, and if so, then is their loss most unfortunate. To him also is attributed a spurious *Life of Homer*. But the one sufficient work to justify his title of the Father of History is his *History of the Persian Wars*, a narrative of the antecedent causes, and the course, of the various collisions between Persians and Greeks down to the year 478 B.C., the last fact in the narrative as such being the capture of Sestus in the spring of that year. But the scheme of the work enabled him to introduce long and invaluable disquisitions on the ancient history of all the great empires of the Old World—Egypt, Assyria, Media, and Lydia—together with much geographical matter and numberless remarks on the manners, customs, and appearance of the various barbaric peoples of whom he speaks. His work is hardly less valuable to the sociologist, ethnographer, geographer, and anthropologist, than to the historian.

Tradition says that he read out portions of his work in public at the Olympic Games of 441 B.C., amidst such appreciation that the nine books of his *History* were forthwith dedicated by popular acclamation to the nine Muses. True or not, the story is testimony to the beauty and charm of the composition: sometimes garrulous, occasionally somewhat too imaginative, but always simple in the extreme, and always intensely interesting. Times and again he has been termed a romancer, not to say “the greatest of liars”; but where he knowingly tells fables, he invariably mentions the facts in such a way as to show that they are to be accepted with caution; and if occasionally he was induced to believe the untrue, later historians have been guilty

of like errors. Suffice it to say that, prior to the interpretation of the Egyptian hieroglyphics and the Assyrian tablets, Herodotus was practically the world's sole authority for the lost history of the Five Great Empires of the East; and that if later discoveries have proved him to have been occasionally mistaken, they have at least as often proved him right.

Herodotus wrote in the Old Ionic dialect. His successor in the field of history was Thucydides, son of Olorus, who wrote in the New Ionic or Attic dialect, and once and for all fixed the idiom of historical Attic prose. But he belongs to the period subsequent to this.

§ 11. Within this period commences the history of Greek oratory. It took its rise from the great cities of Sicily, when the expulsion of Thrasybulus (467 B.C.) liberated Syracuse and led the way to the temporary emancipation of the remaining Greek settlements in the island. Rhetoric—the art of oratory—could find no play under the rule of despots, who suppressed all public debate. With the sudden growth of democracy came the attendant art of swaying popular assemblies. It never attained in Sicily the logical and scientific accuracy and method which characterised the rhetoric of the Athenians of the fourth century B.C., being stamped out while still in its infancy by the despotism of the Dionysii (405 B.C. *full.*). It was distinguished rather by the features natural to an art as yet empirical and untrained—by the lavish use of mere figures of speech and ornamental language, metaphor, and excessive tendency towards striking and often false antitheses. Nevertheless, its first utterances from the lips of Gorgias in the Athenian Assembly produced a great effect, and led to the immediate study of rhetoric in that state.

Corax, of Syracuse, was the pioneer of Sicilian rhetoric. So powerful was his oratory that he became the leading figure in the state upon the expulsion of Thrasybulus. He composed the earliest treatise on rhetoric, which he called simply "The Art" (*Techne*), and his work long retained its value with later rhetoricians. Contemporary with him was Tisias, of whom nothing is known beyond that he taught at Thurii, where Lysias was one of his pupils.

TEST QUESTIONS
ON
GRECIAN HISTORY (495—431 B.C.).

1. What evidence have we for the existence of party-questions in Athens prior to the year 480 B.C.?
2. What is known of the condition of Ionia and the adjacent islands about the year 490 B.C.?
3. Write a brief account of the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes. What causes contributed to its failure?
4. Give an account of the battle of Marathon, pointing out any difficulties involved. Draw a sketch map to illustrate your answer.
5. Sketch the life and political importance of Miltiades.
6. Speaking of the battle of Marathon, Herodotus used the words, *Καλλίμαχος, ὁ κνάμῳ λαχὼν πολέμαρχος εἴη*. Point out the difficulty involved in the phrase.
7. Briefly state what is known of the war between Athens and Aegina, its causes and results.
8. In what ways, if at all, were the Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, better prepared to resist the Persians in 480 B.C. than in earlier years?
9. Mention any states of Hellas which declined to join in the resistance to Xerxes, and account for their several attitudes.
10. An account of the movements of the Greek and Persian armaments in 480 B.C., up to the occupation of Athens by Xerxes.
11. What were the leading features of the policy of Themistocles, and how did he come into collision with other leaders of the democratic party?

12. Describe, with the help of an outline plan, the battle of Salamis.
13. Criticise the accounts of the alleged intercourse between Themistocles and the Persian commanders immediately before and after the battle of Salamis.
14. What do you know of Xanthippus, Eurybiades, Leonidas, Leotychides, Alexander?
15. Describe carefully the route of Xerxes in his march to Athens.
16. What were the events which led immediately to the formation of the Confederacy of Delos?
17. An account of the battle of Plataea. Illustrate your description by the help of a plan.
18. How far was the ascendancy of Athens after 480 B.C. due to the policy of Themistocles and Aristides respectively?
19. Criticise the conduct of Sparta in the matter of the invasions of 490 and 480 B.C.
20. Some account of the original constitution and constituents of the Delian League.
21. Mention, with dates, any occasions subsequent to the battle of Mycale on which the Persians again came into collision with the Greeks.
22. Show the geographical position and historical importance of the following :—Anopaea, Psyttalea, Scyros, Artemisium, Paros, Mycale, Eion, Byzantium.
23. Give a short account of the life of Pausanias, with particular regard to the circumstances of his deposition and death.
24. What causes may be advanced to account for the inactivity of Sparta during the early years of the growth of the Athenian power?
25. Give an outline of the course of party politics in Athens from 490 to 462 B.C. To what causes did Cimon owe his fall from power?
26. Discuss the reasons for Themistocles' loss of influence after 479 B.C., and his subsequent banishment.
27. Write a short life of Themistocles. What were the main features of his *foreign* policy, and how did he seek to put it into effect?
28. Criticise the common account of the relations of Themistocles with Persia.

29. What may be supposed to have been the purpose and scope of the constitutional reforms attributed to Ephialtes?

30. What is meant by *Cleruchies*, and what was their purpose? Mention the more important of these settlements up to 437 B.C.

31. Mention any instances in which the articles of the Delian Confederacy may seem to have been violated prior to the year 454 B.C.

32. Give an outline of the growth, extent, and collapse of the Athenian Territorial Power.

33. To what extent did the Athenians succeed in undermining the hegemony of Sparta within the Peloponnese?

34. What events do you associate with the following names?—Oenophyta, Tanagra, Eretria, Carystus, Eurymedon, Halieis, Thasos, Prosopitis. Define the geographical position of each.

35. What is known of the relations of Athens with Egypt during this period?

36. Describe, with dates, the circumstances attending the battles of (a) the Eurymedon and (b) Cyprian Salamis.

37. Quote any instances to prove the decline of the authority of the monarchy in Sparta during this period.

38. The causes and course of the revolt of Samos.

39. What reasons may be adduced for the gradual change which brought the bulk of the members of the Delian League into the condition of subjects of Athens?

40. How would you account for the peculiarly privileged position accorded to the islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, in the Delian League?

41. Briefly outline the constitution of the Delian League as it was in 445 B.C., pointing out the chief departures from the original constitution.

42. Discuss the merits and demerits of the attitude of Athens towards her allies in regard to (a) finance, (b) judicial procedure, in the days of Pericles.

43. What changes did Pericles introduce into judicial arrangements in Athens? Criticise their value.

44. Examine the assertion that "Ephialtes and Pericles destroyed the power of the Areopagus."

45. In what way may the limitation of the authority of the Areopagus be supposed to have reacted upon the stability of the democracy in Athens?

46. Point out any modifications in the character and composition of the Archonate of Athens during the present period.

47. Adduce any facts which assist us in determining whether Aristides was or was not a democratic leader.

48. Sketch the position of the office of Strategus in the days of Pericles, showing in what way it had developed.

49. Give an outline of the Athenian constitution as it was in the later years of Pericles.

50. What external circumstances led to the final victory of the party of Pericles over the opposition in 445 B.C.?

51. Define the leading points in the internal policy of Pericles.

52. Describe the leading ideas which guided the foreign policy of Pericles.

53. Discuss the problems involved in the so-called Peace of Callias.

54. What evidence may be adduced against the alleged conclusion of peace between Persia and Athens after the battle of Cyprian Salamis?

55. Relate in chronological order the events of the years 446, 445 B.C.

56. Mention any attempts of Athens to establish her power in the north-west of the Aegean. What were the reasons for these attempts, and their results?

57. Describe the invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians 480 B.C.

58. Draw an outline map of Sicily, showing the position of the more important Greek colonies and Carthaginian fortresses.

59. What do you know of Phalaris, Micythus, Anaxilaus, Ducetius, Thero, and Hamilcar?

60. What is known of the constitution of Carthage in the fifth century B.C.?

61. Discuss the attitude of Gelo towards the Greeks of the mainland in regard to the embassy of 481 B.C.

62. What events are associated with, or what is the

geographical position of, the following?—Himera, Cumae, the Strymon, Pagasae, Priene, Sinope, Panticaeum, Ithome.

63. What is known of the organisation of the Athenian Confederacy for purposes of finance about the year 450 B.C.?

64. Mention the chief grievances which could be advanced by the subject-members of the Athenian League in the days of Pericles, and discuss their reality.

65. Adduce any facts to prove whether the populations of the subject-states of the Athenian League were contented with their position or not.

66. Discuss the conduct of Pericles in his appropriation of the funds of the Athenian League.

67. What were the principal items of revenue and expenditure in Athens in Pericles' time?

68. Write a life of Cimon, with special reference to his work as (a) a statesman and (b) a general.

69. Adduce any reasons for the failure of the Persian attacks upon Greece.

70. Describe the fortifications of Athens, distinguishing those portions due respectively to Themistocles, to Cimon, and to Pericles.

71. Describe any one great work of art in Periclean Athens.

72. Draw a sketch map of Athens and her ports, marking the principal sites within the city.

73. Compare Cimon and Pericles in regard to the improvements which they effected in Athens.

74. What is known of the life of Aeschylus? What were his political views, and how are these reflected in his remaining writings?

75. Write a brief account of the origin of Tragedy and Comedy.

76. What is meant by Satyric Drama? How did it differ from Comedy?

77. What do you know of the life and writings of Pindar?

78. What causes led to the first development of prose writing in Ionia rather than in any other part of Hellas?

79. Give some account of the life and work of Herodotus.

80. What do you know of the following:—Thespis, Phrynicus, Epicharmus, Gorgias, Simonides of Ceos, Hesiod, and Democritus?

81. Mention anything which you know in regard to Anaxagoras, Hippodamus, Polygnotus, Mnesicles, Ictinus, Empedocles, Myron, and Sophron.

82. What events are associated with the following:—Paros, Cecryphalea, Dipaca, Laurium, Sestus, Doriscus, the White Fortress, and Sybota?

83. Mention, with dates, any facts connected with the following:—Ephialtes of Malis, Thucydides son of Melesias, Thrasybulus of Syracuse, Callias, Artemisia, Xanthippus, Agnon.

84. Briefly indicate the course of events which led to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

85. Indicate any reasons for the hostility existing between Athens and Sparta in the year 432 B.C.

86. In what sense did Pericles maintain the policy laid down by Themistocles?

87. "The allies of Athens were responsible for their own abasement." Criticise this remark.

88. What may be gathered as to the history of Argos during this period?

89. To what extent is it true that the hegemony of Athens was identified with democratic forms of government amongst her dependents?

90. "After the time of Ephialtes the Athenian democracy became increasingly more unbridled." Explain and discuss this remark of Aristotle's.

91. Mention any authorities and sources for the history of this period.

92. How far did Pericles realise his ambition to make Athens the centre of the Greek world?

93. In what sense may Pericles be spoken of as the monarch of Athens?

94. State what is known of the cause, course, and date of the Third Messenian War.

95. Construct a chronological table to show on what occasions in this period Athens and Sparta came into collision.

96. Relate the circumstances attending the revolt of Naxos, and indicate their importance as evidence for the condition of the Delian League at that date.

97. What was the extent of the Athenian Empire at its greatest?

98. Mention any of the means whereby Pericles sought to carry out his policy of consolidation in regard to the Athenian Empire.

99. Estimate the position and character of Pericles.

100. Translate the following excerpts, and write a historical commentary on each:—

(a) πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήιων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν δρόμῳ ἐσ πολεμίους ἔχρησαντο, πρῶτοι δὲ ἀιέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν δρέοντες καὶ ἄλι δρασ τοὺς ταῦτα ἐσθημέοντος.

(b) παραλαβὼν δὲ ὁ Μιλτιαδῆς τὴν στρατιὴν ἐπλεε ἐπὶ Πάροι, πρόφασιν ἔχων ὡς οἱ Πάριοι ὑπῆρξαν πρότεροι στρατευόμενοι τριήρει ἐσ Μαραθῶνα ἄμα τῷ Ηέροι τοῦτο μὲν δὴ πρόσχημα λόγου ἦν.

(c) οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστὰς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, Λιαγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

(d) διαβολὴν καθ' αὐτοῦ παρέσχεν, ὡς ἄρα Θεμιστοκλῆς το δόρυν καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα τῶν πολιτῶν παρελόμενος εἰς ὑπηρέσιον καὶ λώπην συνέστειλε τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον.

(e) Ὡς ξ?ν, ὁ γέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε κείμεθα, τοῖς κείνων ρήμασι πειθόμενοι.

(f) Ἑλληνοταραία τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή, οἱ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον, οὔτω γὰρ ὥιομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά, ἦν δὲ ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἔξι ἱκοντα.

(g) Θάσιοι δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει πολιορκούμενοι ώμολόγησαν Ἀθηναίοις τεχνός τε καθελόντες καὶ ναῦς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦνται αὐτίκα ταξάμενοι καὶ τὸ λιμπόν φέρειν, τὴν τε ἡπειρον καὶ τὰ μέταλλα ἀφέντες.

(h) καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς.

(i) ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχῆ.

(k) τῶν δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ὑπολοίτων οἱ τε πρεσβύτατοι καὶ οἱ νεώτατοι ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα Μυρωνίδου στρατηγοῦντος.

(l) ἀναχωρήσαντες δὲ ἀπ' Εἴβωνας οὐ πολλῷ ὑστερον σπουδὰς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους κοὶ τοὺς ἔνυμάχους τριακοντούτεις ἀποδόντες Νίσαιαν ~~καὶ Τηγύδας~~ καὶ Τροιζῆνα καὶ Ἀχαίαν.

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